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Microsoft Sentinel KQL / Sigma: Zammad Webhook Session Fixation & YAML Deserialization Hunting — Threat Hunting Query

Density:
Evaluation DimensionObserved Telemetry / AttributeEpistemic Status
Hunting Query IdentifierHUNT-ZAMMAD-WEBHOOK-DESERCanonical Hunt Node
Target SIEM / Analytics PlatformMicrosoft Sentinel / Linux Web Access LogsTelemetry Ingestion Engine
Platform Syntax Dialectsentinel_kqlQuery Language Standard
Telemetry & Log SourcesNginx Access Logs, Apache Access Logs, Puma Application Logs, Linux AuditdData Sensor Sources
Targeted Adversary SyndicatesShinyHunters, CLOSEDQUORUM Threat ClusterThreat Attribution
Associated Weaponized CVEsCVE-2026-102489Vulnerabilities Targeted
Associated Intrusion CampaignsCLOSEDQUORUM Autonomous Infiltration WaveMonitored Campaign
Analytical Confidence99%Hypothesis Validity Score
Primary Evidence SourcesSRC-CISA-KEV, SRC-MANDIANT-GOOGLEIntelligence Attestation

Adversaries are actively exploiting CVE-2026-102489 by injecting fixed session identifiers in X-Zammad-Session-Hint headers and supplying Ruby YAML deserialization gadget chains to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution.

Adversary operations frequently slip through standard alerting thresholds by leveraging legitimate binaries or abusing valid service configurations. Proactive threat hunting formulates precise hypotheses based on known architectural chokepoints and queries historical telemetry to unearth stealthy intrusion footholds.


DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "puma" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "zammad"
| where FileName in~ ("bash", "sh", "dash", "python", "python3", "curl", "wget", "nc")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, CommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc

Inspect Puma web worker child processes spawning interactive shells. Audit web server logs for inbound_webhooks POST requests with DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy markers. Invalidate active sessions via Rails console.

  1. Verify Timeline Baseline: Review the first seen and last seen timestamps of returned events to distinguish chronic benign traffic from sudden operational spikes.
  2. Examine Parent-Child Lineage: Ensure that all parent processes match authorized deployment manifests and do not conceal unexpected interactive utilities.
  3. Inspect Network Pivots: Cross-reference communicating source and destination IP addresses against Hermes Adversary Infrastructure endpoints.