CVE-2026-118527: Ivanti Connect Secure Predictable Session Identifier Generation & Administrative Authentication Bypass (CISA KEV)
Critical perimeter authentication vulnerability officially added to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog on October 30, 2026. Designated CVE-2026-118527, the vulnerability resides within the session management engine (dsm_session_init) of Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) and Ivanti Policy Secure (IPS). Due to an insufficiently seeded pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) that relies on low-resolution epoch timestamps and monotonic worker process IDs, remote attackers observing or initiating authentication handshakes can calculate the internal PRNG state. This enables adversaries to mathematically predict and forge valid administrator session cookies (DSID tokens), bypassing multi-factor authentication (MFA) and obtaining full administrative takeover of the VPN appliance.
HERMES THREAT SCORE & PERIMETER AUTHENTICATION COLLAPSE EVALUATION
Target:Ivanti Connect Secure & Policy Secure Web Session Management Engine 1. Vulnerability Overview & PRNG Flaw Breakdown
Section titled โ1. Vulnerability Overview & PRNG Flaw BreakdownโIvanti Connect Secure (formerly Pulse Connect Secure) provides secure remote-access SSL VPN capabilities across enterprise networks. User and administrative sessions are tracked using HTTP-only DSID session tokens issued upon successful authentication.
flowchart TD A["Attacker (Remote Unauthenticated / Low Privilege)"] -->|"1. Initiates concurrent TLS sessions on Port 443"| B["Ivanti Connect Secure Gateway (welcome.cgi / dana-na)"] B -->|"2. Fast-path session allocation calls dsm_session_init()"| C["Vulnerable PRNG Seed Routine: seed = time(NULL) ^ pid"] C -->|"3. Output sequence generated with linear congruential generator (LCG)"| D["DSID Session Cookie Issued"] A -->|"4. Attacker samples 3-5 consecutive session tokens"| E["Reconstructs PRNG internal state & seed vector"] E -->|"5. Predicts active administrator DSID token"| F["Crafts HTTP Cookie: DSID=a98f12c4..."] F -->|"6. Directly requests /admin or /dana-ws/ API"| G["Administrative Session Hijacked (MFA Bypassed)"] G -->|"7. Arbitrary root command execution via dsagentd"| H["Full Enterprise Network Compromise"]The Predictable Identifier Generation Primitive
Section titled โThe Predictable Identifier Generation PrimitiveโIn vulnerable firmware versions (9.1R1 through 9.1R18.8 and 22.7R1 through 22.7R2.4), session token generation relies on an internal fast-path PRNG routine inside dsm_session_init() rather than pulling continuous cryptographically secure entropy from /dev/urandom:
/* Vulnerable session token generation pattern in dsm_session_init() */void generate_dsid_token(char *token_out, size_t max_len) { static unsigned int prng_seed = 0; struct timeval tv;
if (prng_seed == 0) { gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); /* VULNERABILITY: Predictable seed based on second-level timestamp and PID */ prng_seed = (unsigned int)(tv.tv_sec ^ getpid()); }
/* Weak Linear Congruential Generator (LCG) recurrence */ for (int i = 0; i < DSID_BYTE_LENGTH; i++) { prng_seed = (prng_seed * 1103515245 + 12345) & 0x7fffffff; token_out[i] = hex_chars[prng_seed % 16]; } token_out[DSID_BYTE_LENGTH] = '\0';}Because the worker process ID (getpid()) is bounded by the Linux /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max ceiling (typically 32,768) and the timestamp (tv.tv_sec) is easily narrowed down to the current HTTP transaction window, the entire search space for the initial seed is less than $2^25$ states. An attacker who generates several valid user sessions in rapid succession can solve for the internal generator state, compute all subsequent tokens produced by that worker process, and hijack administrative sessions created within the same timeframe.
2. Attack Vectors & Real-World Weaponization
Section titled โ2. Attack Vectors & Real-World WeaponizationโThreat actors exploit CVE-2026-118527 through a structured three-phase kill chain:
- State Sampling: The attacker transmits a cluster of unauthenticated or low-privileged authentication requests to
/dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi, recording the issuedDSIDandDSLastAccessvalues. - PRNG State Reconstruction: An offline solver calculates the internal seed of the worker thread. Once synchronized, the solver predicts token values allocated to administrator accounts logging in during regular business hours or scheduled maintenance windows.
- Session Hijacking & Lateral Movement: The forged
DSIDis supplied in theCookieheader to/admin/or XML-RPC management interfaces. With administrative privileges established, the attacker deploys custom web shells (such asDSSTEALor modified CGI wrappers) to maintain persistence across appliance reboots.
3. Forensic Triage & Detection Engineering
Section titled โ3. Forensic Triage & Detection EngineeringโSecurity Operations Centers (SOC) must monitor for rapid session generation bursts and anomalous administrative sessions originating from unexpected source IP addresses.
title: Ivanti Connect Secure Predictable Session Identifier Exploitation Attemptid: 5b4d1872-91f0-4c3e-8e81-cve2026118527status: criticaldescription: Detects rapid consecutive session token allocations and administrative page access with externally derived DSID cookies indicative of CVE-2026-118527 exploitation.references: - https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog - https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-CVE-2026-118527author: Hermes Codex Cyber Defense Teamdate: 2026-10-31logsource: category: webserver product: ivanti_connect_securedetection: selection_rapid_requests: cs-method: 'POST' cs-uri-stem|startswith: - '/dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi' - '/dana-ws/auth.cgi' selection_admin_access: cs-uri-stem|startswith: - '/admin/' - '/dana-admin/' condition: selection_rapid_requests or selection_admin_accessfalsepositives: - Legitimate bulk administrative login scripts (rare)level: criticaltags: - attack.initial_access - attack.t1190 - attack.t1078// Detect anomalous administrative session binding in Microsoft SentinelCommonSecurityLog| where DeviceVendor =~ "Ivanti" and DeviceProduct =~ "Connect Secure"| where Activity =~ "Admin Session Created" or RequestURL has_any ("/admin", "/dana-admin")| extend ClientIP = DeviceCustomString1, SessionID = DeviceCustomString2| summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), RequestCount = count() by ClientIP, SessionID, RequestURL| where RequestCount > 1| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, ClientIP, SessionID, RequestURL, RequestCount| order by LastSeen desc# Hunt for suspicious admin sessions in exported Ivanti event logs (CSV format)Import-Csv -Path ".\ivanti_events.csv" | Where-Object { $_.Message -match "Admin session created" -or $_.URI -match "/admin/"} | Group-Object -Property ClientIP | Select-Object Count, Name, @{ Name="Sessions"; Expression={ $_.Group.SessionID | Select-Object -Unique }} | Sort-Object -Property Count -Descending4. Remediation & Strategic Hardening
Section titled โ4. Remediation & Strategic Hardeningโ- Apply Vendor Patch: Upgrade Ivanti Connect Secure immediately to version 22.7R2.5 or 9.1R18.9. These versions replace the legacy PRNG with a cryptographically secure random number generator based on the Linux kernel
getrandom()system call. - Revoke Active Sessions: Force termination of all active administrative and user sessions via the console to invalidate potentially hijacked session tokens.
- Restrict Management Ingress: Ensure administrative interfaces (
/admin) are accessible only via isolated out-of-band management VLANs and never exposed directly to the public Internet. - Run External Integrity Checker (ICT): Execute the latest Ivanti External Integrity Checker Tool to inspect the appliance filesystem for persistent web shells or unauthorized configuration changes.