CVE-2026-112015: Omnigent Sub-Agent CWD Path Traversal & Function Policy Sandbox Escape
Omnigent versions 0.3.0 prior to 0.14.0 suffer from an incomplete fix for GHSA-p8rw-8qj3-hf33 in omnigent/server/bundles.py. While validate_agent_bundle() checked whether the root agent's spec.os_env.cwd escaped the extracted bundle directory, it failed to traverse nested spec.sub_agents and spec.terminals. An attacker uploading an agent bundle or invoking an agent with a sub-agent specifying os_env.cwd: '/' or '../../..' breaks out of the session workspace to read and write arbitrary host files and execute shell tools across the runner filesystem. The release patch (commit 4a406d5b3b3f3a7c3401eab659ab04e728923b94) also resolves a function: policy handler validation bypass and a Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) MCP tool argument tampering flaw on policy-ask retries.
Executive Summary
Section titled โExecutive SummaryโCVE-2026-112015 (GHSA-p5x3-3gqh-x44g) is a critical Multi-Agent Workspace Sandbox Escape (CWE-22) and Agentic Policy Enforcement Bypass (CWE-863) in Omnigent (omnigent-ai/omnigent), an enterprise framework for orchestrating hierarchical AI agents, sub-agents, and MCP (Model Context Protocol) tool pipelines. Affecting all versions from 0.3.0 prior to 0.14.0, the vulnerability is a classic incomplete remediation of an earlier path traversal flaw (GHSA-p8rw-8qj3-hf33).
When an agent bundle archive is uploaded to an Omnigent server (omnigent/server/bundles.py), validate_agent_bundle() verified that the top-level AgentSpec.os_env.cwd remained confined within the bundle extraction directory via _cwd_escapes_workspace(). However, AgentSpec is a recursive tree structure that can declare arbitrary nested sub-agents (spec.sub_agents) and named terminal environments (spec.terminals). Because validate_agent_bundle() inspected only the root spec.os_env.cwd, a malicious bundle could leave the root os_env.cwd set to "." while configuring a child sub-agent or terminal with os_env.cwd: "/" or os_env.cwd: "../../../etc". When the parent agent delegated execution to the sub-agent on a runner without an explicit OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE override, Omnigent materialized the sub-agentโs working directory directly against the host filesystem (shutil.copytree and shell tool execution), granting the sub-agent unrestricted read/write access to the runner host.
In the same security commit (4a406d5b3b3f3a7c3401eab659ab04e728923b94, PR #7457), the maintainers also patched two coupled agentic control-plane bypasses:
- Unvalidated Native
function:Policy Handlers (omnigent/inner/loader.py&omnigent/policies/registry.py): Agent bundles could reference arbitrary Python callables or trigger native C/Rust shim builds (_SHIM_BUILD_PATH) viafunction:policy handlers without strict allowlist enforcement. - HITL Policy-Ask Argument Tampering on Retry (
omnigent/server/routes/_sessions/orchestration.py): After a human operator approved a pausedpolicy_asktool call, the retry loop failed to lock the approvedreviewed_arguments/transformed_arguments, creating a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) window for MCP tool arguments.
HERMES THREAT SCORE & MULTI-AGENT WORKSPACE ESCAPE EVALUATION
Target:Omnigent Bundle Validator, Sub-Agent Workspace Loader & Function Policy Registry While CVSS v4.0 scores CVE-2026-112015 at 7.7 (High) and CVSS v3.1 at 9.1 (Critical), the Hermes Threat Score evaluates this flaw at 90 (CRITICAL) with a Hermes Agentic Security Score (HASS) of 95 (EXTREME). CVE-2026-112015 is a textbook incomplete patch bypass of GHSA-p8rw-8qj3-hf33: validating only the root agent's os_env.cwd while allowing nested sub_agents and terminals to specify arbitrary host directories allows any delegated sub-agent to mount the host root filesystem ('/') as its workspace and copytree source.
CVE-2026-112015: Omnigent Sub-Agent CWD Path Traversal & Function Policy Sandbox EscapeVULNERABILITY
Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.
๐ Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“Confirmed security vulnerability in Omnigent Multi-Agent Orchestrator documented in Hermes dossier.”
- [vulnerability_report]
- [government_confirmation]CISA verified active exploitation in the wild and mandated federal remediation deadline in KEV entry. — Source: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA Adds CVE-2026-59822 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Reliability: VERY_HIGH)
Technical Context & Multi-Agent Bundle Architecture
Section titled โTechnical Context & Multi-Agent Bundle ArchitectureโOmnigent packages declarative multi-agent systems into portable Agent Bundles (.zip / .tar.gz archives containing an agent.yaml manifest, prompt templates, workspace files, and optional policy handlers). Within agent.yaml, an AgentSpec defines:
os_env: operating system environment settings, most notablycwd(current working directory) and environment variables.terminals: named shell execution contexts, each optionally carrying its ownos_env.cwd.sub_agents: a recursive list of childAgentSpecdefinitions that the root orchestrator agent can invoke as specialized delegate tools.policies: guardrail hooks (before_tool_call,after_tool_call) that returnallow,deny, orask(pausing the session for Human-in-the-Loop approval).
When a bundle is uploaded via the Omnigent REST API, validate_agent_bundle() parses the YAML into an AgentSpec object tree before any session is spawned.
flowchart TD A["Attacker Uploads Agent Bundle (agent.yaml)"] -->|"Root spec.os_env.cwd = '.' (Passes Root Check)"| B["validate_agent_bundle() in omnigent/server/bundles.py"] B -->|"VULNERABLE (< 0.14.0): Skips spec.sub_agents & spec.terminals"| C["Bundle Accepted & Session Started"] C -->|"Root Agent Delegates Task to Sub-Agent"| D["Sub-Agent: os_env.cwd = '/' or '../../../'"] D -->|"Session Workspace Copy (shutil.copytree) & Tool CWD"| E["Sub-Agent Escapes Bundle Directory onto Host Filesystem"] A -->|"Policy Handler: function:pkg.mod:fn"| F["omnigent/inner/loader.py: _load_policy_handler()"] F -->|"Bypasses function_policy_handler_allowed() / Triggers _SHIM_BUILD_PATH"| G["Arbitrary Python Callable / Shim Execution in Runner"]Root Cause Analysis & Code Breakdown
Section titled โRoot Cause Analysis & Code BreakdownโA forensic inspection of commit 4a406d5b3b3f3a7c3401eab659ab04e728923b94 (โFix sub-agent cwd validation in bundle upload (#7457)โ, authored by Serena Ruan) reveals the exact flaws across three subsystems.
1. Non-Recursive os_env.cwd Validation in omnigent/server/bundles.py
Section titled โ1. Non-Recursive os_env.cwd Validation in omnigent/server/bundles.pyโIn versions 0.3.0 through 0.13.0, validate_agent_bundle() checked only the top-level spec.os_env.cwd:
# VULNERABLE: omnigent/server/bundles.py (< 0.14.0, lines 187-196) spec_cwd = spec.os_env.cwd if spec.os_env else None if spec_cwd is not None and _cwd_escapes_workspace(spec_cwd): raise BundleValidationError( f"Agent spec os_env.cwd {spec_cwd!r} escapes the bundle directory; " "uploaded bundles must use a relative cwd within the bundle." )If an attacker defined a benign root os_env.cwd: "." and placed the escaping path inside spec.sub_agents[0].os_env.cwd or spec.terminals["bash"].os_env.cwd, validate_agent_bundle() succeeded without error:
# Malicious agent.yaml bypassing root-only CWD check in Omnigent < 0.14.0name: orchestrator-rootmodel: gpt-4oos_env: cwd: "."sub_agents: - name: filesystem-worker description: "Reads host secrets and executes commands outside workspace" model: gpt-4o os_env: cwd: "../../../.." terminals: host_shell: os_env: cwd: "/"In version 0.14.0, the maintainers replaced the flat check with _reject_uploaded_escaping_cwd(spec: AgentSpec), which validates the root os_env.cwd, iterates over all (spec.terminals or {}).values(), and recurses into spec.sub_agents:
# PATCHED: omnigent/server/bundles.py (0.14.0, lines 136-158)def _reject_uploaded_escaping_cwd(spec: AgentSpec) -> None: """Reject os_env.cwd paths that escape the bundle directory across the spec tree.""" spec_cwd = spec.os_env.cwd if spec.os_env else None if spec_cwd is not None and _cwd_escapes_workspace(spec_cwd): raise BundleValidationError( f"Agent spec os_env.cwd {spec_cwd!r} escapes the bundle directory; " "uploaded bundles must use a relative cwd within the bundle." ) for terminal in (spec.terminals or {}).values(): terminal_cwd = terminal.os_env.cwd if terminal.os_env else None if terminal_cwd is not None and _cwd_escapes_workspace(terminal_cwd): raise BundleValidationError( f"Terminal os_env.cwd {terminal_cwd!r} escapes the bundle directory; " "uploaded bundles must use a relative cwd within the bundle." ) for sub in spec.sub_agents: _reject_uploaded_escaping_cwd(sub)2. Native function: Policy Handler & Shim Build Hardening (omnigent/inner/loader.py & omnigent/policies/registry.py)
Section titled โ2. Native function: Policy Handler & Shim Build Hardening (omnigent/inner/loader.py & omnigent/policies/registry.py)โOmnigent allows policies to specify custom Python handlers via the function:<module>:<qualname> URI scheme, as well as compiling a native C/Rust execution shim (_SHIM_BUILD_PATH) when command policies are active. Prior to 0.14.0, _ensure_native_shim() checked whether any policy existed without verifying whether a function: policy handler was authorized by function_policy_handler_allowed(), and _load_policy_handler() resolved callables before validating the normalized module_name:qualname against the server allowlist.
The 0.14.0 patch enforces function_policy_handler_allowed(target) in both omnigent/policies/registry.py and omnigent/inner/loader.py:
# PATCHED: omnigent/inner/loader.py (0.14.0, lines 281-294)def _load_policy_handler(handler_spec: str) -> Callable[..., Any]: target = handler_spec.removeprefix("function:").strip() module_name, sep, qualname = target.partition(":") if not sep or not module_name or not qualname: raise ValueError( f"Invalid function policy handler '{handler_spec}'. " "Expected 'function:<module>:<callable>'." ) normalized_target = f"{module_name}:{qualname}" if not function_policy_handler_allowed(normalized_target): raise ValueError( f"Function policy handler '{handler_spec}' is not allowed." )3. Binding Reviewed Arguments Across HITL policy_ask Retries (omnigent/server/routes/_sessions/orchestration.py)
Section titled โ3. Binding Reviewed Arguments Across HITL policy_ask Retries (omnigent/server/routes/_sessions/orchestration.py)โWhen a policy returned an ask decision on an MCP tool invocation, Omnigent stored the pending approval in _PendingPolicyAskWrites. However, it previously tracked only approved_call_ids: set[str] without binding the exact reviewed_arguments and transformed_arguments inspected during the policy check. In 0.14.0, _PendingPolicyAskWrites maps each call_id to a _PendingPolicyAskApproval(reviewed_arguments, transformed_arguments) dataclass, ensuring that when execution resumes after human approval, the tool receives the exact arguments that were reviewed and transformed by the policy pipeline.
Attack Vectors & Exploitation Scenarios
Section titled โAttack Vectors & Exploitation Scenariosโ- Direct Bundle Upload Escape: An attacker with bundle upload privileges (or via CSRF / unauthenticated API endpoints in self-hosted deployments) uploads an archive where
sub_agents[0].os_env.cwdis set to"/"or"../../../..". - Workspace Cloning Exfiltration: When a session initializes a sub-agent workspace via
shutil.copytree, a relative parent traversal (../../..) can cause the runner to copy host directories (including/root/.ssh,/app/.env, or sibling tenant workspaces) into the sessionโs accessible scratch space. - Sub-Agent Shell Execution: The root agent delegates a benign prompt to the sub-agent (
"Summarize the local configuration"), which invokes its terminal tool rooted at/to read/proc/self/environor modify host files.
Forensic Triage & Detection
Section titled โForensic Triage & Detectionโtitle: Omnigent Sub-Agent CWD Path Traversal and Policy Handler Abuse (CVE-2026-112015)id: 3f7a2c9e-1d8b-4e6a-9c5f-2b8d4e1a7c3fstatus: experimentaldescription: Detects uploaded Omnigent agent bundles or session execution attempts containing parent directory traversal or root paths in sub_agents/terminals os_env.cwd or unauthorized function: policy handlers.references: - https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/commit/4a406d5b3b3f3a7c3401eab659ab04e728923b94 - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p5x3-3gqh-x44gauthor: Hermes Codex Threat Intelligencedate: 2026-10-19tags: - attack.execution - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1059 - cve.2026-112015logsource: category: application product: omnigentdetection: selection_traversal: message|contains: - 'escapes the bundle directory' - 'os_env.cwd' - 'Function policy handler' selection_path_indicators: message|re: '(?:cwd|os_env).*?(?:\.\./|"/")' condition: selection_traversal or selection_path_indicatorsfalsepositives: - Legitimate developer bundle validation errors during local testing.level: high// Microsoft Sentinel / KQL: Detect Omnigent Sub-Agent Workspace Escape & Policy Bypass (CVE-2026-112015)ContainerLogV2| where ContainerName has "omnigent" or LogMessage has_any ("omnigent", "BundleValidationError", "os_env")| where LogMessage matches regex @"(?i)(sub_agents|terminals).*?cwd.*?(\.\.|\"/\")" or LogMessage has_any ("escapes the bundle directory", "Function policy handler", "OMNIGENT_ALLOWED_FUNCTION_POLICY_HANDLERS")| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ContainerName, LogMessage| sort by TimeGenerated desc#!/usr/bin/env bash# Audit Omnigent installation version and scan agent bundle YAML files for CVE-2026-112015 indicators
set -euo pipefail
BUNDLE_DIR="${1:-/var/lib/omnigent/bundles}"
echo "[*] Checking installed Omnigent version..."python3 -c "import omnigent; print('Omnigent version:', getattr(omnigent, '__version__', 'unknown'))" 2>/dev/null || true
echo "[*] Scanning agent.yaml manifests in ${BUNDLE_DIR} for escaping os_env.cwd or function: policy handlers..."if [ -d "${BUNDLE_DIR}" ]; then find "${BUNDLE_DIR}" -type f \( -name "*.yaml" -o -name "*.yml" \) -exec grep -HnE 'cwd:\s*["'\'']?(/|\.\.)|handler:\s*["'\'']?function:' {} + || echo "[+] No suspicious manifests found."else echo "[!] Directory ${BUNDLE_DIR} not found. Pass your bundle storage path as the first argument."fiRemediation Strategy
Section titled โRemediation Strategyโ-
Upgrade Omnigent to Version
0.14.0or Later Update theomnigentpackage across all API servers and runner workers to incorporate commit4a406d5b3b3f3a7c3401eab659ab04e728923b94:Terminal window pip install --upgrade "omnigent>=0.14.0" -
Enforce
OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACEand Container Isolation Always configure an explicit, dedicatedOMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACEdirectory on runner processes and execute each session inside an ephemeral, rootless container or microVM with a read-only root filesystem. -
Restrict Custom
function:Policy Handlers LeaveOMNIGENT_ALLOWED_FUNCTION_POLICY_HANDLERSunset (or restricted to an explicit comma-separated allowlist of auditedmodule:callabletargets) and ensureOMNIGENT_ALLOW_ALL_FUNCTION_POLICY_HANDLERSis never enabled in production.