CVE-2026-108548: AstronRPA AI Agent Gateway Authentication Bypass via Arbitrary Bearer Tokens
OpenResty gateway accepts unvalidated Bearer tokens and trusts client identity headers, granting unauthenticated attackers full control over automated agent workflows.
HERMES THREAT SCORE & AUTONOMOUS RPA RUNTIME EVALUATION
Target:AstronRPA โ OpenResty Edge Gateway (auth_handler.lua) & RPA AI Services While standard CVSS rates this at 8.8 (High), the Hermes Threat Score elevates it to 93 (CRITICAL). AstronRPA is deployed as an enterprise autonomous workforce orchestrator possessing privileged credentials for corporate applications. Bypassing the gateway permits immediate trigger and parameter tampering across all internal bots with zero friction.
CVE-2026-108548: AstronRPA AI Agent Gateway Authentication Bypass via Arbitrary Bearer TokensVULNERABILITY
Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.
๐ Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“Confirmed security vulnerability in AstronRPA Automation Platform documented in Hermes dossier.”
- [vulnerability_report]
- [government_confirmation]CISA verified active exploitation in the wild and mandated federal remediation deadline in KEV entry. — Source: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA Adds CVE-2026-59822 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Reliability: VERY_HIGH)
1. Vulnerability Mechanics in OpenResty Lua Handler
Section titled โ1. Vulnerability Mechanics in OpenResty Lua HandlerโThe AstronRPA architecture places an OpenResty (Nginx + Lua) gateway in front of its microservices:
-- Vulnerable logic in auth_handler.lua (<= 1.1.6)local auth_header = ngx.req.get_headers()["Authorization"]if auth_header and string.find(auth_header, "Bearer ") then -- CRITICAL FLAW: Only verifies presence of 'Bearer ', no cryptographic signature validation! local user_id = ngx.req.get_headers()["X-User-Id"] or "admin" ngx.req.set_header("X-Authenticated-User", user_id) return -- Request allowed to proceed to backend!endAny arbitrary Bearer token (e.g. Authorization: Bearer test) coupled with X-User-Id: 1 allows the attacker to impersonate the system administrator.
2. Agentic Security Standard (HASS) Layer Mapping
Section titled โ2. Agentic Security Standard (HASS) Layer MappingโThis flaw directly violates HASS Layer 1 (Identity & Authority) and Layer 2 (Context & Memory):
- HAS-01: Failure to cryptographically authenticate callers before dispatching agent workflows.
- HAS-08: Blind trust in untrusted client headers leading to catastrophic privilege confusion.
3. Detection Sigma Rule
Section titled โ3. Detection Sigma Ruleโtitle: AstronRPA Gateway Authentication Header Anomalyid: astronrpa-cve-2026-108548-auth-bypassstatus: experimentaldescription: Detects inbound API requests to AstronRPA routes with non-JWT Bearer tokens or external X-User-Id headers.logsource: category: webserverdetection: selection: uri_path|startswith: - '/api/resource/' - '/api/rpa-ai-service/' http_authorization|contains: 'Bearer ' filter: http_authorization|re: '^Bearer eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.' condition: selection and not filterlevel: criticaltags: - attack.initial_access - attack.t11904. Remediation Steps
Section titled โ4. Remediation Stepsโ- Update AstronRPA: Deploy version 1.1.7 immediately.
- Gateway WAF Rule: Reject any inbound client request from external networks containing
X-User-IdorX-Authenticated-Userheaders. - Audit Token Logs: Review OpenResty access logs for unauthenticated access to
/api/rpa-ai-service/.