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Active Directory Kerberoasting & Lateral DCSync Privilege Audit

Density:

Simulates adversary domain reconnaissance and Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) extraction targeting service accounts with weak encryption.

  • Credential Access
  • Discovery
  • Lateral Movement

  1. Stage 1: Domain SPN Enumeration via Benign LDAP Filter

    • Technique: T1087.002 - Domain Account Discovery
    • Safe Command:
      Terminal window
      ldapsearch -x -H ldap://dc01.corp.internal -b 'dc=corp,dc=internal' '(servicePrincipalName=*)' sAMAccountName servicePrincipalName
    • Expected Telemetry: Active Directory Event ID 4662 (Operation on object) and LDAP read query volume spike.
    • Success Verification: List of SPNs retrieved without privilege escalation or credential caching.
  2. Stage 2: Kerberos TGS Request with RC4 Encryption Downgrade Probe

    • Technique: T1558.003 - Kerberoasting
    • Safe Command:
      Terminal window
      python3 -c 'print("HERMES-BAS-SIMULATION: Requesting TGS ticket for test SPN with etype 23 (RC4-HMAC)")'
    • Expected Telemetry: Windows Event ID 4769 (Kerberos ticket requested) with Ticket Options 0x40810000 and Encryption Type 0x17.
    • Success Verification: Event 4769 generated in Domain Controller security logs.
  3. Stage 3: Simulated Lateral SMB Share Discovery

    • Technique: T1135 - Network Share Discovery
    • Safe Command:
      Terminal window
      smbclient -L //fs01.corp.internal -N
    • Expected Telemetry: Event ID 5140 (A network share object was accessed) with IPC$ anonymous query.
    • Success Verification: Share enumeration logged; zero write operations performed.

  • No password cracking or offline hash extraction is permitted.
  • Simulation utilizes dedicated test service accounts (SVC-HERMES-TEST).
  • Domain controller write operations are strictly disallowed.