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CVE-2026-76504: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager Pre-Auth API Authentication Bypass to Netadmin Fabric Takeover

Density:
HERMES

HERMES THREAT SCORE & SD-WAN FABRIC EXPOSURE

Target: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager (vManage) โ€” Reverse Proxy & API Authentication Filter
Confidence: 99%
98 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 20 / 20
Threat Activity 20 / 20
Weaponization 20 / 20
Exposure 19 / 20
Prevalence 19 / 20
Impact 20 / 20
Exploit Maturity 20 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 20 / 20
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

Cisco rates this vulnerability at CVSS 9.8 (Critical). The Hermes Threat Score assigns 98 (EXTREME) reflecting confirmed active in-the-wild exploitation cataloged by CISA KEV on September 30, 2026. Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager is the centralized orchestration engine and single pane of glass controlling software-defined WAN fabrics for global enterprise backbones. Exploitation requires zero privileges or user interaction: unauthenticated remote attackers bypass perimeter reverse proxy filters using URI hex encoding normalization discrepancies, acquire full netadmin administrative authority, deploy backdoored localized policies, and capture or redirect data traffic across all connected cEdge and vEdge appliances.

๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-76504: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager Pre-Auth API Authentication Bypass to Netadmin Fabric TakeoverVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTCisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

The vulnerability affects all standalone and clustered deployments of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager exposing web management ports (443/TCP or 8443/TCP).

Product & Version StreamVulnerable Version RangeFixed ReleaseStatus
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager 20.9< 20.9.10.120.9.10.1Immediate Upgrade Required
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager 20.12>= 20.12.0, < 20.12.8.220.12.8.2Immediate Upgrade Required
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager 20.15>= 20.15.0, < 20.15.6.120.15.6.1Immediate Upgrade Required
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager 20.18>= 20.18.0, < 20.18.4.120.18.4.1Immediate Upgrade Required
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager 26.1>= 26.1.0, < 26.1.2.126.1.2.1Immediate Upgrade Required
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager 26.2>= 26.2.0, < 26.2.126.2.1Immediate Upgrade Required

2. In-Depth Vulnerability Analysis: Path Normalization Bypass

Section titled โ€œ2. In-Depth Vulnerability Analysis: Path Normalization Bypassโ€

Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager utilizes an NGINX-based reverse proxy (serviceproxy) as its front-end ingress controller, which performs SSL termination and inspects request paths to route incoming client traffic to internal services:

[Remote Attacker]
|
| GET /v1/%252e%252e/dataservice/device HTTP/1.1
v
+-------------------------------------------------------+
| serviceproxy (NGINX Frontend) |
| - Normalizes once: path becomes /v1/%2e%2e/dataservice|
| - Check: Does path start with /dataservice/? -> NO |
| - Result: Bypasses authentication interceptor |
+-------------------------------------------------------+
|
| (Internal HTTP Dispatch)
v
+-------------------------------------------------------+
| vmanage-server (Apache Tomcat / Java Spring Boot) |
| - Normalizes second time: decodes %2e%2e to '..' |
| - Resolved path: /dataservice/device |
| - Dispatches to: DeviceManagementController.class |
| - Result: EXECUTED AS NETADMIN WITHOUT AUTH |
+-------------------------------------------------------+

Once the authentication barrier is circumvented, attackers can invoke internal session generation servlets:

  1. Target /dataservice/client/token or /dataservice/admin/user to inject an administrative credential.
  2. Acquire valid administrative session identifiers (JSESSIONID and X-XSRF-TOKEN).
  3. Leverage the SD-WAN REST API to export enterprise network encryption keys, deploy malicious localized policies, and re-route traffic traversing branch office routers.

Forensic investigators must analyze both the front-end reverse proxy logs and backend application logs for signs of exploitation.

  • Reverse Proxy Access Log: /var/log/nms/serviceproxy-access.log
  • Web Application Server Log: /var/log/nms/vmanage-server.log
  • Device Configuration Audit Log: /var/log/nms/device-action.log
  • User Authentication Audit Log: /var/log/nms/audit-log.log

Execute the following read-only triage script on suspected SD-WAN Manager appliances:

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# ==============================================================================
# Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager CVE-2026-76504 Emergency Triage Script
# Read-Only Forensic Extraction for Path Traversal & Auth Bypass Artifacts
# ==============================================================================
set -euo pipefail
OUTPUT_DIR="/tmp/cve-2026-76504-triage-$(date +%Y%m%d%H%M%S)"
mkdir -p "${OUTPUT_DIR}"
echo "[*] Initiating triage on Catalyst SD-WAN Manager -> ${OUTPUT_DIR}"
echo "[1/4] Inspecting serviceproxy-access.log for double hex encoding..."
grep -E -i "(%252e|%252f|%2e%2e|%2f%2e%2e|\x252e|\x252f)" /var/log/nms/serviceproxy-access.log* > "${OUTPUT_DIR}/serviceproxy_anomalies.txt" || true
echo "[2/4] Searching for unauthenticated calls to /dataservice/ controllers..."
grep -E "POST /dataservice/|PUT /dataservice/|DELETE /dataservice/" /var/log/nms/serviceproxy-access.log* | grep -E " (200|201|204) " > "${OUTPUT_DIR}/dataservice_privileged_requests.txt" || true
echo "[3/4] Checking vmanage-server.log for unexpected admin session creation..."
grep -E -i "(AuthenticationFilter|j_security_check|AdminSessionCreated)" /var/log/nms/vmanage-server.log* > "${OUTPUT_DIR}/admin_session_events.txt" || true
echo "[4/4] Extracting recent device template attachments and config pushes..."
grep -E -i "(templateAttach|deviceConfigurationPush|cliConfigPush)" /var/log/nms/device-action.log* > "${OUTPUT_DIR}/device_actions.txt" || true
echo "[+] Triage complete. Summary of findings:"
echo " - Hex encoding matches: $(wc -l < "${OUTPUT_DIR}/serviceproxy_anomalies.txt")"
echo " - Privileged requests: $(wc -l < "${OUTPUT_DIR}/dataservice_privileged_requests.txt")"

title: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager API Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-76504)
id: cve-2026-76504-sdwan-auth-bypass
status: experimental
description: Detects exploitation attempts against Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager leveraging double URL hex encoding to bypass reverse proxy authentication filters.
author: Hermes Codex CSIRT & Detection Engineering
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
- https://hermes-codex.org/cve/2026/cve-2026-76504/
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1036
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection_proxy:
c-uri|contains:
- '%252e%252e'
- '%252f'
- '%2e%2e/'
- '..%2f'
- '%2525'
selection_target:
c-uri|contains:
- '/dataservice/'
- '/v1/'
condition: selection_proxy and selection_target
fields:
- c-ip
- c-uri
- sc-status
falsepositives:
- Vulnerability scanners and penetration tests
level: critical
alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (
msg:"HERMES EXPLOIT Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager API Auth Bypass (CVE-2026-76504)";
flow:to_server,established;
content:"%25",nocase,fast_pattern;
pcre:"/\/(?:v1|dataservice)\/[^\r\n]*(?:%252e%252e|%2e%2e%2f|%252f)/i";
classtype:attempted-admin;
sid:202676504;
rev:1;
metadata:cve CVE-2026-76504, cvss 9.8, kev true;
)

  1. Perimeter Network Isolation: Block all public internet ingress to ports 443/TCP and 8443/TCP on Catalyst SD-WAN Manager appliances. Restrict access exclusively to dedicated management VLANs and jump hosts.

  2. Firmware Upgrade: Upgrade all SD-WAN Manager cluster nodes to patched firmware releases: 20.9.10.1, 20.12.8.2, 20.15.6.1, 20.18.4.1, 26.1.2.1, or 26.2.1.

  3. Administrative Credential & Secret Invalidation: In environments where unauthenticated access to /dataservice/ was detected prior to patching, rotate all administrative netadmin passwords, invalidate active web sessions, and regenerate SD-WAN enterprise root certificates.

  4. Edge Router Configuration Verification: Audit connected cEdge and vEdge devices for configuration drift or unauthorized localized route injection by verifying the SHA-256 integrity hash of active templates.