SURF-01: Exposure 8.9/10
Entry Point: Public User Prompt Ingestion Endpoint
Identified Attack Vectors:
- Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI)
- Jailbreak through base64 unicode smuggling
- Context overflow denial-of-service
Deconstructs the runtime execution topology of multi-agent LLM systems, isolating planner loops, context retrieval vectors, and Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool execution environments behind micro-VM boundaries.
graph TD COMP-AGT-01["COMP-AGT-01"] -->|"HTTPS / JSON REST (TLS 1.3 with Strict HSTS)"| COMP-AGT-02["COMP-AGT-02"] COMP-AGT-02["COMP-AGT-02"] -->|"gRPC (mTLS SPIFFE/SPIRE)"| COMP-AGT-04["COMP-AGT-04"] COMP-AGT-02["COMP-AGT-02"] -->|"HTTPS REST API (TLS 1.3 / Private Endpoint)"| COMP-AGT-03["COMP-AGT-03"] COMP-AGT-02["COMP-AGT-02"] -->|"JSON-RPC over UNIX Socket / vsock (Local Kernel Namespace vsock)"| COMP-AGT-05["COMP-AGT-05"]| Component ID | Name | Tier | Tech Stack | Network Exposure | Data Classification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| COMP-AGT-01 | User Chat Gateway & Guardrails | Ingress & Edge | FastAPI, Llama-Guard-3, WAF | PUBLIC_INTERNET | RESTRICTED_PII |
| COMP-AGT-02 | ReAct Planner Orchestrator | Application Core | Python 3.12, LangGraph, Redis State Store | INTERNAL_MESH | CONFIDENTIAL |
| COMP-AGT-03 | Frontier LLM Inference Service | External Provider API | Private VPC Peering / gRPC mTLS | INTERNAL_MESH | CONFIDENTIAL |
| COMP-AGT-04 | Vector Retrieval Memory (RAG) | Data Tier | Qdrant Cluster, pgvector, AES-256-GCM | INTERNAL_MESH | CONFIDENTIAL |
| COMP-AGT-05 | MCP Tool Executor Micro-VM | Execution Sandbox | Firecracker MicroVM, gVisor, Ephemeral OverlayFS | ISOLATED_CORE | INTERNAL |
| Flow ID | Source | Destination | Protocol | Crosses Boundary | Encryption Standard |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FLOW-01 | COMP-AGT-01 | COMP-AGT-02 | HTTPS / JSON REST | YES | TLS 1.3 with Strict HSTS |
| FLOW-02 | COMP-AGT-02 | COMP-AGT-04 | gRPC | NO | mTLS SPIFFE/SPIRE |
| FLOW-03 | COMP-AGT-02 | COMP-AGT-03 | HTTPS REST API | YES | TLS 1.3 / Private Endpoint |
| FLOW-04 | COMP-AGT-02 | COMP-AGT-05 | JSON-RPC over UNIX Socket / vsock | YES | Local Kernel Namespace vsock |
SURF-01: Exposure 8.9/10
Entry Point: Public User Prompt Ingestion Endpoint
Identified Attack Vectors:
SURF-02: Exposure 7.4/10
Entry Point: MCP Tool Invocation IPC Interface
Identified Attack Vectors:
SURF-03: Exposure 6.8/10
Entry Point: Vector Database Document Indexing Pipeline
Identified Attack Vectors:
| Choke-Point ID | Location | Mitigation Strategy | Blast Radius Containment Guarantee |
|---|---|---|---|
| CHK-01 | Between ReAct Planner and MCP Tool Sandbox (vsock boundary) | Deterministic Schema Validation & Ephemeral Execution Containerization | Restricts compromise strictly to a disposable microVM destroyed immediately post-execution. |
| CHK-02 | Between Ingress Edge and Planner Core (Llama-Guard Gateway) | Dual-pass Semantic Policy Filter with Zero-Trust Output Synthesizer | Neutralizes adversarial jailbreak sequences before reaching the core planner. |