CVE-2026-108719: LLMGateway Blind SSRF via Video-Generation callback_url Webhook Handling
Critical blind SSRF vulnerability in LLMGateway asynchronous video generation callback loop permitting unauthenticated cloud metadata extraction and internal network pivoting.
HERMES AGENTIC SECURITY SCORE & AI REVERSE PROXY EVALUATION
Target:LLMGateway โ Asynchronous Video Generation Webhook Dispatcher CVSS v3.1 rates this vulnerability at 9.3 (CRITICAL) due to the scope change (S:C) allowing access to cloud instance metadata and private cluster services. The Hermes Agentic Security Score (HASS) rates this at 89 (CRITICAL). As an API gateway deployed at the perimeter to broker requests to multiple generative AI and LLM models, LLMGateway frequently runs with elevated cloud permissions to access GPU nodes, cloud storage buckets, and model endpoints. A blind SSRF flaw in its asynchronous callback loop allows attackers to retrieve temporary cloud instance profile credentials (AWS IMDSv1/v2, GCP metadata) and pivot directly into cloud control planes.
CVE-2026-108719: LLMGateway Blind SSRF via Video-Generation callback_url Webhook HandlingVULNERABILITY
Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.
๐ Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“Confirmed security vulnerability in LLMGateway Multimodal AI Reverse Proxy documented in Hermes dossier.”
- [vulnerability_report]
- [government_confirmation]CISA verified active exploitation in the wild and mandated federal remediation deadline in KEV entry. — Source: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA Adds CVE-2026-59822 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Reliability: VERY_HIGH)
1. Technical Context & Affected Architecture Matrix
Section titled โ1. Technical Context & Affected Architecture MatrixโLLMGateway sits between external clients and upstream foundation model APIs, providing load balancing, caching, and rate limiting.
| Parameter | Technical Specification | Operational Details |
|---|---|---|
| CVE Identifier | CVE-2026-108719 | Canonical vulnerability tracking identifier |
| Affected Product | LLMGateway | Multimodal AI reverse proxy and perimeter router |
| Vulnerable Component | gateway/callbacks/dispatcher.py | Asynchronous webhook delivery service |
| Impacted Versions | All versions through 1.20.0 | Cloud, Kubernetes, and bare-metal AI gateway deployments |
| Corrective Release | 1.20.1 | Strict egress policy validation and header sanitization |
| Vulnerability Class | SSRF (CWE-918, CWE-610) | Unrestricted outbound HTTP request dispatch |
| Execution Context | Python / FastAPI / Docker / Kubernetes | AI perimeter gateway pods with cloud IAM role attachments |
2. Root Cause Analysis & Flaw Decomposition
Section titled โ2. Root Cause Analysis & Flaw DecompositionโVulnerable Code Path: Missing Egress Validation on Webhook Dispatch
Section titled โVulnerable Code Path: Missing Egress Validation on Webhook DispatchโIn gateway/callbacks/dispatcher.py, the callback execution routine retrieves the target URL from the incoming request payload and executes an HTTP POST request without verifying if the target hostname resolves to loopback, RFC 1918, or link-local addresses:
import httpx
async def dispatch_completion_webhook(task_id: str, callback_url: str, result_payload: dict, client_headers: dict): # FLAW 1: No URL validation or IP resolution check # FLAW 2: Forwards client and internal headers to the unvalidated callback target! async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client: response = await client.post( callback_url, json={"task_id": task_id, "status": "completed", "output": result_payload}, headers={"Authorization": client_headers.get("Authorization"), "X-Gateway-Node": "ai-proxy-prod"} ) return response.status_codeSSRF Pivot Architecture Diagram
Section titled โSSRF Pivot Architecture DiagramโAttacker Request LLMGateway Perimeter Pod Cloud Metadata / Internal Pods+-------------------------+ +-------------------------------+ +-------------------------------+| POST /v1/video/ | | Video Generation Task Created | | 169.254.169.254 (IMDSv2/v1) || generations | ------> | | | internal-etcd.cluster.local || callback_url: | | Asynchronous Dispatcher fires | ---> | kube-apiserver.default.svc || http://169.254.169.254/ | | HTTP POST from Pod Network | +-------------------------------+| latest/meta-data/ | +-------------------------------+ |+-------------------------+ v +-------------------------------+ | Internal Service Disrupted | | or Metadata Probed by Attacker| +-------------------------------+3. Attack Scenarios & Multi-Stage Execution Flow
Section titled โ3. Attack Scenarios & Multi-Stage Execution Flowโ- Payload Submission:
An unauthenticated or low-privilege attacker sends a JSON payload to
/v1/video/generations:{"prompt": "Render 3D corporate logo rotation","model": "video-gen-v2","callback_url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"} - Task Processing & Callback Trigger: The gateway queues the request. Upon generation completion (or premature cancellation), the background dispatcher initiates an outbound HTTP request to the target metadata URI.
- Internal Network Scanning & Cloud Pivot: By manipulating target paths and monitoring gateway error metrics or response delays, attackers map internal network services, trigger administrative actions on vulnerable internal microservices, or leverage secondary DNS-rebinding listeners to capture exfiltrated authentication headers.
4. Forensic Triage & Multi-Platform Detection
Section titled โ4. Forensic Triage & Multi-Platform Detectionโtitle: LLMGateway Asynchronous Callback SSRF Probeid: c418a920-8114-4a21-9920-202610871901status: experimentaldescription: Detects outbound network traffic from AI gateway container pods directed toward internal IP ranges or cloud metadata endpoints.references: - https://vulncheck.com/advisories/llmgateway-through-1.20.0-blind-ssrf-via-video-generation-callback-urlauthor: Hermes Codex CTI Teamdate: 2026/10/12logsource: category: network_connection product: linuxdetection: selection_process: Image|endswith: - '/python3' - '/uvicorn' - '/llmgateway' selection_dest: DestinationIp: - '169.254.169.254' - '127.0.0.1' DestinationIp|startswith: - '10.' - '172.16.' - '172.17.' - '172.18.' - '192.168.' condition: selection_process and selection_destfields: - Image - CommandLine - DestinationIp - DestinationPortlevel: criticaltags: - attack.initial_access - attack.t1190// Azure Sentinel / Microsoft Defender for Cloud// Detects outbound connections from AI gateway pods to private addressesContainerNetworkInventory| where ContainerName has "llmgateway"| join kind=inner ( CommonSecurityLog | where DestinationIP in ("169.254.169.254", "127.0.0.1") or DestinationIP startswith "10." or DestinationIP startswith "192.168.") on $left.ContainerID == $right.DeviceCustomString1| project TimeGenerated, ContainerName, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort| order by TimeGenerated desc#!/usr/bin/env python3# Test script to verify whether callback URLs are properly validatedimport ipaddressimport urllib.parse
def is_safe_callback(url: str) -> bool: parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url) if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"): return False host = parsed.hostname try: ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host) if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local: print(f"[!] REJECTED: {url} points to internal destination {ip}") return False except ValueError: pass # Hostname requires DNS resolution check before connect return True
# Testis_safe_callback("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")5. Remediation Strategy & Mitigation Matrix
Section titled โ5. Remediation Strategy & Mitigation MatrixโUpstream Security Patch Application
Section titled โUpstream Security Patch ApplicationโUpgrade LLMGateway to version 1.20.1 or later:
pip install --upgrade llmgateway>=1.20.1# Or update the container image:docker pull ghcr.io/llmgateway/llmgateway:1.20.1Defense-in-Depth Network Policies
Section titled โDefense-in-Depth Network PoliciesโEnforce Kubernetes NetworkPolicies to block egress to cloud metadata from AI reverse proxy pods:
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1kind: NetworkPolicymetadata: name: block-metadata-egress namespace: ai-gatewayspec: podSelector: matchLabels: app: llmgateway egress: - to: - ipBlock: cidr: 0.0.0.0/0 except: - 169.254.169.254/32 - 10.0.0.0/8 - 172.16.0.0/12 - 192.168.0.0/16 policyTypes: - Egress