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Hybrid Active Directory & Entra ID Identity Federation Gateway

Density:

Target System: Enterprise Identity Tier (Active Directory Domain Services, Entra Connect, OIDC/SAML Federation)

Threat model evaluating Golden Ticket forgery, SAML token signing key extraction, unconstrained Kerberos delegation abuse, and synchronization agent credential theft.

graph TD
TB0["TB-01: Cloud/On-Premises Hybrid Sync Boundary"]:::boundary
classDef boundary fill:#1e293b,stroke:#38bdf8,stroke-width:2px,color:#f8fafc;
Boundary IDBoundary NameSecurity LevelSecurity Scope & Delineation
TB-01Cloud/On-Premises Hybrid Sync BoundaryPRIVILEGED_CORE_TIER0Demarcates local Active Directory forest from cloud Entra ID tenant synchronization services.

THR-S-04: Spoofing - CRITICAL

Kerberos TGT Forgery via Krbtgt Hash Compromise (Golden Ticket)

Adversary creates self-signed TGTs granting arbitrary Domain Admin privileges across the entire enterprise forest.

  • MITRE ATT&CK: T1558.001
  • CWE Weakness: CWE-287

THR-E-04: Elevation of Privilege - CRITICAL

DCSync Replication Attack Extracting Full NTDS Database

Abuse of directory replication permissions (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All) to simulate a domain controller and retrieve password hashes.

  • MITRE ATT&CK: T1003.006
  • CWE Weakness: CWE-269
Control IDControl NameTarget ThreatTypeVerification Criteria
CTRL-07Tier-0 Administrative Isolation & Protected Users GroupTHR-S-04PREVENTATIVEDomain Admin credentials cannot be cached on workstations; NTLM fallback strictly disabled.