CVE-2026-59823: BerriAI LiteLLM user_config Input Validation Bypass Server-Side Request Forgery
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw in BerriAI LiteLLM (< 1.83.9) enables authenticated callers to bypass internal request validation routines by submitting crafted user_config parameters. Attackers can redirect outbound model requests to attacker-controlled listeners or cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS / GCP metadata), exfiltrating high-value master LLM API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, Bedrock) and cloud IAM credentials.
HERMES THREAT SCORE & CLOUD SSRF EXPOSURE EVALUATION
Target:BerriAI LiteLLM Request Validation Engine (is_request_body_safe / api_base) While CVSS v3.1 rates this at 6.5, the Hermes Threat Score rates it at 82 (HIGH) because LiteLLM instances in Kubernetes or ECS clusters hold access to IAM instance credentials and downstream enterprise API keys.
CVE-2026-59823: BerriAI LiteLLM user_config Input Validation Bypass Server-Side Request ForgeryVULNERABILITY
Enterprise LLM proxy gateway supporting Model Context Protocol (MCP) streamable endpoints and unified LLM APIs.
๐ Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“Confirmed security vulnerability in LiteLLM Proxy & MCP Server documented in Hermes dossier.”
- [vulnerability_report]
- [government_confirmation]CISA verified active exploitation in the wild and mandated federal remediation deadline in KEV entry. — Source: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA Adds CVE-2026-59822 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Reliability: VERY_HIGH)
Technical Overview & Root Cause Analysis
Section titled โTechnical Overview & Root Cause AnalysisโLiteLLM validates incoming completion bodies using internal helper functions such as is_request_body_safe().
In versions prior to 1.83.9, the proxy permitted client requests to supply nested user_config objects specifying custom api_base parameters. The validation pipeline failed to re-validate this nested override against the global allowed-hosts list:
POST /chat/completions HTTP/1.1Host: litellm.corp.internal:4000Authorization: Bearer sk-test-keyContent-Type: application/json
{ "model": "gpt-4o", "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "ping"}], "user_config": { "api_base": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" }}When LiteLLM dispatches the HTTP client request, it attaches the configured upstream master Bearer token and targets the injected address, effectively leaking master secrets to the target listener.
Remediation
Section titled โRemediationโ- Upgrade: Update LiteLLM to
1.83.9or higher. - IMDSv2 Enforcement: Require token-backed Session Identifiers (IMDSv2) with hop limit set to 1 across cloud nodes.