CVE-2026-62911: Microsoft Exchange Server Authentication Bypass by Capture-Replay Remote Code Execution Chain
HERMES THREAT SCORE & ENTERPRISE PERIMETER EXPOSURE
Target:Microsoft Exchange Server - IIS Virtual Directories & Remote PowerShell Backend Vendor CVSS v3.1 rates this vulnerability at 8.0 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) with Low privileges and User Interaction required. The Hermes Threat Score elevates it to 98 (EXTREME). Real-world telemetry from The Shadowserver Foundation reveals active Internet-wide mass scanning and automated exploitation campaigns targeting exposed on-premises Exchange servers. Adversaries chain unauthenticated coercion techniques (e.g., PetitPotam or printer bug) to capture machine and administrative NTLM negotiation tokens, replaying them to unhardened Exchange Web Services (EWS) or PowerShell virtual directories that lack Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA), instantly achieving SYSTEM-level code execution with zero credential disclosure.
CVE-2026-62911: Microsoft Exchange Server Authentication Bypass by Capture-Replay Remote Code Execution ChainVULNERABILITY
Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.
๐ Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“Confirmed security vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange Server documented in Hermes dossier.”
- [vulnerability_report]
- [government_confirmation]CISA verified active exploitation in the wild and mandated federal remediation deadline in KEV entry. — Source: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA Adds CVE-2026-59822 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Reliability: VERY_HIGH)
1. Technical Context & Affected Software Matrix
Section titled โ1. Technical Context & Affected Software MatrixโMicrosoft Exchange Server remains the communication backbone and Active Directory anchor for tens of thousands of corporate and government enterprises worldwide.
| Parameter | Technical Specification | Operational Impact |
|---|---|---|
| CVE Identifier | CVE-2026-62911 | Global tracking reference |
| Vendor Advisory | Microsoft MSRC CVE-2026-62911 Security Update | August 2026 Cumulative Patch Release |
| Monitoring Source | The Shadowserver Foundation Telemetry | Daily scanning & compromised host detection |
| Vulnerability Class | Authentication Bypass by Capture-Replay (CWE-294) | Token replay to privileged Exchange endpoints |
| Affected Components | Exchange IIS Web Front-End (EWS, PowerShell, Autodiscover) | Authentication token verification & TLS channel binding |
| Affected Builds | Exchange 2016 CU23 (< 15.1.2507.41), Exchange 2019 CU13/14 (< 15.2.1258.37, < 15.2.1544.17) | On-premises and hybrid Exchange instances |
| Fixed Builds | 15.1.2507.41, 15.2.1258.37, 15.2.1544.17 | Enforces EPA and Service Binding |
| Operational Impact | Total Enterprise Domain Compromise | Exchange Organization Management & Active Directory takeover |
2. In-Depth Technical Decomposition
Section titled โ2. In-Depth Technical DecompositionโThe Flaw: Missing Channel Binding in NTLM Authentication
Section titled โThe Flaw: Missing Channel Binding in NTLM AuthenticationโThe core flaw in CVE-2026-62911 centers on how Exchangeโs Internet Information Services (IIS) application pool modules handle NTLM Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 messages over TLS connections:
ATTACKER / COERCER TARGET HOST / DC EXCHANGE SERVER (IIS) โ โ โ โ 1. Coerce Auth (PetitPotam/WebDAV) โ โ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ>โ โ โ โ โ โ 2. Outbound NTLM Type 1 (Negotiate) โ โ โ<โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโค โ โ โ โ โ 3. Forward Type 1 to Exchange /EWS โ โ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโผโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ>โ โ โ โ โ 4. Exchange Type 2 Challenge โ โ โ<โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโผโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโค โ โ โ โ 5. Relay Challenge to Victim Host โ โ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ>โ โ โ โ โ โ 6. Victim Signs Challenge (Type 3) โ โ โ<โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโค โ โ โ โ โ 7. Replay Type 3 to /PowerShell โ โ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโผโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ>โ โ โ โ โ โ [VULNERABILITY: No TLS Channel Bind] โ โ โ Exchange validates NTLM challenge โ โ โ WITHOUT checking TLS hash binding โ โ โ โ โ 8. Authenticated Admin Session Granted โ โ โ<โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโผโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโค โ โ โ โ 9. Execute Remote PowerShell / WebShell โ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ>โWhen Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA) is disabled or set to None, IIS does not compare the Channel Binding Token (derived from the SHA-256 hash of the serverโs TLS certificate) sent inside the NTLM Type 3 message with the actual TLS connection state. Consequently, credentials negotiated with an attacker-controlled intermediary can be replayed to any Exchange virtual directory without triggering an authentication failure.
Vulnerable Logic in Authentication Filter
Section titled โVulnerable Logic in Authentication Filterโ// Conceptual reconstruction of vulnerable IIS authentication validationpublic SecurityStatus ValidateNTLMToken(byte[] ntlmType3Message, HttpListenerContext context){ // Extract NTLM AV_PAIR from TargetInfo var targetInfo = NtlmParser.ExtractTargetInfo(ntlmType3Message); var channelBindingHash = targetInfo.GetChannelBindingToken();
// VULNERABILITY: When ExtendedProtection is not enforced, Channel Binding is bypassed if (!this.Configuration.ExtendedProtectionEnforced) { // Token accepted purely on signature validity across challenge-response return AuthenticateAgainstLsa(ntlmType3Message); }
// Fixed logic: Compute server TLS endpoint hash and verify strict match byte[] expectedTlsBinding = TlsBindingHelper.ComputeServerChannelHash(context.Connection); if (!CryptographicEquals(channelBindingHash, expectedTlsBinding)) { SecurityEventLogger.LogAuthReplayAttempt(context.RemoteEndpoint); return SecurityStatus.LogonDenied; }
return AuthenticateAgainstLsa(ntlmType3Message);}3. Attack Vectors & Real-World Weaponization
Section titled โ3. Attack Vectors & Real-World WeaponizationโThreat actors actively exploit CVE-2026-62911 in the wild using multi-stage initial access and lateral movement chains:
- Remote Authentication Coercion: The adversary sends an unauthenticated RPC call (such as MS-EFSR
EfsRpcOpenFileRawor MS-RPRNRpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx) to an internal server or Domain Controller, forcing it to authenticate back to the attackerโs listener machine. - Token Relay Pipeline: The attackerโs relay utility (e.g., customized Impacket or Responder variants) receives the incoming NTLM connection and forwards the negotiation handshake to the target Exchange serverโs
/autodiscover/autodiscover.jsonor/EWS/Exchange.asmxendpoints over HTTPS. - Privilege Elevation & Mailbox Impersonation: Replaying credentials of high-privilege service accounts or Exchange Organization Admins allows the attacker to invoke the Exchange Web Services API with
ExchangeImpersonationprivileges, reading sensitive executive email threads and modifying inbox forwarding rules. - Remote Code Execution via PowerShell: By replaying authentication to the
/powershellvirtual directory, the adversary spawns an authenticated remote PowerShell session, issuing cmdlets such asNew-ManagementRoleAssignment -Role "Mailbox Import Export"or exporting malicious web shells directly into web-accessible IIS directories.
4. Forensic Triage & Detection Engineering
Section titled โ4. Forensic Triage & Detection EngineeringโSecurity teams must audit Exchange IIS logs, network authentication flows, and Active Directory event logs for indicators of capture-replay activity.
title: Microsoft Exchange NTLM Capture-Replay Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-62911)id: 5a8e1b2f-6291-4c11-9a72-8234a1b02691status: experimentaldescription: Detects suspicious Exchange PowerShell and EWS sessions established from unusual source IPs matching NTLM relay patterns without valid Channel Binding.author: Hermes Codex Cyber Intelligencedate: 2026-09-30references: - https://dashboard.shadowserver.org/ - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-62911logsource: category: webserver product: exchangedetection: selection_paths: cs-method: 'POST' cs-uri-stem|contains: - '/powershell' - '/ews/exchange.asmx' - '/autodiscover/autodiscover.json' selection_auth: cs-username|endswith: '$' # Machine accounts authenticating to interactive Exchange services selection_status: sc-status: 200 filter_known_subnets: c-ip|cidr: - '10.0.0.0/8' - '172.16.0.0/12' - '192.168.0.0/16' condition: selection_paths and selection_auth and selection_status and not filter_known_subnetsfields: - c-ip - cs-username - cs-uri-stem - cs-User-Agentfalsepositives: - Legitimate machine accounts running scheduled backup or migration scripts from authorized administration subnetslevel: hightags: - attack.initial_access - attack.credential_access - attack.t1187 - attack.t1557.001 - cve.2026.62911// Detect anomalous machine account authentication to Exchange Virtual Directories// CVE-2026-62911 Relay & Auth Bypass HuntW3CIISLog| where TimeGenerated >= ago(7d)| where csUriStem has_any ("/powershell", "/ews/exchange.asmx", "/ecp", "/autodiscover")| where csUserName endswith "$" // Machine account relay indicator| where scStatus == 200| summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), RequestCount = count(), TargetUris = make_set(csUriStem), UserAgents = make_set(csUserAgent) by cIP, csUserName, sComputerName| order by RequestCount desc# Forensic Audit Script: Verify Extended Protection Status on Exchange Virtual DirectoriesImport-Module WebAdministration -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Write-Host "[*] Auditing Exchange Virtual Directories for CVE-2026-62911 Exposure..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$sites = Get-ChildItem "IIS:\Sites\Exchange Back End", "IIS:\Sites\Default Web Site" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue$vulnerableCount = 0
foreach ($site in $sites) { $vdirs = Get-WebVirtualDirectory -Site $site.Name foreach ($vdir in $vdirs) { $path = "IIS:\Sites\$($site.Name)\$($vdir.Name)" $auth = Get-WebConfiguration -Filter "system.webServer/security/authentication/windowsAuthentication" -PSPath $path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($auth -and $auth.enabled -eq $true) { $ep = $auth.extendedProtection.tokenChecking if ($ep -ne "Require") { Write-Host "[!] VULNERABLE: $($site.Name)/$($vdir.Name) - Extended Protection is '$ep' (Expected: 'Require')" -ForegroundColor Red $vulnerableCount++ } else { Write-Host "[+] SECURE: $($site.Name)/$($vdir.Name) - Extended Protection is Enforced" -ForegroundColor Green } } }}
if ($vulnerableCount -gt 0) { Write-Warning "[!] Found $vulnerableCount virtual directories exposed to NTLM capture-replay attacks."} else { Write-Host "[+] All assessed virtual directories have Extended Protection enforced." -ForegroundColor Green}5. Remediation Strategy & Hardening
Section titled โ5. Remediation Strategy & Hardeningโ-
Apply August 2026 Exchange Security Updates:
Install the relevant Security Update (SU) across all mailbox and edge transport servers:- Exchange Server 2019 CU14: Build
15.2.1544.17(or higher) - Exchange Server 2019 CU13: Build
15.2.1258.37(or higher) - Exchange Server 2016 CU23: Build
15.1.2507.41(or higher)
- Exchange Server 2019 CU14: Build
-
Mandate Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA):
Run the official Microsoft script to enable EPA across all virtual directories:Terminal window .\ExchangeExtendedProtectionManagement.ps1 -EnableExtendedProtectionEnsure that TLS termination is not performed by intermediate load balancers without SSL bridging and certificate re-encryption, as TLS offloading breaks Channel Binding Tokens.
-
Disable NTLM in Favor of Kerberos:
Configure Kerberos authentication for Exchange front-ends and migrate internal authentication policies to disallow legacy NTLM protocols across the Active Directory forest. -
Enforce SMB Signing & WebDAV Restrictions:
Block unauthenticated outbound HTTP/WebDAV traffic from servers and enforce SMB signing on all Active Directory endpoints to thwart authentication coercion primitives.