CVE-2026-100868: Penpot MCP Bridge Unauthenticated WebSocket Access and Agentic Task Poisoning
HERMES THREAT SCORE & AGENTIC PIPELINE COMPROMISE
Target:Penpot Design Platform - Model Context Protocol (MCP) WebSocket Bridge CVSS v3.1 rates this flaw at 6.3 (Medium) by evaluating it under adjacent network access and partial CIA impacts. However, the Hermes Threat Score elevates it to 84 (HIGH), while the Agentic Security Score (HASS) rates it at 88 (HIGH). In an AI-augmented design-to-code pipeline, the Penpot Model Context Protocol (MCP) bridge serves as the authoritative interface connecting frontier LLMs (Claude, Cursor, Copilot) to enterprise design systems. Because the WebSocket bridge binds to 0.0.0.0 without authentication in single-user mode, any adjacent container or cross-site WebSocket attacker can intercept agent tool invocations, exfiltrate design intellectual property, and inject weaponized UI components directly into automated coding workflows.
CVE-2026-100868: Penpot MCP Bridge Unauthenticated WebSocket Access and Agentic Task PoisoningVULNERABILITY
Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.
๐ Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“Confirmed security vulnerability in Penpot Design Platform & MCP documented in Hermes dossier.”
- [vulnerability_report]
- [government_confirmation]CISA verified active exploitation in the wild and mandated federal remediation deadline in KEV entry. — Source: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA Adds CVE-2026-59822 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Reliability: VERY_HIGH)
1. Technical Context & Affected Software Matrix
Section titled โ1. Technical Context & Affected Software MatrixโPenpot is widely adopted by engineering teams as an open-source alternative to Figma, frequently coupled with LLM agents via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to automate the translation of visual mockups into React, Vue, and Tailwind code.
| Parameter | Technical Specification | Operational Impact |
|---|---|---|
| CVE Identifier | CVE-2026-100868 | Global vulnerability tracking reference |
| Advisory Source | VulnCheck Advisory & NVD | Disclosed September 28, 2026 |
| Vulnerable Package | penpot (< 2.18.0), @penpot/mcp (<= 2.15.4) | MCP Server Plugin WebSocket Bridge |
| Fixed Version | Penpot 2.18.0 / @penpot/mcp 2.15.5 | Restricts binding to 127.0.0.1 & enforces tokens |
| Vulnerability Class | CWE-1327 / CWE-306 | Insecure Network Binding & Missing Authentication |
| Target Protocol | Model Context Protocol (MCP) over WebSocket | AI agent tool invocation channel |
2. In-Depth Technical Decomposition
Section titled โ2. In-Depth Technical DecompositionโThe MCP Architecture in Modern AI Design Workflows
Section titled โThe MCP Architecture in Modern AI Design WorkflowsโThe Model Context Protocol (MCP), developed by Anthropic, establishes a standardized client-server protocol enabling LLM agents to query contextual systems and invoke external tools. In Penpotโs architecture, an MCP server (@penpot/mcp) bridges external AI agents with the live Penpot web workspace:
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ โ AI AGENT CLIENT โ โ PENPOT MCP SERVER BRIDGE โ โ (Claude Code/Cursor) โโโStdio/SSEโโบโ (@penpot/mcp) โ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ โ WebSocket (Port 4400) Bound to 0.0.0.0: NO AUTH! โ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโดโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ โ โ โผ โผ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ โ LEGITIMATE PENPOT BROWSER โ โ MALICIOUS ACTOR โ โ (Authentic Design Canvas) โ โ (Container / Subnet Pivot) โ โ โ โ Injects Poisoned UI Models โ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโRoot Cause Analysis: Unrestricted Binding & Null Authentication
Section titled โRoot Cause Analysis: Unrestricted Binding & Null AuthenticationโIn @penpot/mcp prior to version 2.15.5, the WebSocket bridge server initialization script instantiated the ws server with default parameters:
// Vulnerable Implementation in @penpot/mcp (<= 2.15.4)import { WebSocketServer } from 'ws';
export function startMcpBridge(port: number = 4400, isSingleUser: boolean = false) { // CRITICAL FLAW (CWE-1327): Host defaults to '0.0.0.0' when omitted! const wss = new WebSocketServer({ port: port, // host: '127.0.0.1' is omitted! });
wss.on('connection', (ws, req) => { // CRITICAL FLAW (CWE-306): Missing token validation in single-user mode if (isSingleUser) { console.log('[MCP Bridge] Client connected in single-user mode. Skipping auth.'); registerPluginSession(ws); return; }
// Normal multi-user token validation... });}Because host was omitted, Node.js bound the socket to INADDR_ANY (0.0.0.0). When developers launched Penpot in single-user or self-hosted dev environments, the authentication check was completely disabled.
3. Attack Vectors & Real-World Exploitation Flow
Section titled โ3. Attack Vectors & Real-World Exploitation FlowโAn attacker sharing the developerโs Wi-Fi network, an adjacent Docker container on the same host bridge network, or an external website utilizing Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) can establish an unauthorized session:
sequenceDiagram autonumber actor Attacker as Malicious Actor (Adjacent Network) participant Bridge as @penpot/mcp Bridge (ws://host:4400) participant Agent as Autonomous AI Agent (Cursor / Claude) participant Codebase as Target Source Code Repository
Attacker->>Bridge: 1. Connect to WebSocket port 4400 (No credentials requested) Bridge->>Attacker: 2. Accept connection & assign active plugin handle Agent->>Bridge: 3. Invoke MCP tool: "get_component_specs(id='login-form')" Bridge->>Attacker: 4. Forward task payload to attacker WebSocket Attacker->>Bridge: 5. Return crafted vector specs containing hidden credential-stealer script Bridge->>Agent: 6. Pass poisoned tool result to AI reasoning loop Agent->>Codebase: 7. Commit synthesized frontend code with attacker backdoorReal-World Threat Scenarios
Section titled โReal-World Threat Scenariosโ- Agent Tool Poisoning: The adversary intercepts
get_selected_shapesorexport_pagetool calls from the AI agent and substitutes legitimate SVG paths with poisoned attributes (e.g., hiddenonerrortriggers or CSS exfiltration callbacks). - Design Intellectual Property Theft: The attacker queries the Penpot workspace through the hijacked bridge to dump unreleased design mockups, wireframes, and corporate branding assets.
- Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH): If a developer visits a malicious website while running Penpot locally, client-side JavaScript executing in the developerโs browser can open a WebSocket to
ws://localhost:4400, exfiltrating workspace data without triggering Same-Origin Policy (SOP) blocks.
4. Forensic Triage & Multi-Platform Detection
Section titled โ4. Forensic Triage & Multi-Platform Detectionโtitle: Unexpected Inbound WebSocket Connection to Penpot MCP Bridgeid: 4e8190c2-1008-468a-b868-penpotmcp001status: experimentaldescription: Detects non-loopback inbound network connections to the Penpot MCP bridge daemon port 4400.author: Hermes Codex Cyber Defense Teamdate: 2026-09-28logsource: category: network_connection product: linuxdetection: selection: DestinationPort: 4400 Protocol: tcp filter_localhost: SourceIp: - '127.0.0.1' - '::1' condition: selection and not filter_localhostfalsepositives: - Legitimate remote browser plugins configured across private development subnetslevel: hightags: - attack.lateral_movement - attack.t1021 - attack.defense_evasion - attack.t1557// Identify unauthorized external IP connections to Penpot MCP portsDeviceNetworkEvents| where LocalPort == 4400| where RemoteIPType != "Loopback"| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName| sort by TimeGenerated desc# 1. Verify if Penpot MCP bridge is listening on all interfaces (0.0.0.0)ss -tlpn | grep -E "4400|penpot"
# 2. Check Docker container port publishing rulesdocker ps --filter "ancestor=penpot/frontend" --format "table {{.Names}}\t{{.Ports}}"
# 3. Inspect active WebSocket connections to the MCP bridgelsof -i :44005. Hardening & Remediation Playbook
Section titled โ5. Hardening & Remediation Playbookโ-
Upgrade Penpot and
@penpot/mcp: Upgrade your deployment to Penpot version 2.18.0 or later. If deploying the MCP bridge independently, ensure@penpot/mcpis updated to version 2.15.5 or higher. -
Explicitly Bind to Loopback (127.0.0.1): When configuring local development setups or Docker compose files, bind published ports strictly to the loopback interface:
ports:- "127.0.0.1:4400:4400" -
Enforce WebSocket Token Authentication: Configure a persistent shared secret (
PENPOT_MCP_AUTH_TOKEN) in the environment variables and ensure the Penpot plugin handshake transmits the bearer token upon socket connection. -
Audit Agent Code Outputs: Review recent git commits synthesized by LLM agents (Cursor, Copilot, Claude Code) for anomalous SVG inline scripts, unexpected external asset references, or altered UI endpoints.
6. What Hermes Does Not Know (Analytical Uncertainty)
Section titled โ6. What Hermes Does Not Know (Analytical Uncertainty)โ- โ Total deployment scale of single-user MCP bridges: Because Penpot development instances often run in local Docker environments without public DNS records, total exposed instance counts on public search engines remain conservative.
- โ Automated prompt injection payload catalogs: It is unknown whether commercial threat actors maintain standardized weaponization templates tailored specifically for Penpot vector objects versus generic HTML/SVG injections.
- โ Detection efficacy in air-gapped dev containers: The capability of corporate EDR agents to intercept intra-container WebSocket traffic without eBPF network instrumentation is highly variable across customer estates.