CVE-2026-104736: LearnPress WordPress LMS Plugin Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection via checkout-email Deserialization
Critical unauthenticated PHP Object Injection flaw (CVSS 9.8) in the LearnPress WordPress LMS plugin through version 4.4.10. During guest checkout (?lp-ajax=checkout), LP_Checkout::process_checkout_handler() reads the checkout-email parameter without email filtering and saves it to the user session via maybe_serialize() prior to nonce verification. Because maybe_serialize() passes already-serialized strings through unchanged, subsequent calls to LP_Session_Handler::get() invoke PHP unserialize() with allowed_classes unrestricted, triggering POP gadget chains for Remote Code Execution.
HERMES THREAT SCORE & WEB CMS INFRASTRUCTURE EVALUATION
Target:LearnPress WordPress LMS Plugin Checkout & Session Handler (inc/class-lp-checkout.php & inc/class-lp-session-handler.php) CVSS v3.1 scores CVE-2026-104736 at 9.8 (Critical), and the Hermes Threat Score aligns closely at 92 (CRITICAL). LearnPress is deployed across more than 90,000 corporate training portals, universities, and e-learning platforms. Two subtle architectural mistakes make CVE-2026-104736 trivially exploitable without credentials or nonces: (1) LP_Checkout::process_checkout_handler() calls session->set('checkout-email', ...) before validate_checkout_fields() ever verifies the learn-press-checkout-nonce, and (2) WordPress's core maybe_serialize() helper checks is_serialized() and returns already-serialized strings untouchedโdelivering the attacker's raw O:... payload directly to LP_Helper::maybe_unserialize() where @unserialize() was invoked without allowed_classes => false.
CVE-2026-104736: LearnPress WordPress LMS Plugin Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection via checkout-email DeserializationVULNERABILITY
Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.
๐ Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“Confirmed security vulnerability in Microsoft Office & 365 Apps documented in Hermes dossier.”
- [vulnerability_report]
- [government_confirmation]CISA verified active exploitation in the wild and mandated federal remediation deadline in KEV entry. — Source: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA Adds CVE-2026-59822 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Reliability: VERY_HIGH)
Executive Summary
Section titled โExecutive SummaryโOn October 16โ17, 2026, Patchstack and Wordfence Threat Intelligence disclosed CVE-2026-104736 (remediated in LearnPress 4.4.11 via WordPress Plugin Trac Changeset 3750024), a critical Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection vulnerability (CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data) affecting the LearnPress โ WordPress LMS Plugin (learnpress) in all versions up to and including 4.4.10 (CVSS v3.1 9.8 Critical).
LearnPress provides an unauthenticated AJAX checkout handler (?lp-ajax=checkout) to support guest course purchases. When handling a POST request in LP_Checkout::process_checkout_handler() (inc/class-lp-checkout.php), the plugin extracts the checkout-email parameter using LP_Request::get_param( 'checkout-email' ) without specifying an 'email' sanitization type and immediately stores the value into the visitorโs session via LearnPress::instance()->session->set( 'checkout-email', $this->_checkout_email )โbefore verifying the checkout CSRF nonce. Because LP_Session_Handler::set() wraps the value in WordPressโs maybe_serialize(), which leaves strings that already match PHP serialized syntax (is_serialized()) untouched, an attacker can store a raw serialized PHP object string (O:...) in the session and trigger unrestricted @unserialize() execution whenever session->get( 'checkout-email' ) is called.
Technical Vulnerability Mechanics
Section titled โTechnical Vulnerability MechanicsโRoot Cause 1: Pre-Nonce Session Persistence Without Email Type Filtering
Section titled โRoot Cause 1: Pre-Nonce Session Persistence Without Email Type FilteringโIn inc/class-lp-checkout.php (lines 389โ405 in version 4.4.10), LP_Checkout::process_checkout_handler() processes incoming POST requests to the checkout endpoint:
// VULNERABLE: inc/class-lp-checkout.php (LearnPress <= 4.4.10)public function process_checkout_handler() { if ( strtolower( $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] ) != 'post' ) { return; }
/** * Set default fields from request */ $this->payment_method_str = LP_Request::get_param( 'payment_method' ); $this->order_comment = LP_Request::get_param( 'order_comments' ); // FLAW 1: Calls get_param() without the 3rd argument ($type = 'email'), // defaulting to sanitize_text_field() which preserves PHP serialized strings! $this->_checkout_email = LP_Request::get_param( 'checkout-email' ); if ( $this->_checkout_email ) { // FLAW 2: Persists attacker input into the session BEFORE process_checkout() // and BEFORE validate_checkout_fields() checks learn-press-checkout-nonce! LearnPress::instance()->session->set( 'checkout-email', $this->_checkout_email ); }
// do checkout (where nonce verification actually occurs) $this->process_checkout();}Because LP_Request::get_param( 'checkout-email' ) omits the $type = 'email' parameter, LearnPress applies sanitize_text_field(), which strips HTML tags and line breaks but preserves double quotes ("), colons (:), semicolons (;), and braces ({})โleaving a serialized PHP object payload completely intact.
Root Cause 2: The WordPress maybe_serialize() Pass-Through Trap & Unrestricted unserialize()
Section titled โRoot Cause 2: The WordPress maybe_serialize() Pass-Through Trap & Unrestricted unserialize()โWhy doesnโt saving a string into the LearnPress session safely serialize the attackerโs payload as a harmless string (s:42:"O:8:...")? Look at LP_Session_Handler::set() and LP_Session_Handler::get() in inc/class-lp-session-handler.php (lines 373โ394):
// VULNERABLE: inc/class-lp-session-handler.php (Lines 373-394)public function set( string $key, $value, bool $force_change = false ) { if ( $value !== $this->get( $key ) ) { // WordPress core maybe_serialize($value) checks: // if ( is_serialized( $data ) ) { return $data; } // Because $value is ALREADY a valid serialized string ("O:..."), // maybe_serialize() returns the raw attacker payload unchanged! $this->_data[ sanitize_key( $key ) ] = maybe_serialize( $value ); $this->_dirty = true; if ( $force_change ) { $this->save_data(); } }}
public function get( string $key, $default = '' ) { $key = sanitize_key( $key ); return isset( $this->_data[ $key ] ) ? LP_Helper::maybe_unserialize( $this->_data[ $key ] ) : $default;}And inside inc/class-lp-helper.php (lines 25โ43 in <= 4.4.10), LP_Helper::maybe_unserialize() invoked native PHP unserialize() without restricting object instantiation:
// VULNERABLE: inc/class-lp-helper.php (LearnPress <= 4.4.10)public static function maybe_unserialize( $original ) { if ( is_serialized( $original ) ) { // FLAW 3 (CWE-502): Invokes @unserialize() without ['allowed_classes' => false]! return @unserialize( trim( $original ) ); } return $original;}Even within the same HTTP request, after session->set( 'checkout-email', ... ) executes, process_checkout() invokes validate_checkout_fields(), which checks $this->is_enable_guest_checkout() and calls $this->get_checkout_email()โwhich immediately executes LearnPress::instance()->session->get( 'checkout-email' ) and triggers @unserialize() on the attackerโs payload!
flowchart TD subgraph Attacker["Unauthenticated Remote Attacker"] POST["POST /?lp-ajax=checkout<br/>Body: checkout-email=O:21:\"Monolog\\Handler\\...\":1:{...}<br/>(No valid nonce or account required)"] end
subgraph LearnPress["LearnPress WordPress Plugin (<= 4.4.10)"] Handler["LP_Checkout::process_checkout_handler()<br/>LP_Request::get_param('checkout-email')<br/>Applies sanitize_text_field() โ preserves O:... syntax"] SessionSet["LP_Session_Handler::set('checkout-email', $val)<br/>Calls WordPress maybe_serialize($val)<br/>is_serialized($val) == true -> Stored UNCHANGED!"] SessionGet{"LP_Session_Handler::get('checkout-email')<br/>Calls LP_Helper::maybe_unserialize()<br/>@unserialize() without allowed_classes => false (CWE-502)"} POST --> Handler Handler -- "Executes BEFORE nonce check!" --> SessionSet SessionSet --> SessionGet end
subgraph Impact["WordPress CMS Compromise"] SessionGet --> POP["Instantiates Arbitrary PHP Gadget Chains<br/>(WooCommerce / Elementor / Monolog / Guzzle / WP Core)"] POP --> RCE["Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE),<br/>Arbitrary File Deletion (wp-config.php), or SQLi"] end
style SessionSet fill:#ff4d4d,stroke:#990000,color:#ffffff style SessionGet fill:#ff1a1a,stroke:#800000,color:#ffffffOfficial Patch Analysis (LearnPress 4.4.11 โ Trac Changeset 3750024)
Section titled โOfficial Patch Analysis (LearnPress 4.4.11 โ Trac Changeset 3750024)โThimPress remediated CVE-2026-104736 in version 4.4.11 (WordPress Plugin Trac Changeset 3750024) by applying defense-in-depth at both the input source (inc/class-lp-checkout.php) and the deserialization sink (inc/class-lp-helper.php):
--- a/learnpress/trunk/inc/class-lp-checkout.php+++ b/learnpress/trunk/inc/class-lp-checkout.php@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ $this->payment_method_str = LP_Request::get_param( 'payment_method' ); $this->order_comment = LP_Request::get_param( 'order_comments' );- $this->_checkout_email = LP_Request::get_param( 'checkout-email' );+ $this->_checkout_email = LP_Request::get_param( 'checkout-email', '', 'email' ); if ( $this->_checkout_email ) { LearnPress::instance()->session->set( 'checkout-email', $this->_checkout_email ); }--- a/learnpress/trunk/inc/class-lp-helper.php+++ b/learnpress/trunk/inc/class-lp-helper.php@@ -22,22 +22,22 @@- public static function maybe_unserialize( $original ) {+ public static function maybe_unserialize( $original, bool $allow_classes = false ) { if ( is_serialized( $original ) ) { $ fixed = preg_replace_callback( '!s:(\d+):"(.*?)";!', function ( $math ) { return 's:' . strlen( $math[2] ) . ':"' . $math[2] . '";'; }, $original );- $result = @unserialize( trim( $fixed ) );+ $result = @unserialize( trim( $fixed ), array( 'allowed_classes' => $allow_classes ) ); if ( ! $result ) {- $result = @unserialize( trim( $original ) );+ $result = @unserialize( trim( $original ), array( 'allowed_classes' => $allow_classes ) ); }
return $result; } return $original; }- Source Sanitization: Passing
'email'as the third argument toLP_Request::get_param()invokes WordPressโssanitize_email(), which strips double quotes ("), colons (:), semicolons (;), and braces ({}), rendering any PHP serialized string syntactically invalid. - Sink Hardening:
LP_Helper::maybe_unserialize()now defaults to$allow_classes = falseand passesarray( 'allowed_classes' => false )to@unserialize(), converting any serialized object into an inert__PHP_Incomplete_Classinstance without invoking magic methods (__wakeup(),__destruct(),__toString()).
Forensic Analysis & Detection Engineering
Section titled โForensic Analysis & Detection EngineeringโAdministrators managing WordPress sites with LearnPress installed should inspect web server access logs for POST requests to ?lp-ajax=checkout or /lp-checkout/ and audit the wp_learnpress_sessions database table for serialized object strings (O: or C:). Consult our guides on Initial Access TTPs and Linux Process Memory Analysis for web server post-exploitation triage.
title: LearnPress WordPress Plugin Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection via checkout-email (CVE-2026-104736)id: 6c4d9e81-1047-436a-9f12-learnpress36status: experimentaldescription: Detects unauthenticated HTTP POST requests to LearnPress checkout endpoints containing PHP serialized object strings in the checkout-email parameter exploiting CVE-2026-104736.references: - https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3750024/learnpress - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104736author: Hermes Threat Intelligencedate: 2026/10/18logsource: category: webserverdetection: selection_request: cs-method: 'POST' cs-uri-query|contains: - 'lp-ajax=checkout' - 'lp-checkout' selection_payload: request_body|contains: - 'checkout-email=O%3A' - 'checkout-email=O:' - 'checkout-email=C%3A' - 'checkout-email=C:' - 'checkout-email=a%3A' - 'checkout-email=a:' condition: selection_request or selection_payloadfalsepositives: - Legitimate guest checkout POST requests where checkout-email is a standard RFC 5322 email addresslevel: criticaltags: - attack.initial_access - attack.execution - attack.t1190 - cve.2026-104736#!/usr/bin/env bash# Hermes Forensic Triage Script for LearnPress CVE-2026-104736set -euo pipefail
WP_PATH="${1:-/var/www/html}"
echo "[*] 1. Checking installed LearnPress plugin version..."if [ -f "$WP_PATH/wp-content/plugins/learnpress/learnpress.php" ]; then grep -E "Version:" "$WP_PATH/wp-content/plugins/learnpress/learnpress.php" || truefi
echo "[*] 2. Auditing wp_learnpress_sessions table for PHP Object Injection payloads (O:... / C:...)..."if command -v wp >/dev/null 2>&1; then wp db query "SELECT session_id, session_key, session_value FROM wp_learnpress_sessions WHERE session_value LIKE '%checkout-email%' AND (session_value LIKE '%O:%' OR session_value LIKE '%C:%');" --path="$WP_PATH" || truefi
echo "[*] 3. Scanning Nginx / Apache access logs for ?lp-ajax=checkout POST requests..."grep -E "POST .*lp-ajax=checkout" /var/log/nginx/*access*.log /var/log/apache2/*access*.log 2>/dev/null | tail -n 30 || true# ModSecurity / OWASP CRS Virtual Patch for CVE-2026-104736 (LearnPress checkout-email POI)SecRule ARGS:checkout-email "@rx (?:^|[\s\"'])([O|C|a]:\d+:|s:\d+:\"[O|C]:\d+:)" \ "id:2026104736,\ phase:2,\ deny,\ status:403,\ t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:trim,\ msg:'Hermes WAF: Blocked LearnPress Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in checkout-email (CVE-2026-104736)',\ tag:'cve-2026-104736',\ severity:'CRITICAL'"Remediation & Hardening Directives
Section titled โRemediation & Hardening Directivesโ- Update LearnPress to Version
4.4.11or Later Immediately: Upgrade thelearnpressplugin to version 4.4.11 (or later) via the WordPress Admin Dashboard or WP-CLI (wp plugin update learnpress). - Purge Active LearnPress Sessions (
wp_learnpress_sessions): Because serialized payloads injected prior to patching may remain persisted inside thewp_learnpress_sessionsdatabase table until session expiration, truncate or purge untrusted guest rows fromwp_learnpress_sessionsimmediately after upgrading:DELETE FROM wp_learnpress_sessions WHERE session_value LIKE '%checkout-email%'; - Deploy WAF Virtual Patching on
checkout-email: Enforce the ModSecurity / Cloudflare WAF rule above to block any HTTPPOSTrequest wherecheckout-emailcontains PHP serialization prefixes (O:<digits>:,C:<digits>:, ora:<digits>:). - Disable Unauthenticated Guest Checkout If Unused: In LearnPress > Settings > Payments > Guest Checkout, disable guest checkout if your learning portal requires users to register and authenticate prior to enrolling in courses.