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CVE-2026-82384: Apache Roller XML-RPC Java Deserialization Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution

Density:
HERMES

HERMES THREAT SCORE & WEB CMS EXPOSURE

Target: Apache Roller Weblog Server - XML-RPC Endpoint (/roller-services/xmlrpc)
Confidence: 99%
95 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 20 / 20
Threat Activity 18 / 20
Weaponization 20 / 20
Exposure 19 / 20
Prevalence 18 / 20
Impact 20 / 20
Exploit Maturity 20 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 20 / 20
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

Standard CVSS v3.1 rates CVE-2026-82384 at 9.8 (Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). The Hermes Threat Score assigns an operational score of 95 (CRITICAL). Apache Roller powers mission-critical public blogs, developer publications, and enterprise knowledge intranets, including the official Apache Software Foundation blogs. Because the XML-RPC servlet is mapped unconditionally by default in web.xml and deserialization occurs during preliminary XML-RPC unmarshalling prior to any authentication checks or feature-flag verifications, remote adversaries can weaponize known Java gadget chains (e.g., CommonsCollections, Spring) to attain instant remote shell access on the underlying Java application server.

๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-82384: Apache Roller XML-RPC Java Deserialization Pre-Auth Remote Code ExecutionVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 2
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTApache Roller Weblog Server
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in Apache Roller Weblog Server documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:
Inbound Associations (Incoming)
CHAIN-2026-ROLLER-DESEREXPLOIT CHAIN → uses → [This Entity]
96% VERY_HIGH

Apache Roller is an enterprise-class Java weblog server and CMS designed for multi-user, multi-blog platforms, widely utilized in enterprise intranets and open-source foundations.

ParameterTechnical SpecificationOperational Impact
CVE IdentifierCVE-2026-82384Global vulnerability tracking reference
Vendor AdvisoryASF Security Advisory (September 2026)Apache Roller security disclosure
Vulnerability ClassDeserialization of Untrusted Data (CWE-502)Pre-authentication remote code execution
Vulnerable Component/roller-services/xmlrpc (RollerXmlRpcServlet)Apache XML-RPC 3.x request parser
Affected ReleasesApache Roller <= 6.1.5Standard web archive (WAR) deployments
Fixed Release6.1.6Disabled vendor extensions & strict request rejection
Attack VectorNetwork, Unauthenticated, Zero PreconditionsSingle HTTP POST request to exposed endpoint

Apache Roller implements standard Blogger, MetaWeblog, and MovableType APIs via XML-RPC. In versions up to 6.1.5, the web deployment descriptor (web.xml) unconditionally routes incoming requests for /roller-services/xmlrpc to RollerXmlRpcServlet:

UNAUTHENTICATED ATTACKER (Internet)
โ”‚
โ”‚ HTTP POST /roller-services/xmlrpc
โ”‚ Content-Type: text/xml (Payload with <serializable>)
โ–ผ
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ Apache Tomcat / Jetty โ”‚
โ”‚ Servlet Container โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ฌโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
โ”‚ Matched URL Pattern in web.xml
โ–ผ
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ RollerXmlRpcServlet โ”‚
โ”‚ (Apache XML-RPC Engine) โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ฌโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
โ”‚ Request Parsing: TypeFactory & ObjectInputStream
โ–ผ
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ Deserialization Sink โ”‚ <--- [CVE-2026-82384 Vulnerability]
โ”‚ ObjectInputStream.read() โ”‚ Attacker-controlled byte array
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ฌโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
โ”‚ Gadget Chain Invocation (Commons / Spring)
โ–ผ
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ Arbitrary Code Execution โ”‚
โ”‚ (Tomcat process context) โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜

Apache XML-RPC allows vendor extensions that support passing custom Java objects serialized as Base64 strings. When the XML-RPC parser encounters a <serializable> element, it decodes the payload and instantiates an ObjectInputStream:

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<methodCall>
<methodName>blogger.getUsersBlogs</methodName>
<params>
<param>
<value>
<serializable xmlns="http://ws.apache.org/xmlrpc/namespaces/extensions">
rO0ABXNyABFqYXZhLnV0aWwuSGFzaE1hcAUH2sBFlme0AwAC... [Base64 Serialized Gadget Chain]
</serializable>
</value>
</param>
</params>
</methodCall>

In RollerXmlRpcServlet, the server configuration permitted extension types by default. Furthermore, request unmarshalling occurs immediately inside XmlRpcHttpServer.execute() before invoking Rollerโ€™s authentication interceptors:

// Vulnerable request handling flow in Roller XML-RPC parser
public class RollerXmlRpcServlet extends HttpServlet {
protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse resp) {
// VULNERABILITY 1: No verification of global XML-RPC toggle in roller.properties
// VULNERABILITY 2: Extensions enabled without class filtering or JEP 290 filters
XmlRpcServletServer server = new XmlRpcServletServer();
XmlRpcServerConfigImpl config = (XmlRpcServerConfigImpl) server.getConfig();
config.setEnabledForExtensions(true); // Permits <serializable> objects
// SINK: Body unmarshalling invokes ObjectInputStream.readObject() before auth
server.execute(req, resp);
}
}

Because the servlet container classpath includes libraries commonly used by Roller (such as Apache Commons Collections or Spring dependencies), an attacker can supply pre-computed gadget chains generated with tools like ysoserial to trigger command execution upon deserialization.


sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant Attacker as Unauthenticated Remote Adversary
participant Web as Web Server (Tomcat / Roller)
participant Servlet as RollerXmlRpcServlet
participant JVM as JVM Execution Engine
Attacker->>Web: POST /roller-services/xmlrpc
Note over Attacker,Web: Body contains <serializable> base64 gadget payload
Web->>Servlet: Dispatch request to RollerXmlRpcServlet
Servlet->>Servlet: Parse XML-RPC XML document
Servlet->>Servlet: Decode base64 <serializable> byte stream
Servlet->>JVM: Invoke ObjectInputStream.readObject()
JVM->>JVM: Execute dynamic gadget chain (e.g., CommonsCollections / Runtime.exec)
JVM-->>Attacker: Spawn reverse shell / write JSP webshell to /roller/
  1. Endpoint Probing: The attacker issues a lightweight XML-RPC ping or system.listMethods call to /roller-services/xmlrpc to verify responsiveness.
  2. Payload Generation: A Java deserialization gadget payload is formatted into an XML-RPC <methodCall> enclosing a Base64-encoded serialized object.
  3. Pre-Auth Delivery: The HTTP POST request is submitted to the application server. The servlet unmarshals the object before verifying user credentials or checking whether XML-RPC is disabled in the administrative settings.
  4. Execution & Web Shell Drop: The gadget chain triggers Runtime.getRuntime().exec(), launching a shell command that drops a persistent JSP webshell into the webroot, granting full system access under the tomcat service account.

title: Apache Roller XML-RPC Java Deserialization Attempt
id: c7e19320-8238-4a61-912f-823840000001
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP POST requests to Apache Roller XML-RPC endpoint containing Java serialization markers or vendor extension tags.
references:
- https://lists.apache.org/thread/roller-security-cve-2026-82384
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82384
author: Hermes Codex Cyber Intelligence
date: 2026-09-29
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection_endpoint:
cs-method: "POST"
cs-uri-stem|contains: "/roller-services/xmlrpc"
selection_payload:
cs-body|contains:
- "<serializable"
- "rO0AB"
- "ws.apache.org/xmlrpc/namespaces/extensions"
condition: selection_endpoint and selection_payload
falsepositives:
- None expected in standard production environments
level: critical
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059

  1. Upgrade to Apache Roller 6.1.6:
    Deploy the official Apache Roller 6.1.6 release. This version explicitly disables vendor extension handling in RollerXmlRpcServlet and enforces rejection of requests if XML-RPC is disabled in roller.properties.

  2. Immediate Workaround (Disable Endpoint in web.xml):
    If updating the WAR file cannot be executed immediately, comment out or remove the servlet mapping in WEB-INF/web.xml:

    <!-- Remove or comment out this mapping -->
    <!--
    <servlet-mapping>
    <servlet-name>RollerXmlRpcServlet</servlet-name>
    <url-pattern>/roller-services/xmlrpc</url-pattern>
    </servlet-mapping>
    -->

    Restart the Tomcat or application container to apply changes.

  3. Deploy JVM Serialization Filtering (JEP 290):
    Configure JVM-level object input filters in CATALINA_OPTS:

    Terminal window
    CATALINA_OPTS="$CATALINA_OPTS -Djdk.serialFilter=!*;\
    java.lang.*;java.util.*;maxdepth=10;maxbytes=100000"

    This prevents arbitrary classes from being instantiated during any untrusted deserialization.