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CVE-2026-129483: Cyrus SASL SRP Server Authentication Bypass via Non-Zero Modulus Multiple

Density:
C-Level Executive Briefing CVE-2026-129483 CRITICAL SCORE 91/100

Cyrus SASL versions up to 2.1.28 contain a critical cryptographic authentication bypass (CVE-2026-129483, CVSS 9.8) in the Secure Remote Password (SRP) server plugin ('plugins/srp.c', function 'srp_server_mech_step2'). While RFC 5054 requires servers to reject any client ephemeral public value A where A mod N == 0, Cyrus SASL only validates that A > 0. An unauthenticated attacker can supply A = N (or any positive multiple of the group modulus N), forcing the server's derived shared secret K to zero and authenticating as any user without knowing their password. Disable the SASL SRP mechanism immediately or apply the upstream modulus check.

HERMES

HERMES THREAT SCORE & ENTERPRISE RISK EVALUATION

Target: Cyrus SASL <= 2.1.28 (plugins/srp.c / srp_server_mech_step2)
Confidence: 97%
91 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 19 / 20
Threat Activity 17 / 20
Weaponization 19 / 20
Exposure 19 / 20
Prevalence 19 / 20
Impact 19 / 20
Exploit Maturity 18 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 18 / 20
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

Hermes assigns HTS 91 (CRITICAL) because Cyrus SASL is a foundational authentication library embedded across Linux mail servers (Cyrus IMAP, Postfix), LDAP directories, and enterprise messaging daemons. Any deployment enabling the SRP mechanism allows trivial mathematical authentication bypass with zero credentials.


CVE-2026-129483 (CVSS v3.1 9.8 Critical, Hermes Threat Score 91 / CRITICAL) is a mathematical authentication bypass vulnerability in Cyrus SASL through version 2.1.28. Disclosed via VulnCheck on November 15, 2026, the flaw affects deployments that permit the SRP (Secure Remote Password) SASL mechanism (libsrp).

Because Cyrus SASL underpins authentication for mail transfer agents (Postfix, Sendmail), IMAP servers (Cyrus IMAP), Subversion (svnserve), and OpenLDAP/directory services, an unauthenticated remote attacker can impersonate any valid usernameโ€”including administrative or service accountsโ€”without possessing the password or verifier.


In the SRP-6a protocol (RFC 5054, Section 2.5.1), the server must abort authentication if the clientโ€™s ephemeral public value A satisfies A % N == 0 (where N is the large safe prime group modulus). If A is congruent to 0 mod N, then the serverโ€™s shared secret computation collapses:

  • Server computation: $S = (A \cdot v^u)^b \bmod N$. When $A \equiv 0 \pmod N$, $S = 0$ regardless of the password verifier $v$ or random exponent $b$.
  • Flaw in plugins/srp.c: Inside srp_server_mech_step2(), Cyrus SASL checks only whether A is non-zero (BN_is_zero(A)), failing to check A mod N != 0.
  • Exploitation: Sending A = N (or 2 * N) passes the A > 0 check while forcing S = 0 and deriving a predictable session key K = H(0). The attacker then computes the exact client proof M1 expected by the server and gains full authenticated access.

sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant Attacker as Unauthenticated Client
participant Server as Cyrus SASL (plugins/srp.c)
Attacker->>Server: Initiate SASL SRP auth as target username (e.g., admin)
Server-->>Attacker: Send group modulus N, generator g, salt s, and server ephemeral B
Attacker->>Attacker: Set A = N (non-zero, but A mod N == 0)
Attacker->>Server: Send A = N and proof M1 derived from S = 0
Note over Server: srp_server_mech_step2 checks A != 0 (passes!)<br/>Computes S = (N * v^u)^b mod N = 0
Server-->>Attacker: M1 matches! Authentication succeeded as target user

Terminal window
# Check if the SRP SASL plugin is present on Linux hosts
ls -la /usr/lib*/sasl2/libsrp* /usr/lib/*/sasl2/libsrp* 2>/dev/null
# Inspect SASL configuration files for mech_list permitting SRP
grep -rn "SRP" /etc/sasl2/ /etc/postfix/sasl/ /etc/imapd.conf 2>/dev/null

  1. Disable the SRP Mechanism Immediately (Fastest Mitigation): Restrict mech_list in /etc/sasl2/*.conf, /etc/postfix/sasl/smtpd.conf, and /etc/imapd.conf to explicitly exclude SRP (for example: mech_list: PLAIN LOGIN SCRAM-SHA-256 over TLS), or remove libsrp.so* from the SASL plugin directory if unused.
  2. Apply Upstream Patch & Rebuild: Apply the upstream patch to plugins/srp.c in srp_server_mech_step2 that validates (A mod N) != 0 before computing the shared secret S, or install your Linux distributionโ€™s patched cyrus-sasl package as soon as released.
  3. Restart Dependent Daemons: Restart postfix, cyrus-imapd, slapd, and any other services linked against libsasl2 so the updated configuration or library takes effect.
  4. Audit Recent SRP Logins: Review historical authentication logs for any SRP logins and rotate credentials or revoke sessions for any affected accounts.