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CVE-2026-62911: Microsoft Exchange Server Authentication Bypass by Capture-Replay Remote Code Execution Chain

Density:
HERMES

HERMES THREAT SCORE & ENTERPRISE PERIMETER EXPOSURE

Target: Microsoft Exchange Server - IIS Virtual Directories & Remote PowerShell Backend
Confidence: 99%
98 / 100
EXTREME

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 20 / 20
Threat Activity 20 / 20
Weaponization 20 / 20
Exposure 19 / 20
Prevalence 19 / 20
Impact 20 / 20
Exploit Maturity 20 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 20 / 20
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

Vendor CVSS v3.1 rates this vulnerability at 8.0 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) with Low privileges and User Interaction required. The Hermes Threat Score elevates it to 98 (EXTREME). Real-world telemetry from The Shadowserver Foundation reveals active Internet-wide mass scanning and automated exploitation campaigns targeting exposed on-premises Exchange servers. Adversaries chain unauthenticated coercion techniques (e.g., PetitPotam or printer bug) to capture machine and administrative NTLM negotiation tokens, replaying them to unhardened Exchange Web Services (EWS) or PowerShell virtual directories that lack Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA), instantly achieving SYSTEM-level code execution with zero credential disclosure.

๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-62911: Microsoft Exchange Server Authentication Bypass by Capture-Replay Remote Code Execution ChainVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTMicrosoft Exchange Server
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange Server documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

Microsoft Exchange Server remains the communication backbone and Active Directory anchor for tens of thousands of corporate and government enterprises worldwide.

ParameterTechnical SpecificationOperational Impact
CVE IdentifierCVE-2026-62911Global tracking reference
Vendor AdvisoryMicrosoft MSRC CVE-2026-62911 Security UpdateAugust 2026 Cumulative Patch Release
Monitoring SourceThe Shadowserver Foundation TelemetryDaily scanning & compromised host detection
Vulnerability ClassAuthentication Bypass by Capture-Replay (CWE-294)Token replay to privileged Exchange endpoints
Affected ComponentsExchange IIS Web Front-End (EWS, PowerShell, Autodiscover)Authentication token verification & TLS channel binding
Affected BuildsExchange 2016 CU23 (< 15.1.2507.41), Exchange 2019 CU13/14 (< 15.2.1258.37, < 15.2.1544.17)On-premises and hybrid Exchange instances
Fixed Builds15.1.2507.41, 15.2.1258.37, 15.2.1544.17Enforces EPA and Service Binding
Operational ImpactTotal Enterprise Domain CompromiseExchange Organization Management & Active Directory takeover

The core flaw in CVE-2026-62911 centers on how Exchangeโ€™s Internet Information Services (IIS) application pool modules handle NTLM Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 messages over TLS connections:

ATTACKER / COERCER TARGET HOST / DC EXCHANGE SERVER (IIS)
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ 1. Coerce Auth (PetitPotam/WebDAV) โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€>โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ 2. Outbound NTLM Type 1 (Negotiate) โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚<โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ค โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ 3. Forward Type 1 to Exchange /EWS โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ผโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€>โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ 4. Exchange Type 2 Challenge โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚<โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ผโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ค
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ 5. Relay Challenge to Victim Host โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€>โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ 6. Victim Signs Challenge (Type 3) โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚<โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ค โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ 7. Replay Type 3 to /PowerShell โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ผโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€>โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ [VULNERABILITY: No TLS Channel Bind] โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ Exchange validates NTLM challenge โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ WITHOUT checking TLS hash binding โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ 8. Authenticated Admin Session Granted โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚<โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ผโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ค
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ 9. Execute Remote PowerShell / WebShell โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€>โ”‚

When Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA) is disabled or set to None, IIS does not compare the Channel Binding Token (derived from the SHA-256 hash of the serverโ€™s TLS certificate) sent inside the NTLM Type 3 message with the actual TLS connection state. Consequently, credentials negotiated with an attacker-controlled intermediary can be replayed to any Exchange virtual directory without triggering an authentication failure.

// Conceptual reconstruction of vulnerable IIS authentication validation
public SecurityStatus ValidateNTLMToken(byte[] ntlmType3Message, HttpListenerContext context)
{
// Extract NTLM AV_PAIR from TargetInfo
var targetInfo = NtlmParser.ExtractTargetInfo(ntlmType3Message);
var channelBindingHash = targetInfo.GetChannelBindingToken();
// VULNERABILITY: When ExtendedProtection is not enforced, Channel Binding is bypassed
if (!this.Configuration.ExtendedProtectionEnforced)
{
// Token accepted purely on signature validity across challenge-response
return AuthenticateAgainstLsa(ntlmType3Message);
}
// Fixed logic: Compute server TLS endpoint hash and verify strict match
byte[] expectedTlsBinding = TlsBindingHelper.ComputeServerChannelHash(context.Connection);
if (!CryptographicEquals(channelBindingHash, expectedTlsBinding))
{
SecurityEventLogger.LogAuthReplayAttempt(context.RemoteEndpoint);
return SecurityStatus.LogonDenied;
}
return AuthenticateAgainstLsa(ntlmType3Message);
}

Threat actors actively exploit CVE-2026-62911 in the wild using multi-stage initial access and lateral movement chains:

  1. Remote Authentication Coercion: The adversary sends an unauthenticated RPC call (such as MS-EFSR EfsRpcOpenFileRaw or MS-RPRN RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx) to an internal server or Domain Controller, forcing it to authenticate back to the attackerโ€™s listener machine.
  2. Token Relay Pipeline: The attackerโ€™s relay utility (e.g., customized Impacket or Responder variants) receives the incoming NTLM connection and forwards the negotiation handshake to the target Exchange serverโ€™s /autodiscover/autodiscover.json or /EWS/Exchange.asmx endpoints over HTTPS.
  3. Privilege Elevation & Mailbox Impersonation: Replaying credentials of high-privilege service accounts or Exchange Organization Admins allows the attacker to invoke the Exchange Web Services API with ExchangeImpersonation privileges, reading sensitive executive email threads and modifying inbox forwarding rules.
  4. Remote Code Execution via PowerShell: By replaying authentication to the /powershell virtual directory, the adversary spawns an authenticated remote PowerShell session, issuing cmdlets such as New-ManagementRoleAssignment -Role "Mailbox Import Export" or exporting malicious web shells directly into web-accessible IIS directories.

Security teams must audit Exchange IIS logs, network authentication flows, and Active Directory event logs for indicators of capture-replay activity.

title: Microsoft Exchange NTLM Capture-Replay Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-62911)
id: 5a8e1b2f-6291-4c11-9a72-8234a1b02691
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious Exchange PowerShell and EWS sessions established from unusual source IPs matching NTLM relay patterns without valid Channel Binding.
author: Hermes Codex Cyber Intelligence
date: 2026-09-30
references:
- https://dashboard.shadowserver.org/
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-62911
logsource:
category: webserver
product: exchange
detection:
selection_paths:
cs-method: 'POST'
cs-uri-stem|contains:
- '/powershell'
- '/ews/exchange.asmx'
- '/autodiscover/autodiscover.json'
selection_auth:
cs-username|endswith: '$' # Machine accounts authenticating to interactive Exchange services
selection_status:
sc-status: 200
filter_known_subnets:
c-ip|cidr:
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
condition: selection_paths and selection_auth and selection_status and not filter_known_subnets
fields:
- c-ip
- cs-username
- cs-uri-stem
- cs-User-Agent
falsepositives:
- Legitimate machine accounts running scheduled backup or migration scripts from authorized administration subnets
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1187
- attack.t1557.001
- cve.2026.62911

  1. Apply August 2026 Exchange Security Updates:
    Install the relevant Security Update (SU) across all mailbox and edge transport servers:

    • Exchange Server 2019 CU14: Build 15.2.1544.17 (or higher)
    • Exchange Server 2019 CU13: Build 15.2.1258.37 (or higher)
    • Exchange Server 2016 CU23: Build 15.1.2507.41 (or higher)
  2. Mandate Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA):
    Run the official Microsoft script to enable EPA across all virtual directories:

    Terminal window
    .\ExchangeExtendedProtectionManagement.ps1 -EnableExtendedProtection

    Ensure that TLS termination is not performed by intermediate load balancers without SSL bridging and certificate re-encryption, as TLS offloading breaks Channel Binding Tokens.

  3. Disable NTLM in Favor of Kerberos:
    Configure Kerberos authentication for Exchange front-ends and migrate internal authentication policies to disallow legacy NTLM protocols across the Active Directory forest.

  4. Enforce SMB Signing & WebDAV Restrictions:
    Block unauthenticated outbound HTTP/WebDAV traffic from servers and enforce SMB signing on all Active Directory endpoints to thwart authentication coercion primitives.