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Linux Auditd / Microsoft Sentinel: Zammad Sudoers backup.sh Privilege Escalation Hunting — Threat Hunting Query

Density:
Evaluation DimensionObserved Telemetry / AttributeEpistemic Status
Hunting Query IdentifierHUNT-ZAMMAD-BACKUP-LPECanonical Hunt Node
Target SIEM / Analytics PlatformMicrosoft Sentinel / Linux AuditdTelemetry Ingestion Engine
Platform Syntax Dialectsentinel_kqlQuery Language Standard
Telemetry & Log SourcesLinux Auditd, Syslog, Process Creation EventsData Sensor Sources
Targeted Adversary SyndicatesShinyHunters, CLOSEDQUORUM Threat ClusterThreat Attribution
Associated Weaponized CVEsCVE-2026-102490Vulnerabilities Targeted
Associated Intrusion CampaignsCLOSEDQUORUM Autonomous Infiltration WaveMonitored Campaign
Analytical Confidence98%Hypothesis Validity Score
Primary Evidence SourcesSRC-CISA-KEV, SRC-MANDIANT-GOOGLEIntelligence Attestation

Threat actors with local user access under the zammad service account exploit CVE-2026-102490 by abusing sudo /opt/zammad/contrib/backup.sh with trojaned binaries placed in /tmp/bin or writable backup destinations.

Adversary operations frequently slip through standard alerting thresholds by leveraging legitimate binaries or abusing valid service configurations. Proactive threat hunting formulates precise hypotheses based on known architectural chokepoints and queries historical telemetry to unearth stealthy intrusion footholds.


DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName =~ "zammad"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "sudo" and ProcessCommandLine has "backup.sh"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| join kind=inner (
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "backup.sh"
| where FolderPath startswith "/tmp" or FolderPath startswith "/var/tmp"
) on DeviceName
| order by Timestamp desc

Verify /etc/sudoers.d/zammad to remove NOPASSWD directives. Check /tmp, /var/tmp, and /dev/shm for rogue pg_dump or tar binaries with executable permissions. Terminate any persistent root shells spawned by backup.sh.

  1. Verify Timeline Baseline: Review the first seen and last seen timestamps of returned events to distinguish chronic benign traffic from sudden operational spikes.
  2. Examine Parent-Child Lineage: Ensure that all parent processes match authorized deployment manifests and do not conceal unexpected interactive utilities.
  3. Inspect Network Pivots: Cross-reference communicating source and destination IP addresses against Hermes Adversary Infrastructure endpoints.