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CVE-2026-112015: Omnigent Sub-Agent CWD Path Traversal & Function Policy Sandbox Escape

Density:
C-Level Executive Briefing HERMES-SEC-BRIEF HIGH

Omnigent versions 0.3.0 prior to 0.14.0 suffer from an incomplete fix for GHSA-p8rw-8qj3-hf33 in omnigent/server/bundles.py. While validate_agent_bundle() checked whether the root agent's spec.os_env.cwd escaped the extracted bundle directory, it failed to traverse nested spec.sub_agents and spec.terminals. An attacker uploading an agent bundle or invoking an agent with a sub-agent specifying os_env.cwd: '/' or '../../..' breaks out of the session workspace to read and write arbitrary host files and execute shell tools across the runner filesystem. The release patch (commit 4a406d5b3b3f3a7c3401eab659ab04e728923b94) also resolves a function: policy handler validation bypass and a Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) MCP tool argument tampering flaw on policy-ask retries.

CVE-2026-112015 (GHSA-p5x3-3gqh-x44g) is a critical Multi-Agent Workspace Sandbox Escape (CWE-22) and Agentic Policy Enforcement Bypass (CWE-863) in Omnigent (omnigent-ai/omnigent), an enterprise framework for orchestrating hierarchical AI agents, sub-agents, and MCP (Model Context Protocol) tool pipelines. Affecting all versions from 0.3.0 prior to 0.14.0, the vulnerability is a classic incomplete remediation of an earlier path traversal flaw (GHSA-p8rw-8qj3-hf33).

When an agent bundle archive is uploaded to an Omnigent server (omnigent/server/bundles.py), validate_agent_bundle() verified that the top-level AgentSpec.os_env.cwd remained confined within the bundle extraction directory via _cwd_escapes_workspace(). However, AgentSpec is a recursive tree structure that can declare arbitrary nested sub-agents (spec.sub_agents) and named terminal environments (spec.terminals). Because validate_agent_bundle() inspected only the root spec.os_env.cwd, a malicious bundle could leave the root os_env.cwd set to "." while configuring a child sub-agent or terminal with os_env.cwd: "/" or os_env.cwd: "../../../etc". When the parent agent delegated execution to the sub-agent on a runner without an explicit OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE override, Omnigent materialized the sub-agentโ€™s working directory directly against the host filesystem (shutil.copytree and shell tool execution), granting the sub-agent unrestricted read/write access to the runner host.

In the same security commit (4a406d5b3b3f3a7c3401eab659ab04e728923b94, PR #7457), the maintainers also patched two coupled agentic control-plane bypasses:

  1. Unvalidated Native function: Policy Handlers (omnigent/inner/loader.py & omnigent/policies/registry.py): Agent bundles could reference arbitrary Python callables or trigger native C/Rust shim builds (_SHIM_BUILD_PATH) via function: policy handlers without strict allowlist enforcement.
  2. HITL Policy-Ask Argument Tampering on Retry (omnigent/server/routes/_sessions/orchestration.py): After a human operator approved a paused policy_ask tool call, the retry loop failed to lock the approved reviewed_arguments / transformed_arguments, creating a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) window for MCP tool arguments.
HYBRID

HERMES THREAT SCORE & MULTI-AGENT WORKSPACE ESCAPE EVALUATION

Target: Omnigent Bundle Validator, Sub-Agent Workspace Loader & Function Policy Registry
Confidence: 99%
90 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 18 / 20
Threat Activity 15 / 20
Weaponization 18 / 20
Exposure 17 / 20
Prevalence 16 / 20
Impact 19 / 20
Exploit Maturity 18 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 20 / 20
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

While CVSS v4.0 scores CVE-2026-112015 at 7.7 (High) and CVSS v3.1 at 9.1 (Critical), the Hermes Threat Score evaluates this flaw at 90 (CRITICAL) with a Hermes Agentic Security Score (HASS) of 95 (EXTREME). CVE-2026-112015 is a textbook incomplete patch bypass of GHSA-p8rw-8qj3-hf33: validating only the root agent's os_env.cwd while allowing nested sub_agents and terminals to specify arbitrary host directories allows any delegated sub-agent to mount the host root filesystem ('/') as its workspace and copytree source.

๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-112015: Omnigent Sub-Agent CWD Path Traversal & Function Policy Sandbox EscapeVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTOmnigent Multi-Agent Orchestrator
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in Omnigent Multi-Agent Orchestrator documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

Omnigent packages declarative multi-agent systems into portable Agent Bundles (.zip / .tar.gz archives containing an agent.yaml manifest, prompt templates, workspace files, and optional policy handlers). Within agent.yaml, an AgentSpec defines:

  • os_env: operating system environment settings, most notably cwd (current working directory) and environment variables.
  • terminals: named shell execution contexts, each optionally carrying its own os_env.cwd.
  • sub_agents: a recursive list of child AgentSpec definitions that the root orchestrator agent can invoke as specialized delegate tools.
  • policies: guardrail hooks (before_tool_call, after_tool_call) that return allow, deny, or ask (pausing the session for Human-in-the-Loop approval).

When a bundle is uploaded via the Omnigent REST API, validate_agent_bundle() parses the YAML into an AgentSpec object tree before any session is spawned.

flowchart TD
A["Attacker Uploads Agent Bundle (agent.yaml)"] -->|"Root spec.os_env.cwd = '.' (Passes Root Check)"| B["validate_agent_bundle() in omnigent/server/bundles.py"]
B -->|"VULNERABLE (< 0.14.0): Skips spec.sub_agents & spec.terminals"| C["Bundle Accepted & Session Started"]
C -->|"Root Agent Delegates Task to Sub-Agent"| D["Sub-Agent: os_env.cwd = '/' or '../../../'"]
D -->|"Session Workspace Copy (shutil.copytree) & Tool CWD"| E["Sub-Agent Escapes Bundle Directory onto Host Filesystem"]
A -->|"Policy Handler: function:pkg.mod:fn"| F["omnigent/inner/loader.py: _load_policy_handler()"]
F -->|"Bypasses function_policy_handler_allowed() / Triggers _SHIM_BUILD_PATH"| G["Arbitrary Python Callable / Shim Execution in Runner"]

A forensic inspection of commit 4a406d5b3b3f3a7c3401eab659ab04e728923b94 (โ€œFix sub-agent cwd validation in bundle upload (#7457)โ€, authored by Serena Ruan) reveals the exact flaws across three subsystems.

1. Non-Recursive os_env.cwd Validation in omnigent/server/bundles.py

Section titled โ€œ1. Non-Recursive os_env.cwd Validation in omnigent/server/bundles.pyโ€

In versions 0.3.0 through 0.13.0, validate_agent_bundle() checked only the top-level spec.os_env.cwd:

# VULNERABLE: omnigent/server/bundles.py (< 0.14.0, lines 187-196)
spec_cwd = spec.os_env.cwd if spec.os_env else None
if spec_cwd is not None and _cwd_escapes_workspace(spec_cwd):
raise BundleValidationError(
f"Agent spec os_env.cwd {spec_cwd!r} escapes the bundle directory; "
"uploaded bundles must use a relative cwd within the bundle."
)

If an attacker defined a benign root os_env.cwd: "." and placed the escaping path inside spec.sub_agents[0].os_env.cwd or spec.terminals["bash"].os_env.cwd, validate_agent_bundle() succeeded without error:

# Malicious agent.yaml bypassing root-only CWD check in Omnigent < 0.14.0
name: orchestrator-root
model: gpt-4o
os_env:
cwd: "."
sub_agents:
- name: filesystem-worker
description: "Reads host secrets and executes commands outside workspace"
model: gpt-4o
os_env:
cwd: "../../../.."
terminals:
host_shell:
os_env:
cwd: "/"

In version 0.14.0, the maintainers replaced the flat check with _reject_uploaded_escaping_cwd(spec: AgentSpec), which validates the root os_env.cwd, iterates over all (spec.terminals or {}).values(), and recurses into spec.sub_agents:

# PATCHED: omnigent/server/bundles.py (0.14.0, lines 136-158)
def _reject_uploaded_escaping_cwd(spec: AgentSpec) -> None:
"""Reject os_env.cwd paths that escape the bundle directory across the spec tree."""
spec_cwd = spec.os_env.cwd if spec.os_env else None
if spec_cwd is not None and _cwd_escapes_workspace(spec_cwd):
raise BundleValidationError(
f"Agent spec os_env.cwd {spec_cwd!r} escapes the bundle directory; "
"uploaded bundles must use a relative cwd within the bundle."
)
for terminal in (spec.terminals or {}).values():
terminal_cwd = terminal.os_env.cwd if terminal.os_env else None
if terminal_cwd is not None and _cwd_escapes_workspace(terminal_cwd):
raise BundleValidationError(
f"Terminal os_env.cwd {terminal_cwd!r} escapes the bundle directory; "
"uploaded bundles must use a relative cwd within the bundle."
)
for sub in spec.sub_agents:
_reject_uploaded_escaping_cwd(sub)

2. Native function: Policy Handler & Shim Build Hardening (omnigent/inner/loader.py & omnigent/policies/registry.py)

Section titled โ€œ2. Native function: Policy Handler & Shim Build Hardening (omnigent/inner/loader.py & omnigent/policies/registry.py)โ€

Omnigent allows policies to specify custom Python handlers via the function:<module>:<qualname> URI scheme, as well as compiling a native C/Rust execution shim (_SHIM_BUILD_PATH) when command policies are active. Prior to 0.14.0, _ensure_native_shim() checked whether any policy existed without verifying whether a function: policy handler was authorized by function_policy_handler_allowed(), and _load_policy_handler() resolved callables before validating the normalized module_name:qualname against the server allowlist.

The 0.14.0 patch enforces function_policy_handler_allowed(target) in both omnigent/policies/registry.py and omnigent/inner/loader.py:

# PATCHED: omnigent/inner/loader.py (0.14.0, lines 281-294)
def _load_policy_handler(handler_spec: str) -> Callable[..., Any]:
target = handler_spec.removeprefix("function:").strip()
module_name, sep, qualname = target.partition(":")
if not sep or not module_name or not qualname:
raise ValueError(
f"Invalid function policy handler '{handler_spec}'. "
"Expected 'function:<module>:<callable>'."
)
normalized_target = f"{module_name}:{qualname}"
if not function_policy_handler_allowed(normalized_target):
raise ValueError(
f"Function policy handler '{handler_spec}' is not allowed."
)

3. Binding Reviewed Arguments Across HITL policy_ask Retries (omnigent/server/routes/_sessions/orchestration.py)

Section titled โ€œ3. Binding Reviewed Arguments Across HITL policy_ask Retries (omnigent/server/routes/_sessions/orchestration.py)โ€

When a policy returned an ask decision on an MCP tool invocation, Omnigent stored the pending approval in _PendingPolicyAskWrites. However, it previously tracked only approved_call_ids: set[str] without binding the exact reviewed_arguments and transformed_arguments inspected during the policy check. In 0.14.0, _PendingPolicyAskWrites maps each call_id to a _PendingPolicyAskApproval(reviewed_arguments, transformed_arguments) dataclass, ensuring that when execution resumes after human approval, the tool receives the exact arguments that were reviewed and transformed by the policy pipeline.


  1. Direct Bundle Upload Escape: An attacker with bundle upload privileges (or via CSRF / unauthenticated API endpoints in self-hosted deployments) uploads an archive where sub_agents[0].os_env.cwd is set to "/" or "../../../..".
  2. Workspace Cloning Exfiltration: When a session initializes a sub-agent workspace via shutil.copytree, a relative parent traversal (../../..) can cause the runner to copy host directories (including /root/.ssh, /app/.env, or sibling tenant workspaces) into the sessionโ€™s accessible scratch space.
  3. Sub-Agent Shell Execution: The root agent delegates a benign prompt to the sub-agent ("Summarize the local configuration"), which invokes its terminal tool rooted at / to read /proc/self/environ or modify host files.

title: Omnigent Sub-Agent CWD Path Traversal and Policy Handler Abuse (CVE-2026-112015)
id: 3f7a2c9e-1d8b-4e6a-9c5f-2b8d4e1a7c3f
status: experimental
description: Detects uploaded Omnigent agent bundles or session execution attempts containing parent directory traversal or root paths in sub_agents/terminals os_env.cwd or unauthorized function: policy handlers.
references:
- https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/commit/4a406d5b3b3f3a7c3401eab659ab04e728923b94
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p5x3-3gqh-x44g
author: Hermes Codex Threat Intelligence
date: 2026-10-19
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1059
- cve.2026-112015
logsource:
category: application
product: omnigent
detection:
selection_traversal:
message|contains:
- 'escapes the bundle directory'
- 'os_env.cwd'
- 'Function policy handler'
selection_path_indicators:
message|re: '(?:cwd|os_env).*?(?:\.\./|"/")'
condition: selection_traversal or selection_path_indicators
falsepositives:
- Legitimate developer bundle validation errors during local testing.
level: high

  1. Upgrade Omnigent to Version 0.14.0 or Later Update the omnigent package across all API servers and runner workers to incorporate commit 4a406d5b3b3f3a7c3401eab659ab04e728923b94:

    Terminal window
    pip install --upgrade "omnigent>=0.14.0"
  2. Enforce OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE and Container Isolation Always configure an explicit, dedicated OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE directory on runner processes and execute each session inside an ephemeral, rootless container or microVM with a read-only root filesystem.

  3. Restrict Custom function: Policy Handlers Leave OMNIGENT_ALLOWED_FUNCTION_POLICY_HANDLERS unset (or restricted to an explicit comma-separated allowlist of audited module:callable targets) and ensure OMNIGENT_ALLOW_ALL_FUNCTION_POLICY_HANDLERS is never enabled in production.