Elastic KQL/EQL: AI Agent Container Breakout to Worker Node Host Socket — Threat Hunting Query
Hunting Telemetry & Platform Metadata
Section titled “Hunting Telemetry & Platform Metadata”| Evaluation Dimension | Observed Telemetry / Attribute | Epistemic Status |
|---|---|---|
| Hunting Query Identifier | HUNT-ELASTIC-K8S-CONTAINER-ESCAPE | Canonical Hunt Node |
| Target SIEM / Analytics Platform | Elasticsearch & Kibana (EQL) | Telemetry Ingestion Engine |
| Platform Syntax Dialect | elastic_kql | Query Language Standard |
| Telemetry & Log Sources | Kubernetes Audit Logs, Elastic Defend Process Events | Data Sensor Sources |
| Targeted Adversary Syndicates | CLOSEDQUORUM Threat Cluster | Threat Attribution |
| Associated Weaponized CVEs | CVE-2026-101861 | Vulnerabilities Targeted |
| Associated Intrusion Campaigns | CAMP-GLOVE-2026 | Monitored Campaign |
| Analytical Confidence | 96% | Hypothesis Validity Score |
| Primary Evidence Sources | SRC-GITHUB-ADVISORIES, SRC-CISCO-TALOS | Intelligence Attestation |
Threat Hunting Hypothesis
Section titled “Threat Hunting Hypothesis”Adversaries compromising Langflow instances (CVE-2026-101861) interact with host sockets or dump service account tokens to escalate to cluster administration.
Adversary operations frequently slip through standard alerting thresholds by leveraging legitimate binaries or abusing valid service configurations. Proactive threat hunting formulates precise hypotheses based on known architectural chokepoints and queries historical telemetry to unearth stealthy intrusion footholds.
Production Hunting Query
Section titled “Production Hunting Query”process where event.type == "start" and process.name in ("curl", "wget", "kubectl", "nc", "socat") and ( process.command_line : "*docker.sock*" or process.command_line : "*containerd.sock*" or process.command_line : "*/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount*" ) and container.image.name : "*langflow*"Triage Guidance & Investigation Protocol
Section titled “Triage Guidance & Investigation Protocol”Inspect Langflow pod container logs and verify if external IP communication took place. Rotate all cluster secrets and cloud credentials accessible to the service account.
- Verify Timeline Baseline: Review the first seen and last seen timestamps of returned events to distinguish chronic benign traffic from sudden operational spikes.
- Examine Parent-Child Lineage: Ensure that all parent processes match authorized deployment manifests and do not conceal unexpected interactive utilities.
- Inspect Network Pivots: Cross-reference communicating source and destination IP addresses against Hermes Adversary Infrastructure endpoints.