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Inter-Agent Mutual Authentication & Hardware Attestation

Density:
+----------------------------+ +----------------------------+
| Agent Node A (Proposer) | | Agent Node B (Verifier) |
| (TPM 2.0 / SEV-SNP Enclave)| | (TPM 2.0 / SEV-SNP Enclave)|
+----------------------------+ +----------------------------+
| |
| 1. TLS 1.3 Handshake (mTLS with X25519) |
|<=================================================>|
| |
| 2. Challenge Nonce (256-bit CSPRNG) |
|<--------------------------------------------------|
| |
| 3. Hardware Attestation Quote |
| - PCR 0-7, 10 Digests |
| - Firmware Measurement Log |
| - VCEK / AK Signature over Nonce |
|-------------------------------------------------->|
| |
| 4. Verification against Hardware Vendor Root PKI |
| (AMD KDS / TCG CA / Intel PCS) |
| |
| 5. Issue SPIFFE SVID (TTL = 1800s) |
|<--------------------------------------------------|
| |
| === SECURE AGENT COMMUNICATION CHANNEL OPEN === |

  • Standard: TCG TPM2 Attestation Quote.
  • PCR Registers Monitored:
    • PCR 0-3: Core UEFI firmware and platform initialization.
    • PCR 4-5: OS bootloader and kernel integrity.
    • PCR 7: Secure Boot state and enforcement certificates.
    • PCR 10: Immutable agent binary execution hash.
  • Quote Verification: Comparison against baseline golden hash computed during verifiable container build.
  • Standard: AMD SEV-SNP Hardware Measurement & Versioned Chip Endorsement Key (VCEK).
  • Protection Boundary: Hypervisor-isolated confidential execution; memory is encrypted in-flight with hardware-generated AES-128 keys.
  • Verification: Direct validation against AMD Key Distribution Service (KDS) certificate authority.
  • Standard: Intel DCAP (Data Center Attestation Primitives) with ECDSA remote quotes.
  • Measurement: MRENCLAVE (cryptographic hash of code and data inside the enclave) and MRSIGNER (public key hash of the enclave author).

Every agent node is dynamically issued an X.509 SVID formatted as:

spiffe://hermes.internal/agent/<subsystem>/<node-id>

Example: spiffe://hermes.internal/agent/edge-sentinel/node-01

  • Ephemeral Key TTL: Maximum 1,800 seconds (30 minutes) for critical IAM wardens; maximum 3,600 seconds for perimeter sentinels.
  • Automated Revocation: If any hardware quote fails or memory anomaly is detected, the HSM Ledger Auditor immediately broadcasts a signed Certificate Revocation List (CRL) across the swarm mesh within 250 milliseconds.