CVE-2026-129483: Cyrus SASL SRP Server Authentication Bypass via Non-Zero Modulus Multiple
Cyrus SASL versions up to 2.1.28 contain a critical cryptographic authentication bypass (CVE-2026-129483, CVSS 9.8) in the Secure Remote Password (SRP) server plugin ('plugins/srp.c', function 'srp_server_mech_step2'). While RFC 5054 requires servers to reject any client ephemeral public value A where A mod N == 0, Cyrus SASL only validates that A > 0. An unauthenticated attacker can supply A = N (or any positive multiple of the group modulus N), forcing the server's derived shared secret K to zero and authenticating as any user without knowing their password. Disable the SASL SRP mechanism immediately or apply the upstream modulus check.
HERMES THREAT SCORE & ENTERPRISE RISK EVALUATION
Target:Cyrus SASL <= 2.1.28 (plugins/srp.c / srp_server_mech_step2) Hermes assigns HTS 91 (CRITICAL) because Cyrus SASL is a foundational authentication library embedded across Linux mail servers (Cyrus IMAP, Postfix), LDAP directories, and enterprise messaging daemons. Any deployment enabling the SRP mechanism allows trivial mathematical authentication bypass with zero credentials.
1. Executive Summary & Operational Context
Section titled โ1. Executive Summary & Operational ContextโCVE-2026-129483 (CVSS v3.1 9.8 Critical, Hermes Threat Score 91 / CRITICAL) is a mathematical authentication bypass vulnerability in Cyrus SASL through version 2.1.28. Disclosed via VulnCheck on November 15, 2026, the flaw affects deployments that permit the SRP (Secure Remote Password) SASL mechanism (libsrp).
Because Cyrus SASL underpins authentication for mail transfer agents (Postfix, Sendmail), IMAP servers (Cyrus IMAP), Subversion (svnserve), and OpenLDAP/directory services, an unauthenticated remote attacker can impersonate any valid usernameโincluding administrative or service accountsโwithout possessing the password or verifier.
2. Technical Vulnerability Analysis & Root Cause
Section titled โ2. Technical Vulnerability Analysis & Root CauseโIn the SRP-6a protocol (RFC 5054, Section 2.5.1), the server must abort authentication if the clientโs ephemeral public value A satisfies A % N == 0 (where N is the large safe prime group modulus). If A is congruent to 0 mod N, then the serverโs shared secret computation collapses:
- Server computation: $S = (A \cdot v^u)^b \bmod N$. When $A \equiv 0 \pmod N$, $S = 0$ regardless of the password verifier $v$ or random exponent $b$.
- Flaw in
plugins/srp.c: Insidesrp_server_mech_step2(), Cyrus SASL checks only whetherAis non-zero (BN_is_zero(A)), failing to checkA mod N != 0. - Exploitation: Sending
A = N(or2 * N) passes theA > 0check while forcingS = 0and deriving a predictable session keyK = H(0). The attacker then computes the exact client proofM1expected by the server and gains full authenticated access.
3. Attack Execution Flow & Weaponization Mechanics
Section titled โ3. Attack Execution Flow & Weaponization MechanicsโsequenceDiagram autonumber participant Attacker as Unauthenticated Client participant Server as Cyrus SASL (plugins/srp.c)
Attacker->>Server: Initiate SASL SRP auth as target username (e.g., admin) Server-->>Attacker: Send group modulus N, generator g, salt s, and server ephemeral B Attacker->>Attacker: Set A = N (non-zero, but A mod N == 0) Attacker->>Server: Send A = N and proof M1 derived from S = 0 Note over Server: srp_server_mech_step2 checks A != 0 (passes!)<br/>Computes S = (N * v^u)^b mod N = 0 Server-->>Attacker: M1 matches! Authentication succeeded as target user4. Forensic Signatures, Detection Queries & IOCs
Section titled โ4. Forensic Signatures, Detection Queries & IOCsโ# Check if the SRP SASL plugin is present on Linux hostsls -la /usr/lib*/sasl2/libsrp* /usr/lib/*/sasl2/libsrp* 2>/dev/null
# Inspect SASL configuration files for mech_list permitting SRPgrep -rn "SRP" /etc/sasl2/ /etc/postfix/sasl/ /etc/imapd.conf 2>/dev/null- Mail / Auth Logs (
/var/log/mail.log,/var/log/auth.log): Unexpected successful SASL logins usingmech=SRPfor privileged or dormant accounts from external IP addresses. - Protocol Anomaly: SASL SRP client handshake packets where the transmitted public value
Aequals the serverโs advertised modulusNor a small multiple thereof.
5. Comprehensive Remediation, Hardening & Mitigation Plan
Section titled โ5. Comprehensive Remediation, Hardening & Mitigation Planโ- Disable the SRP Mechanism Immediately (Fastest Mitigation):
Restrict
mech_listin/etc/sasl2/*.conf,/etc/postfix/sasl/smtpd.conf, and/etc/imapd.confto explicitly excludeSRP(for example:mech_list: PLAIN LOGIN SCRAM-SHA-256over TLS), or removelibsrp.so*from the SASL plugin directory if unused. - Apply Upstream Patch & Rebuild:
Apply the upstream patch to
plugins/srp.cinsrp_server_mech_step2that validates(A mod N) != 0before computing the shared secretS, or install your Linux distributionโs patchedcyrus-saslpackage as soon as released. - Restart Dependent Daemons:
Restart
postfix,cyrus-imapd,slapd, and any other services linked againstlibsasl2so the updated configuration or library takes effect. - Audit Recent SRP Logins:
Review historical authentication logs for any
SRPlogins and rotate credentials or revoke sessions for any affected accounts.