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CVE-2026-110886: QuantumCloud Conversational Forms for ChatBot Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection

Density:
C-Level Executive Briefing HERMES-SEC-BRIEF HIGH

QuantumCloud Conversational Forms for ChatBot (WPBot) versions <= 1.5.1 accept unauthenticated conversational chat answers via WordPress admin-ajax.php, store raw user strings in the wfb_form_entry_values table after only calling sanitize_text_field() (which preserves PHP serialized object strings), and subsequently pass those stored values into WordPress maybe_unserialize() without allowed_classes restrictions. Combined with missing per-entry nonce verification, unauthenticated attackers can inject arbitrary PHP objects into new or existing chat entries and trigger Property-Oriented Programming (POP) gadget chains for remote code execution, arbitrary file deletion, or WordPress administrator takeover.

CVE-2026-110886 is a critical unauthenticated PHP Object Injection (CWE-502) and Broken Access Control (CWE-862) vulnerability in QuantumCloud Conversational Forms for ChatBot (conversational-forms), the conversational workflow builder for the WPBot WordPress AI ChatBot ecosystem. In all versions up to and including 1.5.1, the unauthenticated AJAX handler in qcformbuilder-core.php processes user-submitted chat answers ($_POST['answer']) by applying sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_POST['answer'])) before inserting the value directly into the $wpdb->prefix . "wfb_form_entry_values" table. Because sanitize_text_field() strips HTML tags and normalizes whitespace without rejecting or escaping PHP serialization syntax (O:8:"stdClass":...), an unauthenticated visitor can store arbitrary serialized PHP object payloads inside form entry records. Furthermore, prior to version 1.5.2, the handler accepted caller-controlled $entry IDs when $entry != 0 without verifying an entry-bound session nonce, enabling unauthenticated attackers to inject serialized payloads into existing conversational sessions.

Whenever form entries, conditional processor fields, or entry metadata are subsequently loaded by classes/entry/field.php, classes/entry/meta.php, or the administrative viewer in classes/admin.php, the plugin invokes WordPressโ€™s maybe_unserialize($value) helperโ€”which calls PHPโ€™s native unserialize() without allowed_classes => false. This immediately instantiates attacker-specified PHP classes and invokes magic methods (__wakeup(), __destruct(), __toString()), activating Property-Oriented Programming (POP) gadget chains across any loaded WordPress plugin or theme.

HYBRID

HERMES THREAT SCORE & CHATBOT OBJECT INJECTION EVALUATION

Target: QuantumCloud WPBot Conversational Forms AJAX Entry Handler & Field/Meta Deserializer
Confidence: 99%
91 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 19 / 20
Threat Activity 16 / 20
Weaponization 19 / 20
Exposure 19 / 20
Prevalence 17 / 20
Impact 19 / 20
Exploit Maturity 18 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 19 / 20
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

CVSS v3.1 scores CVE-2026-110886 at 9.8 (Critical), and the Hermes Threat Score aligns at 91 (CRITICAL) with a Hermes Agentic Security Score (HASS) of 82 (HIGH). Conversational Forms for ChatBot (WPBot) is deployed on thousands of WordPress sites to power interactive AI/chatbot lead-capture and conversational workflows. Because the chatbot entry handler in qcformbuilder-core.php is intentionally exposed to unauthenticated site visitors (wp_ajax_nopriv) and lacked both is_serialized() input rejection and per-entry nonce binding (entry_nonce), any unauthenticated HTTP POST request can plant a serialized POP gadget chain into wfb_form_entry_values or hijack another visitor's active conversational session ID ($entry).

๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-110886: QuantumCloud Conversational Forms for ChatBot Unauthenticated PHP Object InjectionVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTQuantumCloud Conversational Forms for ChatBot
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in QuantumCloud Conversational Forms for ChatBot documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

QuantumCloudโ€™s Conversational Forms for ChatBot (conversational-forms) extends the WPBot WordPress ChatBot with interactive, step-by-step conversational forms, conditional branching processors, and automated lead-capture pipelines. Because conversational chat widgets must interact with anonymous website visitors on the frontend, the plugin registers unauthenticated AJAX actions (wp_ajax_nopriv_*) in qcformbuilder-core.php.

During an interactive chat conversation, each prompt answered by the visitor triggers an AJAX request containing:

  • form_id: the identifier of the conversational form schema.
  • field_id: the target field identifier within the form configuration.
  • entry: the database row ID in wp_wfb_form_entries tracking the active chat session (0 on the initial turn, or an integer ID on subsequent turns).
  • answer: the visitorโ€™s text or selection response.

To support both scalar text answers and multi-value checkbox/select arrays in the same value column (slug / value pairs in wp_wfb_form_entry_values and wp_wfb_form_entry_meta), legacy versions of the plugin relied on WordPressโ€™s maybe_unserialize() whenever reading field values back from MySQL.

flowchart TD
A["Unauthenticated Attacker / AI Chat Visitor"] -->|"POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php (answer = O:21:\"GadgetClass\":...)"| B["qcformbuilder-core.php AJAX Handler"]
B -->|"sanitize_text_field() preserves serialized syntax"| C[("MySQL: wp_wfb_form_entry_values")]
B -->|"No entry_nonce check on existing entry != 0"| C
C -->|"1. Next Turn / Conditional Field Lookup"| D["classes/entry/field.php: maybe_unserialize()"]
C -->|"2. Admin Entry Viewer / Export"| E["classes/admin.php & classes/entry/meta.php: maybe_unserialize()"]
D -->|"unserialize() without allowed_classes => false"| F["POP Gadget Chain Execution (__wakeup / __destruct)"]
E -->|"unserialize() without allowed_classes => false"| F
F -->|"RCE / Arbitrary File Deletion / Admin Creation"| G["Full WordPress Host Compromise"]

The vulnerability stems from three compounding architectural defects across qcformbuilder-core.php, classes/admin.php, classes/entry/field.php, and classes/entry/meta.php, remediated in WordPress Plugin Trac Changeset 3745718 (version 1.5.2).

1. Failure to Reject Serialized Payloads & Unverified $entry Hijacking (qcformbuilder-core.php)

Section titled โ€œ1. Failure to Reject Serialized Payloads & Unverified $entry Hijacking (qcformbuilder-core.php)โ€

In qcformbuilder-core.php (lines 369โ€“435), the unauthenticated AJAX submission handler extracted $_POST['entry'] and $_POST['answer']. When $entry == 0, it created a new row in wfb_form_entries; when $entry != 0, it trusted the caller-supplied $entry integer without verifying that the caller owned that conversational session. It then sanitized $_POST['answer'] with sanitize_text_field() and inserted the string directly into wfb_form_entry_values:

// VULNERABLE: qcformbuilder-core.php (<= 1.5.1, lines 369-424)
$entry = isset($_POST['entry']) ? (int) sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_POST['entry'])) : 0;
if($entry == 0){
$wpdb->insert(
$wpdb->prefix."wfb_form_entries",
array(
'datestamp' => current_time( 'mysql', 1 ),
'user_id' => 0,
'form_id' => $form_id,
'status' => 'active'
)
);
$entry = $wpdb->insert_id;
}
if($field_id != ''){
$answer = '';
if ( isset( $_POST['answer'] ) ) {
if ( is_array( $_POST['answer'] ) ) {
$answer = array_map( 'sanitize_text_field', wp_unslash( $_POST['answer'] ) );
} else {
// sanitize_text_field() does NOT strip PHP serialized object syntax!
$answer = sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['answer'] ) );
}
}
// ...
if($answer != ''){
$wpdb->insert(
$wpdb->prefix."wfb_form_entry_values",
array(
'entry_id' => $entry,
'field_id' => $field_id,
'slug' => ($field['slug']),
'value' => $answer
)
);
}
}

Because is_serialized() checks whether a string starts with a:, O:, C:, s:, i:, d:, or b: and ends with ; or }, a payload such as O:29:"GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar":4:{...} passes cleanly through sanitize_text_field() as long as it does not rely on null bytes (i.e., using public properties or PHP 7.2+ object property coercion, or S: hex-escaped strings O:8:"..." where \00 is represented as \00 in uppercase S: serialization tokens).

2. Unsafe maybe_unserialize() Sinks Across Entry Retrieval (classes/entry/field.php, classes/entry/meta.php, classes/admin.php)

Section titled โ€œ2. Unsafe maybe_unserialize() Sinks Across Entry Retrieval (classes/entry/field.php, classes/entry/meta.php, classes/admin.php)โ€

Whenever the stored entry value was read back from wfb_form_entry_values or wfb_form_entry_meta, the plugin called maybe_unserialize() directly:

// VULNERABLE: classes/entry/field.php (<= 1.5.1, lines 113-140)
protected function filter_value( $value ) {
if ( is_string( $value ) && is_serialized( $value ) ) {
$unserialized = maybe_unserialize( $value ); // Instantiates arbitrary PHP objects!
if ( is_array( $unserialized ) ) {
$value = $unserialized;
} else {
$value = array( $unserialized );
}
}
return $value;
}

And identically in classes/admin.php (line 988) and classes/entry/meta.php (line 40):

// VULNERABLE: classes/admin.php (<= 1.5.1, line 988)
$entry[$field_id] = maybe_unserialize($field_value->value);
// VULNERABLE: classes/entry/meta.php (<= 1.5.1, line 40)
$this->$key = maybe_unserialize( $value );

3. The Official Patch in Version 1.5.2 (Changeset 3745718)

Section titled โ€œ3. The Official Patch in Version 1.5.2 (Changeset 3745718)โ€

In version 1.5.2, QuantumCloud implemented defense-in-depth at both the ingestion boundary and every deserialization sink:

  1. Per-Entry Nonce Enforcement: When $entry == 0, the server generates $entry_nonce = wp_create_nonce('wpbot_entry_' . absint($entry)) and returns it in the JSON response. When $entry != 0, the server verifies wp_verify_nonce($entry_nonce, 'wpbot_entry_' . absint($entry)) and confirms the (id, form_id) pair exists in wfb_form_entries.
  2. Input Serialization Rejection & JSON Encoding: Before sanitizing $_POST['answer'], qcformbuilder-core.php checks is_serialized($raw_answer) and halts execution with wp_send_json_error(array('message' => 'Invalid answer value.'), 400). Valid scalar answers are wrapped with wp_json_encode($answer) before database insertion.
  3. Safe Deserialization (allowed_classes => false): In classes/admin.php, classes/entry/field.php, and classes/entry/meta.php, maybe_unserialize() was replaced with unserialize($value, array('allowed_classes' => false)) alongside json_decode($value, true):
// PATCHED: classes/entry/field.php (1.5.2)
if ( is_string( $value ) && is_serialized( $value ) ) {
$unserialized = @unserialize( trim( $value ), array( 'allowed_classes' => false ) );
if ( is_array( $unserialized ) ) {
$value = $unserialized;
} else {
$value = ( $unserialized !== false && ! ( $unserialized instanceof __PHP_Incomplete_Class ) )
? array( $unserialized )
: array();
}
}

  1. Stage 1 โ€” Form & Field Discovery: The attacker inspects the public webpage hosting the WPBot widget or queries the unauthenticated chatbot initialization action to obtain a valid form_id (e.g., CF64a1b2c3d4e5f) and field_id (e.g., fld_8901234).
  2. Stage 2 โ€” Serialized Payload Crafting: Using PHPGGC or custom WordPress POP chains targeting co-installed plugins (such as WooCommerce, Elementor, Contact Form 7, or Guzzle/Monolog libraries bundled in AI connector plugins), the attacker crafts a serialized object string using S: hex-escaped property names if protected/private properties are required, avoiding raw null bytes that sanitize_text_field() would strip.
  3. Stage 3 โ€” Unauthenticated Injection: The attacker sends a POST request to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with entry=0 (or an existing active entry ID), form_id, field_id, and answer=O:....
  4. Stage 4 โ€” Deserialization & Code Execution: On subsequent conversational step evaluation (classes/entry/field.php) or admin entry review (classes/admin.php), maybe_unserialize() instantiates the injected object, executing the POP chain to write a PHP web shell or delete wp-config.php.

Co-Disclosed WordPress Ecosystem Flaw: OttoKit (SureTriggers) CVE-2026-110372

Section titled โ€œCo-Disclosed WordPress Ecosystem Flaw: OttoKit (SureTriggers) CVE-2026-110372โ€

In the same Patchstack intelligence wave, researchers disclosed CVE-2026-110372 in Brainstorm Force OttoKit (formerly SureTriggers) <= 1.1.40 / 1.1.41 (patched in 1.1.42 via Trac Changeset 3747752). When an unconfigured OttoKit plugin had never connected to the SaaS platform, SaasApiToken::get() returned the hardcoded fallback sentinel string 'connection-denied'. An unauthenticated attacker could pass Authorization: Bearer connection-denied (or st_authorization: Bearer connection-denied) to /wp-json/sure-triggers/v1/automation/action or /wp-json/sure-triggers/v1/connection/create-wp-connection, satisfying the non-empty strict comparison in AuthController::authenticate_Rest() and SaasApiToken::verify() to execute arbitrary WordPress automation actions and create administrator accounts. Administrators operating WordPress AI chatbots alongside automation connectors should patch both plugins simultaneously.


Use the following detection rules across your WAF, SIEM, and WordPress database to identify exploitation attempts and persisted serialized payloads.

title: WordPress Conversational Forms Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection (CVE-2026-110886)
id: 9b4e1d2a-6c8f-4a3e-b5d1-7f8e9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP POST requests to WordPress admin-ajax.php containing PHP serialized object payloads targeting Conversational Forms for ChatBot (CVE-2026-110886).
references:
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3745718/conversational-forms
author: Hermes Codex Threat Intelligence
date: 2026-10-19
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1190
- attack.execution
- cve.2026-110886
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection_endpoint:
cs-method: 'POST'
cs-uri-stem|contains: '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php'
selection_payload:
cs-request-body|re: 'answer=(?:O|C)(?:%3A|:)\d+(?:%3A|:)(?:%22|")[A-Za-z0-9_\\]+(?:%22|")'
condition: selection_endpoint and selection_payload
falsepositives:
- None expected; conversational form answers should never contain raw PHP serialized object notation.
level: critical

  1. Upgrade Conversational Forms for ChatBot to 1.5.2 or Later Update the conversational-forms plugin immediately via WP-CLI or the WordPress administrator dashboard:

    Terminal window
    wp plugin update conversational-forms --version=1.5.2

    Verify that qcformbuilder-core.php rejects is_serialized($raw_answer) and that classes/entry/field.php, classes/entry/meta.php, and classes/admin.php pass array('allowed_classes' => false) to unserialize().

  2. Purge Malicious Serialized Entries from the Database Before opening the Conversational Forms Entries screen in wp-admin, run the MySQL forensic query above and delete any rows in wp_wfb_form_entry_values or wp_wfb_form_entry_meta containing O:<digits>: or C:<digits>: serialized object markers.

  3. Enforce WAF Inspection on admin-ajax.php Configure Cloudflare WAF, ModSecurity (OWASP CRS Rule 944130 / custom rule), or Wordfence to block any POST body parameter matching (?:^|[&?])answer=(?:O|C)(?:%3A|:)\d+(?:%3A|:) targeting /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php.