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CVE-2026-72898: Metabase Pre-Authentication SQL Injection in Password Reset via HoneySQL Bypass

Density:
HERMES

HERMES THREAT SCORE & ENTERPRISE BI PERIMETER EVALUATION

Target: Metabase Business Intelligence Suite โ€” Password Reset API & Clojure HoneySQL Core
Confidence: 99%
98 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 20 / 20
Threat Activity 20 / 20
Weaponization 20 / 20
Exposure 20 / 20
Prevalence 18 / 20
Impact 20 / 20
Exploit Maturity 20 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 20 / 20
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

CVSS v3.1 assigns a maximum score of 10.0 (Critical) due to unauthenticated network exploitability with total loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability across authorization scopes. The Hermes Threat Score evaluates this vulnerability at 98 (CRITICAL) with an Agentic Security Score (HASS) of 72 (HIGH). Metabase operates as a centralized data aggregation and visualization gateway connecting directly to high-value enterprise databases and data lakes (Snowflake, BigQuery, PostgreSQL, MySQL). Unauthenticated SQL injection on /api/session/reset_password allows adversaries to extract the application encryption key (MB_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_KEY), decrypt stored database credentials, and forge administrative sessions in the core_session table. The Shadowserver Foundation sensor telemetry documents mass scanning and automated exploitation campaigns on port 3000/tcp, demonstrating active in-the-wild weaponization.

๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-72898: Metabase Pre-Authentication SQL Injection in Password Reset via HoneySQL BypassVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTMetabase Business Intelligence
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in Metabase Business Intelligence documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

Metabase serves as an analytics layer across modern data stacks. It runs as a Clojure application on the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), using the HoneySQL library to programmatically generate database queries against its application database.

ParameterTechnical SpecificationOperational Details
CVE IdentifierCVE-2026-72898International vulnerability catalog identifier
Affected ProductMetabase Open Source & EnterpriseBusiness intelligence & reporting analytics platform
Vulnerable Componentsrc/metabase/api/session.clj & user reset modelPassword reset token verification handler
Vulnerability ClassCWE-89 / CWE-287 / CWE-306SQL Injection / Missing Authentication / Authentication Bypass
Attack VectorNetwork (POST /api/session/reset_password)Single unauthenticated HTTP payload
Remediation Releasesv0.58.24, v0.59.21, v0.60.17, v0.61.11, v0.62.9, v0.63.5Strict parameterization and token sanitization
[ Unauthenticated Remote Attacker ]
|
1. POST /api/session/reset_password
- token: "' UNION SELECT ... INTO core_session --"
- password: "AttackerSuppliedSecret!"
|
v
+-------------------------------------------+
| Metabase Jetty Web Server (:3000) |
| Endpoint: /api/session/reset_password |
+-------------------------------------------+
|
v
+-------------------------------------------+
| Vulnerable Clojure Token Handler |
| Bypasses HoneySQL parameterization; |
| Concatenates raw reset token into SQL |
+-------------------------------------------+
|
v
+-------------------------------------------+
| Metabase Internal Metadata Database |
| (H2 / PostgreSQL / MySQL) |
| - Executes Injected SQL Statement |
| - Inserts session into core_session |
| - Leaks MB_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_KEY |
+-------------------------------------------+
|
v
2. GET /api/user/current (Cookie: metabase.SESSION=<forged_token>)
|
v
+-------------------------------------------+
| Full Admin Compromise & DB Pivot |
| - Access connected Snowflake/Postgres DBs|
| - Remote code execution via native SQL |
+-------------------------------------------+

In Metabase, password resets are processed via /api/session/reset_password. The endpoint accepts a JSON dictionary containing the password reset token and the new password. The application resolves the reset token by querying the user record associated with the token.

In vulnerable versions, the token lookup routine in the Clojure session namespace failed to pass the input through HoneySQLโ€™s parameterized binding map. Instead, a string formatting helper constructed an unparameterized raw query fragment:

;; Vulnerable Implementation in session token validation
(defn get-user-by-reset-token [token]
(let [sql-query (str "SELECT u.* FROM core_user u "
"JOIN reset_token r ON u.id = r.user_id "
"WHERE r.token = '" token "' AND r.expires_at > NOW()")]
(db/query-one (honeysql.core/raw sql-query))))

Because token is passed directly into honeysql.core/raw without parameter binding (?), an attacker who supplies a token such as:

' OR 1=1; INSERT INTO core_session (id, user_id, created_at) VALUES ('attacker-session-uuid', 1, NOW()); --

causes the application database engine to execute stacked queries (in PostgreSQL or H2) or union queries, writing an active session token tied to user_id = 1 (the primary instance administrator) directly into the core_session table.


Telemetry from The Shadowserver Foundation and honeypots shows that threat actors exploit this flaw in a two-step automated cadence:

  1. Probe and Session Injection: The adversary issues an HTTP POST request to /api/session/reset_password carrying the injection payload in the token field. Metabase executes the SQL injection and returns an HTTP 400 Bad Request (due to subsequent schema verification failing), while the database transaction commits the forged session row into core_session.
  2. Session Verification: Immediately following the HTTP 400 response, the adversary sends GET /api/user/current containing the cookie metabase.SESSION=<forged_uuid>. Metabase validates the session against core_session and returns HTTP 200 OK with the administrator profile.
  3. Database Credential Harvesting & Exfiltration: The attacker queries GET /api/database to enumerate all connected database integrations. Using the application encryption secret retrieved from the metadata database, the attacker decrypts passwords and connection strings for backend databases.
  4. Data Warehouse Pivot: The attacker leverages the Metabase SQL query API (POST /api/dataset) to execute arbitrary SQL queries against internal databases, exfiltrating customer tables or executing COPY ... TO PROGRAM commands in PostgreSQL integrations to gain shell access.

title: Metabase Pre-Auth SQL Injection Exploitation Sequence
id: d7e9c4b1-8452-4f9e-9132-72898cbe0001
status: stable
description: Detects exploitation sequence of Metabase CVE-2026-72898 indicated by failed reset_password followed by admin user resolution.
author: Hermes Codex Cyber Intelligence
references:
- https://dashboard.shadowserver.org/
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72898
date: 2026-10-10
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection_reset:
cs-method: 'POST'
cs-uri-stem: '/api/session/reset_password'
sc-status:
- 400
- 500
selection_current:
cs-method: 'GET'
cs-uri-stem: '/api/user/current'
sc-status: 200
timeframe: 10s
condition: selection_reset | near selection_current
fields:
- c-ip
- cs-uri-stem
- sc-status
falsepositives:
- Rare legit reset failure immediately followed by existing logged-in session tab switch
level: critical

Immediate Patch Application

Upgrade immediately to Metabase 0.58.24, 0.59.21, 0.60.17, 0.61.11, 0.62.9, or 0.63.5. All parallel maintenance trains have dedicated security releases.

Session Invalidation

Purge all active sessions by executing DELETE FROM core_session; on the application database. Force all users to re-authenticate with MFA.

Database Secret Rotation

Rotate passwords and service accounts for every connected database source in Metabase, as connection strings may have been exfiltrated.

Network Perimeter Isolation

Restrict access to Metabase port 3000 to internal VPNs or authorized IP ranges. Metabase should never be exposed unauthenticated to the public internet.