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CVE-2026-105138: Obot Agent Platform MCP Catalog Entry API Credential Exposure and Lateral Movement

Density:
HERMES

HERMES THREAT SCORE & AGENTIC INFRASTRUCTURE EVALUATION

Target: Obot AI Agent Platform โ€” MCP Catalog API Handlers & Authorization Layer (pkg/api/handlers/mcp.go)
Confidence: 96%
86 / 100
HIGH

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 18 / 20
Threat Activity 16 / 20
Weaponization 18 / 20
Exposure 16 / 20
Prevalence 15 / 20
Impact 18 / 20
Exploit Maturity 18 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 19 / 20
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

Traditional CVSS v3.1 rates this flaw at 7.7 (High) as an authenticated information disclosure vulnerability within an application boundary. The Hermes Threat Score assesses it at 86 (HIGH) with an Agentic Security Score (HASS) of 94 (CRITICAL). In an autonomous agent architecture, Obot serves as the centralized orchestration orchestrator integrating tools and resources via the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The exposed configurations are not merely generic application settings, but production external credentials configured by enterprise administratorsโ€”such as AWS IAM access keys, GitHub personal access tokens, database connection URIs, and enterprise SaaS bearer tokens. A low-privilege employee granted access to an agent workflow can query the MCP catalog endpoint to extract plaintext infrastructure secrets, completely bypassing intended tool sandboxes and achieving lateral breakout into external enterprise environments (MITRE ATLAS AML.T0040 & MITRE ATT&CK T1552).

๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-105138: Obot Agent Platform MCP Catalog Entry API Credential Exposure and Lateral MovementVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 2
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTObot Autonomous AI Agent Platform
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in Obot Autonomous AI Agent Platform documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:
→ usesATTACK TECHNIQUET1552: Unsecured Credentials
90% VERY_HIGH

Adversaries search compromise victims for unsecured credentials in files, environment variables, or memory.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Attack execution telemetry aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1552.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

Obot coordinates autonomous multi-agent systems, providing a web workspace, user authentication, and tool execution runtimes. To equip agents with capabilities (e.g., querying Jira, writing to Snowflake, pushing to Git repositories), administrators configure MCP servers in the central catalog.

ParameterTechnical SpecificationOperational Details
CVE IdentifierCVE-2026-105138International vulnerability catalog tracking identifier
Software PlatformObot Autonomous AI Agent PlatformOpen-source enterprise LLM agent orchestration platform
Vulnerable Componentpkg/api/handlers/mcp.go & pkg/api/authz/resources.goRoute handler for GET /api/all-mcps/entries/{entry_id}
Vulnerability ClassCWE-522 / CWE-200Insufficiently Protected Credentials / Information Disclosure
Attack VectorNetwork (HTTP REST API)Authenticated low-privilege HTTP GET request
Remediation ReleaseObot v0.26.2Response field sanitization & credential redaction middleware
[ Low-Privilege Authenticated User ]
|
GET /api/all-mcps/entries/{entry_id} with User Token
|
v
+-----------------------------------+
| Obot API Gateway & Router |
| pkg/api/handlers/mcp.go |
+-----------------------------------+
|
Authorization Check: User has READ permission? (YES)
Response Sanitization: Redact Secrets? (NO - MISSING!)
|
v
+-----------------------------------+
| Full Catalog Entry Returned |
| Cleartext env: |
| AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY |
| GITHUB_TOKEN |
| DB_PASSWORD |
+-----------------------------------+
|
v
+-----------------------------------+
| Adversary Lateral Movement |
| Direct Access to Enterprise |
| Databases, Cloud & Repos |
+-----------------------------------+

The root cause resides in pkg/api/handlers/mcp.go. When an authenticated user requests details for an MCP catalog entry, the server verifies that the user belongs to the workspace or has read permissions on catalog resources. However, it fails to sanitize the output struct before writing the response:

// Vulnerable handler flow in pkg/api/handlers/mcp.go (prior to v0.26.2)
func (s *Server) getMCPEntry(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
entryID := chi.URLParam(r, "entry_id")
// Authorization check passes for any authenticated user with catalog visibility
entry, err := s.storage.GetMCPEntry(ctx, entryID)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
// FLAW: The raw entry object, including entry.Configuration.Secrets
// and entry.Configuration.Env containing static tokens, is serialized directly!
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(entry); err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
}

In v0.26.2, the response model was restructured to explicitly sanitize the configuration payload:

// Patched implementation in Obot v0.26.2
func (s *Server) getMCPEntry(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// ...
// Redact secret key-value pairs before transmitting to non-admin callers
sanitizedEntry := entry.SanitizeForUser(ctx, user)
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(sanitizedEntry)
}

An attacker weaponizes this vulnerability by querying the list of available MCP catalog entries and retrieving the configuration details of each tool:

[Authentication] โ”€โ”€> [Enumerate MCP Entries] โ”€โ”€> [Fetch Specific Entry] โ”€โ”€> [Harvest Cleartext Secrets]
Standard User GET /api/all-mcps/entries GET /api/.../{entry_id} Extract AWS/GitHub/DB Keys
Session Cookie Catalog List Response Unredacted JSON Body Pivot to External Systems

An attacker logs into the Obot interface with an ordinary team member account and issues the following API call:

GET /api/all-mcps/entries/mcp-ent-98f21bc HTTP/1.1
Host: obot.corp.internal
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsIn...
Accept: application/json

The vulnerable server responds with unmasked credentials:

{
"id": "mcp-ent-98f21bc",
"name": "corporate-github-mcp",
"description": "Internal GitHub Enterprise MCP tool server",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
"env": {
"GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN": "ghp_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx",
"ENTERPRISE_ORG": "cyber-research-dev"
},
"created_by": "admin@corp.internal"
}

With the extracted token, the attacker directly accesses corporate GitHub repositories, bypassing MFA, agent guardrails, and role-based permissions enforced within the Obot web UI.


Security teams monitoring Obot deployments should analyze HTTP gateway logs for abnormal bursts of MCP catalog detail queries from non-administrative user accounts.

title: Obot Non-Admin Bulk MCP Catalog Secret Harvesting
id: 4e9a712c-9011-4fa3-b187-d4fa23c51138
status: experimental
description: Detects unusual access frequency to Obot MCP catalog detail endpoints by non-administrative user sessions.
author: Hermes Codex Cyber Threat Intelligence
date: 2026-10-08
logsource:
category: webserver
product: obot_api / envoy / ingress
detection:
selection:
cs-method: 'GET'
cs-uri-stem|startswith: '/api/all-mcps/entries/'
sc-status: 200
filter_admin:
cs-username|contains:
- 'admin'
- 'system'
condition: selection and not filter_admin
fields:
- c-ip
- cs-username
- cs-method
- cs-uri-stem
- sc-status
level: high
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1552.001
- cve.cve-2026-105138

  1. Upgrade Obot Instance: Update your Obot deployment to version 0.26.2 or later immediately:

    Terminal window
    helm upgrade obot oci://ghcr.io/obot-platform/charts/obot --version 0.26.2
  2. Rotate All Exposed MCP Credentials: Because all authenticated users previously had read access to configured catalog entries, treat all static secrets, API tokens, and private keys entered into the MCP catalog as compromised. Rotate:

    • Cloud provider credentials (AWS IAM keys, GCP service accounts)
    • Source code repository tokens (GitHub PATs, GitLab tokens)
    • Database connection passwords
    • Third-party SaaS API keys (Slack, Salesforce, Jira)
  3. Transition to Dynamic Secret Resolution: Rather than storing static credentials in catalog entry configuration blocks, configure Obot to pull secrets from HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, or Kubernetes Secrets at tool execution time.

  4. Implement Principle of Least Privilege: Restrict user workspace invitations and ensure only trusted personnel have accounts on clusters orchestrating sensitive enterprise agent tools.