CVE-2024-28224: Ollama Local Daemon DNS Rebinding API Authorization Bypass
HERMES THREAT SCORE & LOCAL INFERENCE INFRASTRUCTURE RISK
Target:Ollama Local LLM Inference Daemon (versions antรฉrieures ร 0.1.29) NVD catalogs this vulnerability as High severity (CVSS 8.8). Hermes evaluates CVE-2024-28224 at an HTS of 86 (CRITICAL) and an Agentic Score of 84 (CRITICAL). Local AI runners like Ollama are deployed on millions of developer and workstation endpoints. By abusing DNS rebinding, remote websites completely bypass browser Same-Origin Policy (SOP), effectively turning localhost:11434 into an unauthenticated remote execution bridge.
CVE-2024-28224: Ollama Local Daemon DNS Rebinding API Authorization BypassVULNERABILITY
Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.
๐ Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“Confirmed security vulnerability in Ollama Local LLM Runner documented in Hermes dossier.”
- [vulnerability_report]
- [government_confirmation]CISA verified active exploitation in the wild and mandated federal remediation deadline in KEV entry. — Source: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA Adds CVE-2026-59822 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Reliability: VERY_HIGH)
Adversary embeds covert payload instructions into retrieved external data (web pages, repositories, emails) that subvert model planning when parsed by autonomous agents.
๐ Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“CVE-2024-28224 weaponizes the agentic attack pattern formalized under AAP-002.”
- [technical_analysis]Pillar Security demonstrated that executing export BASH_ENV in Auto-Run causes bash to source hostile payloads upon subsequent commands. — Source: Pillar Security Research: Bypassing Cursor Auto-Run: When Shell Built-ins Lead to Host RCE (Reliability: HIGH)
1. Identification & Architectural Vulnerability
Section titled โ1. Identification & Architectural Vulnerabilityโ| Parameter | Technical Specification | Operational Impact |
|---|---|---|
| CVE Identifier | CVE-2024-28224 | Official MITRE / NVD entry |
| Associated CWEs | CWE-346: Origin Validation ErrorCWE-350: Reverse DNS Reliance | Local service control via external browser session |
| CVSS v3.1 Score | 8.8 HIGH | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| Hermes Threat Score (HTS) | 86 / 100 (CRITICAL) | Widespread exposure across AI developer laptops |
| Hermes Agentic Score (HASS) | 84 / 100 (CRITICAL) | Unauthorized model tampering and prompt extraction |
| Affected Software | ollama:ollama | Versions antรฉrieures ร 0.1.29 |
| Fixed Version | 0.1.29 | Host header validation and Origin whitelisting |
| Research Credit | NCC Group | Cybersecurity research advisory |
2. Technical Mechanism: The DNS Rebinding Primitive
Section titled โ2. Technical Mechanism: The DNS Rebinding PrimitiveโDNS rebinding allows an attacker to bypass the browserโs Same-Origin Policy (SOP) by manipulating the Time-To-Live (TTL) of a domain name:
graph TD User["Victim Developer"] -->|1. Visits attacker.com| AttackerDNS["Attacker Authoritative DNS (TTL=0)"] AttackerDNS -->|2. Resolves first to Attacker IP| AttackerSite["Attacker Web Server (Delivers JS Payload)"] AttackerSite -->|3. Second DNS lookup resolves to 127.0.0.1| Localhost["Localhost 127.0.0.1:11434 (Ollama Daemon)"] Localhost -->|4. Browser executes API commands| Exfil["Steal Prompts, Delete Models, DoS Memory"]Attack Workflow
Section titled โAttack Workflowโ- The victim visits
attacker.com. The attackerโs nameserver returns the attackerโs public IP address with a DNS TTL of0seconds. - The browser downloads the attackerโs JavaScript code.
- The JavaScript initiates continuous fetch requests to the same origin (
attacker.com). When the browserโs DNS cache expires, the second DNS request resolves to127.0.0.1. - Because the browser perceives both requests as having the same hostname origin, it permits cross-request inspection.
- Because Ollama did not validate that the HTTP
Hostheader waslocalhostor127.0.0.1, it accepted requests addressed toHost: attacker.comand executed commands such as:GET /api/tags(enumerate all local models)POST /api/generate(issue prompts and exfiltrate responses)DELETE /api/delete(destroy local model weights)POST /api/pull(download rogue model weights containing backdoors)
3. Detection & Forensic Indicators
Section titled โ3. Detection & Forensic IndicatorsโNetwork & DNS Traces
Section titled โNetwork & DNS Tracesโ- DNS Telemetry: Look for domains resolving to
127.0.0.1or::1with abnormally short TTL values (0sor1s). - Endpoint Traffic: Local loopback HTTP traffic on port
11434with non-localhostHostheaders (Host: *.comor alphanumeric domain names).
4. Remediation & Hardening Roadmap
Section titled โ4. Remediation & Hardening RoadmapโUpgrade Ollama to version 0.1.29 or later:
# On macOS / Linuxcurl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | shConfigure local DNS resolvers (e.g., dnsmasq, Unbound, or enterprise firewalls) with DNS rebinding protection (stop-dns-rebind), blocking external domain queries from resolving to private RFC 1918 or loopback IP ranges.
Bind Ollama strictly to explicit localhost interfaces and restrict API access behind token-authenticated gateways when exposed to networks.