CVE-2026-121936: easyVoice AI Voice & TTS API Server-Side Request Forgery via openaiBaseUrl
On November 5, 2026, VulnCheck cataloged as weaponized a high-impact Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability affecting easyVoice text-to-speech (TTS) services prior to version 0.0.23. Widely integrated into autonomous voice agents and conversational AI platforms to synthesize real-time speech, easyVoice accepts an arbitrary openaiBaseUrl parameter when handling TTS requests with useLLM enabled. Because backend URL sanitization was incomplete in packages/backend/src/utils/ssrf.ts, unauthenticated remote attackers can coerce the Node.js server into dispatching arbitrary POST requests to internal VPC endpoints, loopback interfaces (127.0.0.1), private LLM inference clusters (vLLM, Ollama), and cloud instance metadata services (169.254.169.254). Crucially, failed connection errors and HTTP response status banners are reflected directly to the caller via the custom x-generate-tts-warning HTTP response header, creating an interactive port-scanning and asset-discovery oracle. Hermes assigns an Agentic Security Score (HASS) of 86 and an overall HTS of 84.
HERMES THREAT SCORE & AUTONOMOUS AI AGENT AUDIO SSRF INTEGRITY EVALUATION
Target:easyVoice TTS API Controller & SSRF Sanitizer (/api/v1/tts) [object Object]
1. Vulnerability Overview & Architectural Context
Section titled โ1. Vulnerability Overview & Architectural ContextโIn modern enterprise generative AI systems, conversational voice agents rely on multi-stage pipeline architectures. When an autonomous agent interacts with users over WebSockets or telephony gateways, text generated by large language models (LLMs) is dispatched to text-to-speech (TTS) synthesis microservices. easyVoice is an open-source voice generation engine designed to bridge natural language generation with dynamic voice cloning, phonetic timing, and audio synthesis.
To allow voice agents to enhance, rephrase, or translate text prompts before generating audio, easyVoice includes an optional LLM integration feature (useLLM). When enabled, the caller can specify an alternative OpenAI-compatible API base URL (openaiBaseUrl) to route pre-processing queries to customized model endpoints (such as local vLLM instances, self-hosted Ollama servers, or fine-tuned language models).
+---------------------------------------+ | Adversary (Unauthenticated Internet) | +---------------------------------------+ | | 1. POST /api/v1/tts | openaiBaseUrl: "http://169.254.169.254" v +----------------------------+ | easyVoice Microservice | | (VPC Private Container) | +----------------------------+ / \ 2. SSRF Query (IAM Metadata) / \ 3. SSRF Query (Local AI) v v +-----------------------+ +-------------------------------+ | AWS / GCP IMDSv2 | | Unauthenticated Internal LLM | | (169.254.169.254) | | (vLLM / Ollama: 10.0.1.50) | +-----------------------+ +-------------------------------+ \ / \ / v v 4. Leaked Connection Errors & Tokens x-generate-tts-warning: "..."CVE-2026-121936 represents a critical architectural failure in how easyVoice processes openaiBaseUrl. In versions prior to 0.0.23, the application failed to validate whether the supplied URL targeted external, publicly routable IP addresses. Consequently, unauthenticated remote attackers can abuse public-facing easyVoice endpoints to force the server into performing arbitrary HTTP requests against internal cloud infrastructure, container networks, and private API microservices. Furthermore, easyVoice reflects internal connection errors in the x-generate-tts-warning response header, turning the service into a high-speed reconnaissance and exploitation scanner.
2. Root Cause Analysis & Code Breakdown
Section titled โ2. Root Cause Analysis & Code BreakdownโThe vulnerability stems from defective URL validation logic located in packages/backend/src/utils/ssrf.ts and invoked by the main text-to-speech handler in packages/backend/src/controllers/tts.controller.ts.
// packages/backend/src/controllers/tts.controller.ts (Vulnerable Implementation)export async function generateTTS(req: Request, res: Response) { const { text, voice, useLLM, openaiBaseUrl, openaiApiKey } = req.body;
let processedText = text;
if (useLLM) { try { // INSECURE: Target URL accepted directly from unauthenticated user input const targetUrl = openaiBaseUrl || process.env.OPENAI_BASE_URL || 'https://api.openai.com/v1';
// Flawed pre-check: only checks for protocol presence, no IP resolution or private range blocking if (!isValidProtocol(targetUrl)) { throw new Error('Invalid URL protocol'); }
const client = new OpenAI({ baseURL: targetUrl, apiKey: openaiApiKey || process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY, });
const completion = await client.chat.completions.create({ model: 'gpt-4o-mini', messages: [{ role: 'user', content: `Format text for TTS: ${text}` }], });
processedText = completion.choices[0].message.content; } catch (error: any) { // INFORMATION LEAKAGE: Internal error strings reflected directly in response headers res.setHeader('x-generate-tts-warning', `LLM Preprocessing Failed: ${error.message}`); } }
// Proceeds to audio generation... const audioBuffer = await synthesizeSpeech(processedText, voice); return res.type('audio/mpeg').send(audioBuffer);}The Architectural Failure Points
Section titled โThe Architectural Failure Pointsโ-
Missing DNS Resolution & CIDR Filtering: The validation routine only checked whether the URL began with
http://orhttps://. It performed no DNS lookup prior to connecting and failed to inspect whether resolved IP addresses fell within private, link-local, loopback, or reserved blocks:127.0.0.0/8(Loopback)10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16(RFC 1918 Private Networks)169.254.169.254(RFC 3927 Cloud Instance Metadata)::1,fe80::/10(IPv6 Loopback and Link-Local)
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Full Reflection in Response Headers: When the OpenAI SDK attempts to establish a TCP handshake with an internal host (e.g.,
http://10.0.0.12:8000/v1), network timeouts, refused connections, or HTTP status codes (e.g.,401 Unauthorized,404 Not Found) are captured in the catch block. Instead of logging the error privately, the controller attaches the raw string tox-generate-tts-warning. This completely bypasses traditional โblindโ SSRF constraints, giving attackers immediate feedback on open ports and active internal services.
The Remediation Patch (Commit 82fcb5b)
Section titled โThe Remediation Patch (Commit 82fcb5b)โIn version 0.0.23, the developers refactored packages/backend/src/utils/ssrf.ts to implement strict hostname resolution and socket-level IP pinning:
// packages/backend/src/utils/ssrf.ts (Patched Implementation)import dns from 'node:dns/promises';import ipaddr from 'ipaddr.js';
export async function validateSafeUrl(rawUrl: string): Promise<URL> { const parsed = new URL(rawUrl);
if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') { throw new Error('Restricted protocol: Only HTTP and HTTPS are permitted'); }
// Resolve hostname to all associated IP addresses const addresses = await dns.lookup(parsed.hostname, { all: true });
for (const { address } of addresses) { const addr = ipaddr.parse(address); const range = addr.range();
// Block private, loopback, link-local, and cloud metadata ranges if ( range === 'loopback' || range === 'private' || range === 'linkLocal' || range === 'uniqueLocal' || address === '169.254.169.254' ) { throw new Error(`SSRF Prevention: Access to private network target ${address} is forbidden`); } }
return parsed;}3. Attack Vector & Exploitation Flow
Section titled โ3. Attack Vector & Exploitation FlowโAdversaries weaponize CVE-2026-121936 to perform internal network reconnaissance and cloud credential exfiltration:
Exploit Sequence
Section titled โExploit Sequenceโ-
Host & Port Enumeration via Header Reflection: The attacker scripts automated POST requests to
/api/v1/tts, cycling through internal IP addresses (e.g.http://10.0.0.1:22,http://10.0.0.1:80,http://10.0.0.1:6379).- If port 6379 (Redis) is open, the header returns:
x-generate-tts-warning: LLM Preprocessing Failed: Expected JSON, received -ERR unknown command. - If the port is closed:
x-generate-tts-warning: LLM Preprocessing Failed: connect ECONNREFUSED 10.0.0.1:6379. - If the host is inactive:
x-generate-tts-warning: LLM Preprocessing Failed: connect ETIMEDOUT 10.0.0.1:6379.
- If port 6379 (Redis) is open, the header returns:
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Cloud Metadata Target Hijacking: On AWS Elastic Container Service (ECS) or EC2 environments running IMDSv1 or misconfigured IMDSv2, the attacker points
openaiBaseUrltohttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/. -
Autonomous Agent Knowledge Injection & Prompt Poisoning: If internal LLM inference engines (such as Ollama on port 11434 or vLLM on port 8000) are deployed without authentication on the container network, the attacker crafts malicious completion prompts through the
textparameter, inducing the internal model to execute unauthorized tool invocations or poisoned context summaries.
4. Forensic Investigation & Threat Hunting
Section titled โ4. Forensic Investigation & Threat HuntingโSecurity teams can detect exploit attempts through reverse proxy access logs, web application firewall (WAF) inspect rules, and container egress traffic monitoring.
Sigma Detection Rule: easyVoice SSRF Exploitation Attempt
Section titled โSigma Detection Rule: easyVoice SSRF Exploitation Attemptโtitle: easyVoice TTS API SSRF Exploitation Attempt via openaiBaseUrlid: c48a1290-9f1e-4c7b-b389-cve2026121936-sigmastatus: productiondescription: Detects unauthenticated POST requests targeting easyVoice TTS API containing private IPs, loopback, or cloud metadata indicators in the openaiBaseUrl field.author: Hermes Codex Cyber Risk Intelligencedate: 2026-11-05references: - https://vulncheck.com/advisories/easyvoice-before-0.0.23-ssrf-via-openaibaseurl-in-tts-api - https://github.com/cosin2077/easyVoice/pull/88logsource: category: webserver product: easyvoicedetection: selection_endpoint: cs-method: 'POST' cs-uri-stem|endswith: '/api/v1/tts' selection_payload: cs-body|contains: - '169.254.169.254' - '127.0.0.1' - 'localhost' - '10.' - '172.16.' - '172.17.' - '172.18.' - '172.19.' - '172.20.' - '172.31.' - '192.168.' - 'metadata.google.internal' condition: selection_endpoint and selection_payloadfields: - c-ip - cs-method - cs-uri-stem - cs-body - sc-statusfalsepositives: - Legitimate self-hosted internal LLMs explicitly configured in non-production development environmentslevel: criticaltags: - attack.initial_access - attack.t1090 - attack.t1552 - cve.2026.121936Detection Engineering & Threat Hunting Tabs
Section titled โDetection Engineering & Threat Hunting Tabsโ// Detect easyVoice SSRF payloads targeting private or metadata IPsW3CIISLog| where csMethod =~ "POST" and csUriStem has "/api/v1/tts"| where csBody has_any ("169.254.169.254", "localhost", "127.0.0.1", "metadata.google", "10.", "192.168.")| project TimeGenerated, cIP, csMethod, csUriStem, csBody, scStatus, scSubStatus| order by TimeGenerated desc# Verify whether easyVoice responds with reflected error headerscurl -s -i -X POST "http://target-easyvoice:3000/api/v1/tts" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "text": "Security audit test probe", "voice": "alloy", "useLLM": true, "openaiBaseUrl": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" }' | grep -i "x-generate-tts-warning"alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"HERMES - easyVoice SSRF Probe Targeting Metadata or RFC1918"; \ flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; \ content:"/api/v1/tts"; http_uri; \ content:"openaiBaseUrl"; http_client_body; \ pcre:"/openaiBaseUrl\"\s*:\s*\"https?:\/\/(169\.254\.169\.254|127\.|10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|localhost)/i"; \ classtype:web-application-attack; sid:2026121936; rev:1;)5. Remediation Strategy & Mitigation Guidance
Section titled โ5. Remediation Strategy & Mitigation GuidanceโTo remediate CVE-2026-121936 across containerized and cloud environments:
1. Upgrade easyVoice to Version 0.0.23 or Higher
Section titled โ1. Upgrade easyVoice to Version 0.0.23 or HigherโUpdate the backend package to version 0.0.23 or later:
npm install easyvoice@latest# or if using dockerdocker pull cosin2077/easyvoice:0.0.23Confirm that validateSafeUrl in packages/backend/src/utils/ssrf.ts is actively enforced on all incoming openaiBaseUrl parameters.
2. Restrict Cloud Metadata Access (AWS IMDSv2 & GCP)
Section titled โ2. Restrict Cloud Metadata Access (AWS IMDSv2 & GCP)โEnforce strict IMDSv2 hop limits to prevent containers from querying instance metadata:
# AWS CLI: Enforce IMDSv2 with maximum hop limit of 1aws ec2 modify-instance-metadata-options \ --instance-id <instance-id> \ --http-tokens required \ --http-put-response-hop-limit 1 \ --http-endpoint enabled3. Container Egress Network Isolation
Section titled โ3. Container Egress Network IsolationโDeploy Kubernetes NetworkPolicies or Docker bridge firewall rules disallowing easyVoice containers from communicating directly with internal RFC 1918 subnets unless explicitly whitelisted:
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1kind: NetworkPolicymetadata: name: easyvoice-egress-lockdownspec: podSelector: matchLabels: app: easyvoice policyTypes: - Egress egress: # Allow external DNS - to: - namespaceSelector: {} podSelector: matchLabels: k8s-app: kube-dns ports: - protocol: UDP port: 53 # Allow outbound HTTPS only to legitimate public AI providers - to: - ipBlock: cidr: 0.0.0.0/0 except: - 10.0.0.0/8 - 172.16.0.0/12 - 192.168.0.0/16 - 169.254.169.254/32 ports: - protocol: TCP port: 443