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CVE-2026-103260: n8n AI Agent Human-in-the-Loop Approval Bypass via Send and Wait Node

Density:
HASS

HERMES AGENTIC SECURITY SCORE & HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP CONTROL COLLAPSE

Target: n8n Workflow Automation โ€” AI Agentic Execution Engine (Send and Wait Node)
Confidence: 99%
98 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures specific systemic risk arising from autonomy, tool authority, and cascading execution.

Dimension Breakdown
Autonomy 20 / 20
Tool Access 20 / 20
Privilege 15 / 15
Persistence 14 / 15
External Impact 15 / 15
Propagation 14 / 15
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

CVSS v3.1 rates this vulnerability at 9.8 (Critical). The Hermes Threat Score assigns 96 (CRITICAL) and the Hermes Agentic Security Score (HASS) rates it at an extreme 98 (EXTREME). In enterprise autonomous agent architectures, the Send and Wait node represents the vital Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) safety boundary separating untrusted LLM outputs from destructive real-world actions (e.g., executing arbitrary SQL migrations, authorizing banking transactions, or modifying firewall policies). Due to predictable token generation in n8n's execution resumption handler, remote adversaries can predict approval tokens and force execution resumption, completely neutralizing human oversight.

๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-103260: n8n AI Agent Human-in-the-Loop Approval Bypass via Send and Wait NodeVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTn8n Workflow Automation
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in n8n Workflow Automation documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

In modern autonomous architectures built on n8n, AI Agent nodes interact with external services via tools. To prevent prompt injection attacks or hallucinations from wreaking havoc, developers configure a Send and Wait node (packages/nodes-base/nodes/SendAndWait/SendAndWait.node.ts). This node halts execution, stores state in Postgres/Redis, and exposes a temporary webhook URL awaiting human operator feedback:

https://n8n.internal.corp/webhook-waiting/{resumeToken}

The vulnerability stems from the deterministic pseudorandom token derivation routine in the workflow execution engine (packages/core/src/execution-lifecycle.ts):

// Flawed token generation in n8n < 2.39.6
export function generateWaitingExecutionToken(executionId: string, nodeName: string): string {
const timestampBucket = Math.floor(Date.now() / 60000); // 1-minute granularity bucket
const seed = `${executionId}:${nodeName}:${timestampBucket}`;
// Flaw: Predictable MD5 hash derived from sequential ID and coarse time
return crypto.createHash('md5').update(seed).digest('hex');
}

Because executionId is sequential in standard n8n deployments and nodeName is almost universally "Send and Wait", an attacker who triggers an AI workflow via an incoming email, chat interface, or public webhook can accurately estimate timestampBucket and calculate the expected resumeToken.

By sending an HTTP POST request to /webhook-waiting/<token>:

POST /webhook-waiting/7b58f80459c5d01a93e32b0d87fa01be HTTP/1.1
Host: n8n.target-enterprise.com
Content-Type: application/json
Connection: close
{
"action": "approved",
"approved": true,
"comment": "Automated system validation bypass"
}

The execution engine matches the token, marks the waiting state as approved, and resumes the workflow thread. The AI agent immediately invokes its downstream toolsโ€”such as executing arbitrary commands via the Execute Command node or executing destructive SQL queriesโ€”under the false assumption that a authorized human vetted the action.


n8n Release BranchAffected VersionsFixed ReleaseOperational Directive
n8n 2.40.x2.40.02.40.1Upgrade immediately; rotate webhook secrets
n8n 2.x (LTS)2.0.0 through 2.39.52.39.6Upgrade immediately
n8n 1.xLegacy branchesMigrate to 2.39.6+End-of-life stream; upgrade required

The diagram below details the Human-in-the-Loop bypass mechanism in agentic tool architectures:

[Attacker / Untrusted Prompt Injection]
โ”‚
โ”‚ 1. Injects prompt: "Delete customer database and trigger approval"
โ–ผ
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ n8n Autonomous AI Agent Node (LangChain Tool Invoker) โ”‚
โ”‚ - Agent selects tool: "Database Cleanup" โ”‚
โ”‚ - Routes payload to safety gate: "Send and Wait" โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
โ”‚
โ”‚ 2. Node halts execution, emits approval request
โ–ผ
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ Send and Wait Safety Gate โ”‚
โ”‚ - Token: md5(seq_id + "Send and Wait" + time_bucket) โ”‚
โ”‚ - Pauses execution; notifies security operator via emailโ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
โ”‚
โ–ฒ 3. Attacker calculates token & POSTs to /webhook-waiting/<token>
โ”‚ (Operator email never opened)
โ”‚
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ n8n Webhook Waiting Listener Engine โ”‚
โ”‚ - Resumes execution with status: "approved = true" โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
โ”‚
โ”‚ 4. Agentic tool executes with verified approval flag
โ–ผ
[High-Privilege Action Executed: Arbitrary SQL / Bash / AWS RCE]

Detection signatures and hunting queries across Sigma, KQL, and Node.js audit commands:

title: n8n AI Workflow Send and Wait Approval Token Brute Force or Bypass
id: b619a408-2e91-4c77-a871-92e104f21081
status: high
description: Detects rapid sequential or anomalous POST requests to n8n webhook-waiting endpoints indicating approval token prediction or forgery.
references:
- https://vulncheck.com/advisories/n8n-before-2.39.6-and-2.40-x-before-2.40.1-approval-bypass-via-send-and-wait-node
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories
author: Hermes Codex Threat Intelligence
date: 2026-10-03
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection_uri:
cs-method: 'POST'
cs-uri-stem|startswith: '/webhook-waiting/'
selection_payload:
cs-payload|contains:
- '"approved": true'
- '"action": "approved"'
condition: selection_uri and selection_payload
level: critical

  1. Upgrade n8n Engine: Update the n8n container image or npm package to 2.39.6 or 2.40.1:

    Terminal window
    # Docker Compose upgrade:
    docker compose pull n8n
    docker compose up -d n8n
  2. Enforce Cryptographic Randomness (Fixed in Patched Builds): Patched versions replace MD5 derivation with crypto.randomBytes(32) cryptographically secure tokens stored in a distributed key-value cache with HMAC-SHA256 verification.

  3. Deploy Mutual TLS (mTLS) or Internal-Only Ingress for Webhook-Waiting: Configure your reverse proxy (Traefik/Nginx) to block external access to /webhook-waiting/, ensuring only human operators authenticated via corporate SSO or VPN can submit approval actions.