Splunk SPL: Oracle WebLogic Integration Broker Request Smuggling Anomaly Hunting — Threat Hunting Query
Hunting Telemetry & Platform Metadata
Section titled “Hunting Telemetry & Platform Metadata”| Evaluation Dimension | Observed Telemetry / Attribute | Epistemic Status |
|---|---|---|
| Hunting Query Identifier | HUNT-SPLUNK-ORACLE-WEBLOGIC | Canonical Hunt Node |
| Target SIEM / Analytics Platform | Splunk Enterprise / Cloud | Telemetry Ingestion Engine |
| Platform Syntax Dialect | splunk_spl | Query Language Standard |
| Telemetry & Log Sources | Web Server Access Logs, WAF Telemetry, F5 BIG-IP / Nginx Ingress | Data Sensor Sources |
| Targeted Adversary Syndicates | ShinyHunters | Threat Attribution |
| Associated Weaponized CVEs | CVE-2026-35273, CVE-2026-96560 | Vulnerabilities Targeted |
| Associated Intrusion Campaigns | Operation PeopleSoft Infiltration 2026 | Monitored Campaign |
| Analytical Confidence | 98% | Hypothesis Validity Score |
| Primary Evidence Sources | SRC-MANDIANT-GOOGLE, SRC-ORACLE-SECURITY | Intelligence Attestation |
Threat Hunting Hypothesis
Section titled “Threat Hunting Hypothesis”Adversaries are actively exploiting CVE-2026-35273 to bypass perimeter WAF rules by sending desynchronized HTTP chunks that trigger unauthenticated POST access to internal IntegrationBroker URIs.
Adversary operations frequently slip through standard alerting thresholds by leveraging legitimate binaries or abusing valid service configurations. Proactive threat hunting formulates precise hypotheses based on known architectural chokepoints and queries historical telemetry to unearth stealthy intrusion footholds.
Production Hunting Query
Section titled “Production Hunting Query”index=web_proxy sourcetype="access_combined" (uri_path="*/IntegrationBroker/*" OR uri_path="*/psc/*")| eval has_te=if(match(http_headers, "(?i)transfer-encoding"), 1, 0)| eval has_cl=if(match(http_headers, "(?i)content-length"), 1, 0)| where has_te=1 AND has_cl=1| stats count, earliest(_time) as first_seen, latest(_time) as last_seen, values(src_ip) as attacking_ips, values(status) as http_status by uri_path, dest_host| sort - countTriage Guidance & Investigation Protocol
Section titled “Triage Guidance & Investigation Protocol”Investigate destination backend hosts receiving status 200/500 with both headers present. Check for subsequent node.js process creations or anomalous outbound HTTPS connections.
- Verify Timeline Baseline: Review the first seen and last seen timestamps of returned events to distinguish chronic benign traffic from sudden operational spikes.
- Examine Parent-Child Lineage: Ensure that all parent processes match authorized deployment manifests and do not conceal unexpected interactive utilities.
- Inspect Network Pivots: Cross-reference communicating source and destination IP addresses against Hermes Adversary Infrastructure endpoints.