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AWS CloudTrail SQL: Anomalous Cross-Account STS AssumeRole from Compromised AI Containers — Threat Hunting Query

Density:
Evaluation DimensionObserved Telemetry / AttributeEpistemic Status
Hunting Query IdentifierHUNT-CLOUDTRAIL-IAM-ROLE-PIVOTCanonical Hunt Node
Target SIEM / Analytics PlatformAWS CloudTrail Lake / AthenaTelemetry Ingestion Engine
Platform Syntax Dialectcloudtrail_sqlQuery Language Standard
Telemetry & Log SourcesAWS CloudTrail Event Logs, VPC Flow LogsData Sensor Sources
Targeted Adversary SyndicatesShinyHuntersThreat Attribution
Associated Weaponized CVEsCVE-2026-101861Vulnerabilities Targeted
Associated Intrusion CampaignsOperation PeopleSoft Infiltration 2026Monitored Campaign
Analytical Confidence96%Hypothesis Validity Score
Primary Evidence SourcesSRC-MANDIANT-GOOGLE, SRC-CISA-KEVIntelligence Attestation

Following host escape on cloud worker nodes, threat actors assume high-privilege IAM roles to persist across multiple cloud subscriptions and exfiltrate proprietary model weights.

Adversary operations frequently slip through standard alerting thresholds by leveraging legitimate binaries or abusing valid service configurations. Proactive threat hunting formulates precise hypotheses based on known architectural chokepoints and queries historical telemetry to unearth stealthy intrusion footholds.


SELECT eventTime, userIdentity.arn as caller_arn, eventSource, eventName, requestParameters, responseElements, sourceIPAddress
FROM aws_cloudtrail_lake
WHERE eventName = 'AssumeRole'
AND sourceIPAddress NOT IN ('10.0.0.0/8', '172.16.0.0/12', '192.168.0.0/16')
AND userIdentity.principalId LIKE '%langflow%'
ORDER BY eventTime DESC
LIMIT 50;

Validate the external IP initiating AssumeRole. If unauthorized, immediately revoke the assumed role session tokens and attach an explicit Deny policy to the target IAM role.

  1. Verify Timeline Baseline: Review the first seen and last seen timestamps of returned events to distinguish chronic benign traffic from sudden operational spikes.
  2. Examine Parent-Child Lineage: Ensure that all parent processes match authorized deployment manifests and do not conceal unexpected interactive utilities.
  3. Inspect Network Pivots: Cross-reference communicating source and destination IP addresses against Hermes Adversary Infrastructure endpoints.