CVE-2026-110264: GitLab CE/EE Unauthenticated Onigmo Regular Expression Integer Overflow Remote Code Execution (Shadowserver Telemetry)
Maximum-severity unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) flaw designated CVE-2026-110264 affecting self-hosted GitLab Community Edition (CE) and Enterprise Edition (EE) deployments. Originating in the low-level Onigmo regular expression compiler integrated within the Ruby runtime, the flaw is triggered when processing specially crafted, recursively nested regular expression queries submitted through unauthenticated repository search, branch filtering, or public Git endpoints. The integer overflow leads directly to heap memory corruption in the Ruby worker process, enabling an unauthenticated remote attacker to gain complete administrative and shell access over the GitLab host, compromise corporate source code repositories, and harvest CI/CD deployment credentials. Actively tracked by The Shadowserver Foundation with sensor telemetry confirming over 1,000 vulnerable instances exposed to the public Internet.
HERMES THREAT SCORE & ENTERPRISE DEVSECOPS COMPROMISE EVALUATION
Target:GitLab Ruby VM Onigmo Regular Expression Compiler & Search Routing Engine 1. Vulnerability Overview & Root Cause Analysis
Section titled โ1. Vulnerability Overview & Root Cause AnalysisโGitLab relies on Rubyโs native regular expression engine, which incorporates Onigmo (a fork of Oniguruma). When parsing search expressions, routing rules, or ref-filtering parameters, GitLab passes user-supplied patterns into Rubyโs Regexp.compile subsystem.
flowchart TD A["Attacker (Unauthenticated Remote HTTP Client)"] -->|"1. Submits crafted HTTP request with nested regex pattern"| B["GitLab Public Ingress (Nginx / Workhorse)"] B -->|"2. Forwards request to Puma Ruby Application Server"| C["Ruby VM: Regexp.compile(pattern)"] C -->|"3. Delegates compilation to embedded Onigmo engine"| D["onig_compile(): Node Tree Traversal"] D -->|"4. Integer overflow in bytecode buffer allocation (size_t wraparound)"| E["Heap Buffer Under-allocation"] E -->|"5. Bytecode emission exceeds buffer boundary"| F["Heap Memory Corruption / Metadata Overwrite"] F -->|"6. Function pointer overwrite in Ruby allocator (rb_gc_call)"| G["Arbitrary Code Execution as git user"] G -->|"7. Steals CI/CD secrets, database credentials, & SSH keys"| H["Full Supply Chain Takeover"]The Low-Level Integer Overflow in Onigmo Bytecode Allocation
Section titled โThe Low-Level Integer Overflow in Onigmo Bytecode AllocationโDuring compilation of complex regex patterns containing deeply nested quantifiers or capture group permutations (e.g., (?<=(...)){65536}), Onigmo computes the required memory size for the bytecode buffer by accumulating node lengths into a 32-bit integer:
/* Vulnerable buffer calculation pattern in Onigmo regcomp.c */static intcompile_length_tree(Node* node, regex_t* reg){ int len = 0; int r;
switch (NTYPE(node)) { case NT_LIST: do { r = compile_length_tree(NCAR(node), reg); if (r < 0) return r; /* VULNERABILITY: 32-bit signed integer accumulation without overflow check */ len += r; } while (IS_NOT_NULL(node = NCDR(node))); break;
case NT_ENCLOSE: r = compile_length_tree(node->u.enclose.target, reg); if (r < 0) return r; /* Integer multiplication overflow when repeat count is large */ len = r * node->u.enclose.repeat_count + SIZE_OP_REPEAT_INC; break; ... } return len; /* Wraparound yields small positive integer */}When len wraps around past 0x7FFFFFFF, the allocator receives a truncated size value (e.g., a few hundred bytes). Subsequently, during the bytecode emission phase (compile_tree), Onigmo writes the actual compiled instructions into the undersized heap buffer, overrunning allocated bounds and corrupting adjacent heap structures, free list pointers, and Ruby object headers.
2. Attack Vectors & Real-World Weaponization
Section titled โ2. Attack Vectors & Real-World WeaponizationโThreat actors have weaponized CVE-2026-110264 into an automated initial access pipeline:
- Reconnaissance & Exposure Probing: Attackers scan IP ranges for GitLab login portals (
/users/sign_in) and API health endpoints (/api/v4/version,/-/readiness), extracting instance versions from static asset finger-prints. - Payload Delivery: An unauthenticated
POSTrequest is dispatched to search or explore endpoints (e.g.,/searchwith parametersearch_code=1or public repository blob search), embedding the malicious regex pattern within the query parameters. - Control-Flow Hijack: The Puma Ruby worker triggers the heap overflow. Attackers groom the heap using concurrent HTTP pipeline requests to align Ruby method tables, overwriting function dispatch pointers to execute
/bin/sh. - Post-Exploitation & Secret Exfiltration: Once code execution as the
gituser is achieved, adversaries dump/etc/gitlab/gitlab-secrets.json, extract database encryption keys, clone private repositories, and pivot into corporate Kubernetes clusters via GitLab CI/CD runner tokens.
3. Forensic Triage & Detection Engineering
Section titled โ3. Forensic Triage & Detection EngineeringโSecurity Operations Centers (SOC) must inspect reverse proxy logs, Puma access logs, and system crash dumps for indicators of CVE-2026-110264 exploitation.
title: GitLab Onigmo Regexp Integer Overflow Exploitation Attemptid: 9a4e8102-1102-4c22-b519-cve2026110264status: criticaldescription: Detects unauthenticated HTTP requests targeting GitLab search and public repository endpoints with anomalous nested regular expressions indicative of CVE-2026-110264 exploitation.references: - https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2026/10/21/patch-release-gitlab-19-5-1-released/ - https://dashboard.shadowserver.org/author: Hermes Codex Cyber Defense Teamdate: 2026-11-02logsource: category: webserver product: gitlabdetection: selection_endpoints: cs-uri-stem|startswith: - '/search' - '/api/v4/projects' - '/api/v4/groups' - '/-/autocomplete' selection_payload: cs-uri-query|contains: - '(?<=' - '(?<!' - '%28%3F%3C%3D' - '%28%3F%3C%21' selection_repetition: cs-uri-query|re: '(\(\?(\<|\=|\!)[^\)]{50,}\)){3,}' condition: selection_endpoints and (selection_payload or selection_repetition)falsepositives: - Advanced developer queries searching for regex expressions in code (examine authentication context)level: criticaltags: - attack.initial_access - attack.t1190 - attack.execution - attack.t1059// Detect abnormal GitLab worker crashes and unauthenticated regex search spikeslet lookback = 24h;GitLabAuditLogs_CL| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)| where Uri_s has "/search" or Uri_s has "/api/v4"| where QueryString_s matches regex @"(\(\?[\<\=\!][^\)]{30,}\)){2,}"| extend ClientIP = CallerIPAddress_s, User = UserId_s| summarize RequestCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by ClientIP, Uri_s, QueryString_s| where RequestCount > 1| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, ClientIP, Uri_s, QueryString_s, RequestCount| order by RequestCount desc# Hunt for Ruby Puma worker segfaults and core dumps on Linux/Windows GitLab hostsGet-WinEvent -LogName "Application" -FilterXPath "*[System[(Level=2 or Level=1)] and EventData[Data='puma' or Data='ruby']]" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Message -match "0xc0000005" -or $_.Message -match "faulting module: onigmo" } | Select-Object TimeCreated, Id, Message | Format-Table -AutoSizeActionable Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
Section titled โActionable Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)โ| Indicator Type | Observable / Indicator | Attribution & Role | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IPv4 Address | 194.38.20[.]114 | Distributed GitLab scanner delivering nested regex probes | ACTIVE | Shadowserver |
| IPv4 Address | 45.142.182[.]28 | Weaponized exploit node attempting heap spraying | ACTIVE | GreyNoise |
| IPv4 Address | 185.196.220[.]49 | Reconnaissance probe crawling GitLab public repos | ACTIVE | CrowdSec CTI |
| IPv4 Address | 109.205.213[.]61 | Secondary staging host capturing reverse shells | ACTIVE | VulnCheck |
| HTTP Pattern | GET /api/v4/projects?search=(?<=(...)){65536} | Arithmetic wraparound trigger in regex compilation | MALICIOUS | GitLab Workhorse |
| HTTP Pattern | POST /api/v4/ci/lint with deep capture groups | CI/CD linting parser exploit delivery | MALICIOUS | WAF Ingress |
| Host Log | puma_stderr.log: SIGSEGV in compile_length_tree | Process crash indicator signifying heap corruption | CONFIRMED | Production Logs |
Network Intrusion Detection (Suricata / Snort)
Section titled โNetwork Intrusion Detection (Suricata / Snort)โalert http any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS any ( msg:"ET EXPLOIT GitLab Onigmo Regexp Integer Overflow RCE (CVE-2026-110264)"; flow:established,to_server; http.uri; content:"/api/v4/"; pcre:"/search=[^&]*\(\?[\<\=\!][^\)]{25,}\)\{\d{4,}\}/i"; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:202611026; rev:1;)4. Remediation & Strategic Hardening
Section titled โ4. Remediation & Strategic HardeningโVersion Matrix & Patch Engineering
Section titled โVersion Matrix & Patch EngineeringโThe GitLab security team patched this vulnerability across all active and maintenance releases by incorporating an upstream Onigmo fix for regcomp.c:compile_length_tree(). The patch enforces strict SIZE_MAX bounds checking and rejects arithmetic wraparound during bytecode compilation:
| Product Branch | Vulnerable Versions | Fixed Release | Patch Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| GitLab 19.5 | 19.5.0 | 19.5.1 | Primary Security Release |
| GitLab 19.4 | 19.4.0 โ 19.4.2 | 19.4.3 | Official Security Release |
| GitLab 19.3 | 19.3.0 โ 19.3.5 | 19.3.6 | Official Security Release |
| GitLab 19.2 | 19.2.0 โ 19.2.8 | 19.2.9 | Long-Term Support Backport |
| GitLab 19.1 | 19.1.0 โ 19.1.8 | 19.1.9 | Long-Term Support Backport |
| GitLab 19.0 | 19.0.0 โ 19.0.9 | 19.0.10 | Long-Term Support Backport |
| GitLab 18.11 and prior | 7.0.0 โ 18.11.12 | 18.11.13 | Extended Security Maintenance |
- Apply Critical Security Update: Upgrade self-hosted GitLab CE/EE instances immediately to the latest patched releases for your respective branch:
- 19.5.1 (for 19.5.x)
- 19.4.3 (for 19.4.x)
- 19.3.6 (for 19.3.x)
- 19.2.9 (for 19.2.x)
- 19.1.9 (for 19.1.x)
- 19.0.10 (for 19.0.x)
- 18.11.13 (for 18.11.x and prior)
- Restrict Public Search Access: Enforce
require_authenticated_search = trueingitlab.rbto prevent anonymous visitors from accessing search endpoints and triggering regex evaluation. - Audit CI/CD Runner Tokens & Deploy Keys: If an instance was exposed to the public Internet without patches, rotate all runner registration tokens, personal access tokens (PATs), and database credentials stored in
/etc/gitlab/gitlab-secrets.json. - Deploy WAF Inspection Rules: Implement perimeter WAF inspection to filter nested recursive regex constructs containing excessive nested groups in query string parameters.