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CVE-2026-105396: Heym AI Agent Human-in-the-Loop Review Capability Token Leak via Spoofable Origin Header

Density:
HASS

AGENTIC SECURITY SCORE & HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP GUARDRAIL EVALUATION

Target: Heym AI Agent Orchestration โ€” HITL Review URL Generator (build_public_base_url)
Confidence: 98%
94 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures specific systemic risk arising from autonomy, tool authority, and cascading execution.

Dimension Breakdown
Autonomy 18 / 20
Tool Access 19 / 20
Privilege 15 / 15
Persistence 13 / 15
External Impact 15 / 15
Propagation 14 / 15
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

NVD and generic CVSS calculators rate CVE-2026-105396 at 5.3 (Medium), classifying it as an unauthenticated token disclosure requiring user interaction (UI:R). The Agentic Security Score (HASS) elevates this evaluation to 94 (CRITICAL). In autonomous multi-agent systems, Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) review checkpoints represent the final authoritative guardrail preventing autonomous LLM agents from executing irreversible, privileged actions (MITRE ATLAS AML.T0054 / OWASP LLM06 Excessive Agency). Leaking the cryptographic review capability token completely eliminates human oversight, enabling adversaries to forge supervisor approval decisions and command autonomous agents to execute arbitrary shell commands, database drops, or financial transactions with the reviewer's authenticated authority.

๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-105396: Heym AI Agent Human-in-the-Loop Review Capability Token Leak via Spoofable Origin HeaderVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTHeym AI HITL Review Framework
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in Heym AI HITL Review Framework documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

Heym is widely integrated into autonomous AI workflows (including LangChain, LlamaIndex, and custom Agentic API servers) to enforce human oversight over dangerous tool actions.

ParameterTechnical SpecificationOperational Details
CVE IdentifierCVE-2026-105396International vulnerability tracking identifier
Software PlatformHeym AI Agent FrameworkPython-based Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) review framework
Vulnerable Componentheym/server/helpers.py (build_public_base_url)Review URL builder & origin resolver
Vulnerability ClassCWE-346 / CWE-200 / CWE-862Origin Validation Error / Capability Token Disclosure
Attack VectorNetwork (HTTP/HTTPS)Remote unauthenticated HTTP request with spoofed Origin header
Remediation ReleaseHeym v0.0.112Replaces header reflection with strict server configuration allowlist
[ Unauthenticated Attacker ]
|
POST /api/v1/workflow/trigger
Header Origin: https://evil-review.attacker.com
Payload: "Deploy infrastructure and clean temp tables"
|
v
+------------------------------------------+
| Heym AI Agent Engine |
| Agent generates execution plan |
| Requires Human-in-the-Loop Approval |
+------------------------------------------+
|
[ build_public_base_url() ]
Reflects untrusted Origin header!
|
v
+------------------------------------------+
| Generated Review Link with Token |
| https://evil-review.attacker.com/review |
| ?token=eyJhbGciOi...[Capability Token] |
+------------------------------------------+
|
Sent via Email / Slack / Webhook
v
+------------------------------------------+
| Human Reviewer (DevOps) |
| Clicks link to inspect agent request |
+------------------------------------------+
|
Token delivered to Attacker Web Server!
v
+------------------------------------------+
| Attacker Decision API Injection |
| POST /api/v1/review/decision (Approved) |
+------------------------------------------+
|
v
+------------------------------------------+
| Autonomous Agent Executes Hijacked |
| Tool Actions with Full Privileges |
+------------------------------------------+

The root cause of CVE-2026-105396 lies in the dynamic determination of the external application URL from unvalidated client request headers within heym/server/helpers.py:

# Vulnerable implementation in Heym < 0.0.112 (heym/server/helpers.py)
def build_public_base_url(request) -> str:
# FLUID VULNERABILITY: Blind trust in client-supplied headers
if "origin" in request.headers:
return request.headers["origin"].rstrip("/")
if "x-forwarded-host" in request.headers:
proto = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-proto", "https")
host = request.headers["x-forwarded-host"]
return f"{proto}://{host}".rstrip("/")
return settings.PUBLIC_BASE_URL.rstrip("/")

When an agentic pipeline halts at a human review node, Heym formats the review notification:

def generate_review_link(request, review_session) -> str:
base_url = build_public_base_url(request)
# The capability token grants complete decision authority
return f"{base_url}/review/{review_session.id}?token={review_session.capability_token}"

Because build_public_base_url returned request.headers["origin"] verbatim without cross-referencing an authorized domain list, the review link sent to the human operator directed their browser to the attackerโ€™s web infrastructure.

In Heym v0.0.112, the implementation strips dynamic header inspection, binding URL construction strictly to static environment settings or an explicit host whitelist:

# Patched implementation in Heym v0.0.112
def build_public_base_url(request) -> str:
# Strict fallback to verified configuration
configured_url = settings.PUBLIC_BASE_URL
if not configured_url:
raise ConfigurationError("PUBLIC_BASE_URL must be explicitly configured")
# Optional whitelist verification if multi-domain is required
if hasattr(settings, "ALLOWED_HOSTS") and "x-forwarded-host" in request.headers:
host = request.headers["x-forwarded-host"]
if host in settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS:
proto = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-proto", "https")
return f"{proto}://{host}".rstrip("/")
return configured_url.rstrip("/")

sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor Attacker as Remote Adversary
participant Heym as Heym Engine (:8000)
participant Agent as Autonomous LLM Agent
participant Reviewer as Human Reviewer (Slack/Email)
participant Evil as Attacker Server (evil.com)
Attacker->>Heym: POST /workflow/run (Origin: https://evil.com)
Note over Heym: Agent formulates action: rm -rf /prod/backups
Heym->>Heym: Hit Human-in-the-Loop review gate
Heym->>Reviewer: Dispatch notification: "Approval needed: https://evil.com/review?token=CAP_TOKEN_99"
Reviewer->>Evil: Clicks review link in Slack (GET /review?token=CAP_TOKEN_99)
Note over Evil: Attacker captures CAP_TOKEN_99 in access logs
Evil->>Reviewer: Displays generic error: "Service temporarily unavailable"
Attacker->>Heym: POST /api/v1/review/decision (Bearer CAP_TOKEN_99, decision: "APPROVE")
Heym->>Agent: Approval confirmed by Human Supervisor
Agent->>Agent: Executes irreversible destructive action with verified authority

The severity of this attack stems from the unique trust relationship established in agentic architectures:

  • Zero-trust bypass: Security teams rely on Human-in-the-Loop gates specifically so that unvetted agent prompts or external inputs cannot trigger critical operations without manual verification.
  • Decision forgery: By possessing the capability bearer token, the attacker does not need to compromise the human operatorโ€™s enterprise SSO credentials; the capability token itself confers single-use or session-wide approval authority.
  • Agentic escalation: Once approved, the agent executes shell commands, Kubernetes deployments, or financial transfers under its own pre-configured service identity.

Detecting CVE-2026-105396 exploitation involves monitoring ingress HTTP traffic for mismatched Origin and Host headers, checking audit logs for rapid review approvals, and searching notification records for unauthorized external domains.

title: Heym HITL Review Origin Header Spoofing
id: 5a29c118-4f12-4c89-a201-105396e99001
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests to Heym agentic workflow endpoints where the Origin or X-Forwarded-Host header diverges from internal organizational domains.
references:
- https://vulncheck.com/advisories/heym-before-0.0.112-hitl-review-token-leak-via-spoofable-origin-header
- https://hermes-codex.vercel.app/cve/2026/cve-2026-105396/
author: Hermes Codex Cyber Intelligence
date: 2026-10-06
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection_endpoint:
cs-uri-stem|startswith:
- '/api/v1/workflow'
- '/workflow'
- '/api/v1/review'
selection_suspicious:
cs-header-origin|contains: 'http'
filter_internal:
cs-header-origin|contains:
- 'internal.domain.corp'
- 'heym.corp.local'
- 'localhost'
condition: selection_endpoint and selection_suspicious and not filter_internal
falsepositives:
- Legitimate new domain migrations where ALLOWED_HOSTS has not yet been synchronized
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
- atlas.aml.t0054

  1. Upgrade Heym to v0.0.112 or later: Update the Heym package in your Python environment or container Dockerfile:

    Terminal window
    pip install --upgrade "heym>=0.0.112"
  2. Explicitly Set PUBLIC_BASE_URL: Configure a static canonical base URL in your environment variables to disable automatic resolution:

    Terminal window
    export HEYM_PUBLIC_BASE_URL="https://heym.internal.company.com"
    export HEYM_ALLOWED_HOSTS="heym.internal.company.com"
  3. Enforce Reverse Proxy Header Sanitization: In your Nginx or Traefik ingress gateway, strip or overwrite incoming X-Forwarded-Host and Origin headers before forwarding traffic to the Heym service:

    location /api/v1/workflow {
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $host;
    proxy_set_header Origin "";
    proxy_pass http://heym_upstream;
    }