DCSync is not a vulnerability but the abuse of a legitimate feature. An attacker with sufficient privileges (typically Domain Admin or similar) mimics a Domain Controller (DC) to request password hashes from another DC.
Using the Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (MS-DRSR), the attacker can pull the NTLM hash of any account, most importantly the krbtgt account hash, which is the foundation for further Kerberos attacks.
A Golden Ticket is a forged Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). To create it, the attacker needs the krbtgt account hash, obtained via DCSync or LSASS dump on a DC.
Identify the Breach: Confirm the compromise of the Domain Controller.
First krbtgt Reset: Change the password of the krbtgt account. This invalidates current TGTs but allows for a transition period.
Second krbtgt Reset: Wait for replication (usually 24h) and reset the password a second time. This is mandatory to clear out the previous hash and fully invalidate all forged Golden Tickets.