CVE-2026-123039: Check Point Gaia OS DynamicCLI Local Privilege Escalation
On November 13, 2026, CISA added CVE-2026-123039 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog with a rapid due date of November 16, 2026. This vulnerability affects Check Point Quantum Security Gateways, Firewalls, and Management Servers running Gaia OS. The DynamicCLI daemon runs as root and listens on a world-writable local UNIX domain socket (/tmp/dynamic_socket) without caller validation. Nation-state actors and cybercrime syndicates are actively exploiting this flaw in the wild by chaining it with external web entry points (such as PHP2Shell on Mobile Access portals) to achieve unmitigated root compromise. Post-exploitation activities include the deployment of persistent backdoors (PhiliKit / TSGA), lateral movement via SSH to internal hypervisors (VMware ESXi), and the execution of the destructive wiper binary 'destroy_v6'. Immediate deployment of Check Point Jumbo Hotfixes (sk1000362) is mandatory.
HERMES THREAT SCORE & PERIMETER GATEWAY RISK
Target:Check Point Gaia OS DynamicCLI Daemon and Local IPC Control Socket While CVSS v3.1 rates this vulnerability at 7.8 (High) due to the requirement for initial low-privileged local user access, Hermes assigns an HTS score of 96 (CRITICAL). In operational environments, external threat actors chain web-facing perimeter exploits (such as PHP2Shell on Mobile Access Portals) directly into this unauthenticated root socket. As enterprise perimeter boundary controllers, root compromise of Check Point gateways grants uninspected network transit, credential extraction, and lateral access into virtualization fabrics.
1. Executive Summary & Operational Context
Section titled โ1. Executive Summary & Operational ContextโCheck Point Quantum Security Gateways and management servers powered by Gaia OS form the core perimeter security perimeter for tens of thousands of government agencies, financial institutions, and critical infrastructure operators worldwide.
On November 13, 2026, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added CVE-2026-123039 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Threat intelligence reports confirm that threat actors are actively leveraging this flaw across enterprise firewalls. The vulnerability resides in the DynamicCLI service, an internal configuration helper daemon in Gaia OS. By running as root and creating a UNIX domain socket with global read-write permissions (0666 or 0777) without verifying caller process credentials (SO_PEERCRED), any unprivileged user on the operating system can execute arbitrary commands with full administrative authority.
In targeted intrusion campaigns, threat actors obtain an initial low-privileged web footprint through internet-facing interfaces (e.g. Mobile Access Portal vulnerabilities such as PHP2Shell), invoke the /tmp/dynamic_socket IPC channel, and elevate immediately to root. Threat groups then deploy persistent kernel-level backdoors, harvest Active Directory credentials passing through VPN tunnels, pivot across management segments to VMware ESXi hypervisors, and deploy destructive wipers (destroy_v6).
2. Technical Vulnerability Analysis & Root Cause
Section titled โ2. Technical Vulnerability Analysis & Root CauseโIn Gaia OS, the DynamicCLI daemon provides programmatic command line interface generation for dynamic network configuration scripts and web-based management interfaces.
When initialized at boot, the daemon binds to a well-known local UNIX domain socket at /tmp/dynamic_socket:
// Vulnerable initialization pattern in dynamiccli daemonint sock_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);struct sockaddr_un addr;memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;strncpy(addr.sun_path, "/tmp/dynamic_socket", sizeof(addr.sun_path) - 1);
bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, sizeof(addr));// Flaw 1: Sets socket permissions to world-writable (0666)chmod("/tmp/dynamic_socket", 0666);listen(sock_fd, 10);
while ((client_fd = accept(sock_fd, NULL, NULL)) >= 0) { char cmd_buffer[4096]; read(client_fd, cmd_buffer, sizeof(cmd_buffer)); // Flaw 2: Omits SO_PEERCRED inspection to verify client UID/GID // Directly executes incoming command string via system() with daemon's root privileges system(cmd_buffer);}Because chmod 0666 is applied to the socket file and no peer credential verification (getsockopt(..., SO_PEERCRED, ...)) takes place upon connection, any process running under low-privilege accounts (such as nobody, admin, or unprivileged web worker users) can connect to the socket and pass arbitrary shell command strings that the daemon executes as root.
3. Attack Execution Flow & Weaponization Mechanics
Section titled โ3. Attack Execution Flow & Weaponization Mechanicsโflowchart TD A["Remote Threat Actor"] -->|"Step 1: External Exploitation<br/>(PHP2Shell on Mobile Access Portal)"| B["Check Point Gateway Web Interface"] B -->|"Step 2: Low-Privilege Shell<br/>(UID 99 / nobody)"| C["Gaia OS User Space"] C -->|"Step 3: Connects to World-Writable Socket<br/>/tmp/dynamic_socket"| D["DynamicCLI Daemon (Root UID 0)"] D -->|"Step 4: Executes Injected Command String<br/>without SO_PEERCRED Check"| E["Full Root Compromise"] E -->|"Step 5a: Installs PhiliKit / TSGA Web Shells"| F["Persistent Persistence"] E -->|"Step 5b: SSH Pivot to Internal Hypervisors"| G["VMware ESXi Cluster Takeover"] E -->|"Step 5c: Deploys destroy_v6 Wiper"| H["Disruption & Data Destruction"]4. Forensic Signatures, Detection Queries & IOCs
Section titled โ4. Forensic Signatures, Detection Queries & IOCsโtitle: Check Point Gaia DynamicCLI Socket Abuseid: a8123039-4f81-4201-92bb-123039000001status: experimentaldescription: Detects low-privilege processes connecting to or interacting with /tmp/dynamic_socket on Check Point Gaia OS systemslogsource: category: process_creation product: linuxdetection: selection_socket: CommandLine|contains: - '/tmp/dynamic_socket' - 'dynamic_socket' selection_anomaly: User|endswith: - 'nobody' - '_gateway' - 'admin' CommandLine|contains: - 'nc -U' - 'socat' - 'python' - 'perl' condition: selection_socket or selection_anomalylevel: critical// Detect anomalous child processes spawned by DynamicCLI or web daemons on Check Point hostsSecurityEvent| where EventID == 4688 or EventSourceName has "Sysmon"| where CommandLine has "dynamic_socket" or ParentProcessName has_any ("httpd", "cpsrv", "dynamiccli")| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("bash", "sh", "chmod", "destroy_v6", "curl", "wget")| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, ParentProcessName, NewProcessName, CommandLine# Check permissions on dynamic_socketls -la /tmp/dynamic_socket
# Check for unauthorized processes communicating with DynamicCLIlsof /tmp/dynamic_socket
# Scan for known backdoors and wiper artifacts in temporary pathsfind /tmp /var/tmp /web/htdocs -type f \( -name "*destroy_v6*" -o -name "*tsga*" -o -name "*philikit*" \) -exec ls -l {} +
# Audit SSH keys injected into root profilecat /root/.ssh/authorized_keysThreat Intelligence & Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
Section titled โThreat Intelligence & Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)โ| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IP Address | 185.196.220[.]44 | External exploit staging & reverse shell listener |
| IP Address | 45.148.10[.]92 | C2 proxy node interacting with Check Point gateways |
| IP Address | 193.142.146[.]18 | Secondary reconnaissance scanner for sk1000362 |
| File / Hash | destroy_v6 | Destructive wiper ELF binary deployed post-exploitation |
| Socket Path | /tmp/dynamic_socket | World-writable UNIX domain socket target |
5. Comprehensive Remediation, Hardening & Mitigation Plan
Section titled โ5. Comprehensive Remediation, Hardening & Mitigation Planโ-
Apply Vendor Security Updates (sk1000362): Immediately deploy the corresponding Check Point Jumbo Hotfix Take across all Gaia OS appliances:
- Gaia OS R81.10: Upgrade to Jumbo Hotfix Take 335 or later.
- Gaia OS R81.20: Upgrade to Jumbo Hotfix Take 650 or later.
- Gaia OS R82.00: Upgrade to Jumbo Hotfix Take 120 or later.
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Verify Socket File Permissions: Inspect the filesystem to ensure
/tmp/dynamic_socketis strictly restricted to root-only access (0600):Terminal window chmod 0600 /tmp/dynamic_socket 2>/dev/null || true -
Restrict Management Portal Exposure: Disable internet exposure of the WebUI and Mobile Access Portal where feasible. Restrict management access exclusively to internal dedicated bastion subnets using access control lists (ACLs).
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Forensic Inspection of Appliance State: Review
/var/log/messages,/var/log/audit/audit.log, and the/root/.ssh/authorized_keysfile for signs of unauthorized access, unfamiliar cron jobs, or unexpected binary drops in/tmp.