Linux Auditd / Microsoft Sentinel: Zammad Sudoers backup.sh Privilege Escalation Hunting — Threat Hunting Query
Hunting Telemetry & Platform Metadata
Section titled “Hunting Telemetry & Platform Metadata”| Evaluation Dimension | Observed Telemetry / Attribute | Epistemic Status |
|---|---|---|
| Hunting Query Identifier | HUNT-ZAMMAD-BACKUP-LPE | Canonical Hunt Node |
| Target SIEM / Analytics Platform | Microsoft Sentinel / Linux Auditd | Telemetry Ingestion Engine |
| Platform Syntax Dialect | sentinel_kql | Query Language Standard |
| Telemetry & Log Sources | Linux Auditd, Syslog, Process Creation Events | Data Sensor Sources |
| Targeted Adversary Syndicates | ShinyHunters, CLOSEDQUORUM Threat Cluster | Threat Attribution |
| Associated Weaponized CVEs | CVE-2026-102490 | Vulnerabilities Targeted |
| Associated Intrusion Campaigns | CLOSEDQUORUM Autonomous Infiltration Wave | Monitored Campaign |
| Analytical Confidence | 98% | Hypothesis Validity Score |
| Primary Evidence Sources | SRC-CISA-KEV, SRC-MANDIANT-GOOGLE | Intelligence Attestation |
Threat Hunting Hypothesis
Section titled “Threat Hunting Hypothesis”Threat actors with local user access under the zammad service account exploit CVE-2026-102490 by abusing sudo /opt/zammad/contrib/backup.sh with trojaned binaries placed in /tmp/bin or writable backup destinations.
Adversary operations frequently slip through standard alerting thresholds by leveraging legitimate binaries or abusing valid service configurations. Proactive threat hunting formulates precise hypotheses based on known architectural chokepoints and queries historical telemetry to unearth stealthy intrusion footholds.
Production Hunting Query
Section titled “Production Hunting Query”DeviceProcessEvents| where InitiatingProcessAccountName =~ "zammad"| where ProcessCommandLine has "sudo" and ProcessCommandLine has "backup.sh"| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName| join kind=inner ( DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "backup.sh" | where FolderPath startswith "/tmp" or FolderPath startswith "/var/tmp") on DeviceName| order by Timestamp descTriage Guidance & Investigation Protocol
Section titled “Triage Guidance & Investigation Protocol”Verify /etc/sudoers.d/zammad to remove NOPASSWD directives. Check /tmp, /var/tmp, and /dev/shm for rogue pg_dump or tar binaries with executable permissions. Terminate any persistent root shells spawned by backup.sh.
- Verify Timeline Baseline: Review the first seen and last seen timestamps of returned events to distinguish chronic benign traffic from sudden operational spikes.
- Examine Parent-Child Lineage: Ensure that all parent processes match authorized deployment manifests and do not conceal unexpected interactive utilities.
- Inspect Network Pivots: Cross-reference communicating source and destination IP addresses against Hermes Adversary Infrastructure endpoints.