CVE-2026-113356: DokuWiki PHP Object Injection via Draft::getDraftText() TOCTOU Race Condition & Companion Web CMS / Container File-Access Flaws (CVE-2026-113354, CVE-2026-113358, CVE-2026-113353)
Critical Web CMS, RAG knowledge-base, and container-management vulnerability cluster disclosed on October 20โ21, 2026. Under CVE-2026-113356 (CWE-502 / CWE-362), DokuWiki versions prior to 2026-07-14c pass serialized draft files (.draft) directly to PHP's unserialize() inside Draft::getDraftText() (inc/Draft.php) without ['allowed_classes' => false]. By exploiting a concurrent AJAX draft_save race condition, users with page-editing permissions splice crafted serialized PHP object payloads into the draft file to trigger Property-Oriented Programming (POP) gadget chains and Remote Code Execution (RCE). Dissected alongside Finsys Dockhand < 1.0.46 arbitrary file read via /api/system/files/content (CVE-2026-113354), LavaLite CMS <= 10.1.2 unauthenticated file download via /filer/download (CVE-2026-113358), and WordPress LearnPress < 4.4.10 legacy editor AJAX authorization bypass (CVE-2026-113353).
HERMES THREAT SCORE & ENTERPRISE KNOWLEDGE BASE / CONTAINER API EVALUATION
Target:DokuWiki Draft Deserializer (inc/Draft.php Draft::getDraftText) & Finsys Dockhand Container Stack File API (/api/system/files/content) Standard CVSS v3.1 metrics score CVE-2026-113356 at 7.5โ8.1 (HIGH) because winning a concurrent file-write race condition is modeled as High Attack Complexity (AC:H) and editing a draft requires contributor permissions (PR:L). However, the Hermes Threat Score elevates this cluster to 91 (CRITICAL) with a Hermes Agentic Security Score (HASS) of 87 (CRITICAL). In practice, asynchronous HTTP/2 multiplexing against lib/exe/ajax.php?call=draft_save reliably hits the unlocked file-truncation/write window in seconds, turning any open-registration or contributor wiki account into full PHP unserialize() RCE. Furthermore, DokuWiki serves as a primary internal documentation and RAG ingestion source for enterprise LLM agents, while companion flaw CVE-2026-113354 in Finsys Dockhand (< 1.0.46) allows any user with 'stacks:edit' permissions to read arbitrary host/container files (/etc/shadow, SSH private keys, .git-credentials) via GET /api/system/files/content?path=.
CVE-2026-113356: DokuWiki PHP Object Injection via Draft::getDraftText() TOCTOU Race Condition & Companion Web CMS / Container File-Access Flaws (CVE-2026-113354, CVE-2026-113358, CVE-2026-113353)VULNERABILITY
Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.
๐ Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“Confirmed security vulnerability in DokuWiki Open-Source Wiki & Knowledge Base documented in Hermes dossier.”
- [vulnerability_report]
- [government_confirmation]CISA verified active exploitation in the wild and mandated federal remediation deadline in KEV entry. — Source: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA Adds CVE-2026-59822 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Reliability: VERY_HIGH)
Executive Summary
Section titled โExecutive SummaryโOn October 20โ21, 2026, VulnCheck Initial Access Intelligence published weaponization advisories for four high-impact vulnerabilities targeting enterprise knowledge bases (DokuWiki), Docker stack management planes (Finsys Dockhand), and web Content/Learning Management Systems (LavaLite CMS & WordPress LearnPress):
- CVE-2026-113356 (
CWE-502/CWE-362, DokuWiki< 2026-07-14cPHP Object Injection via Draft Race Condition): Ininc/Draft.php,Draft::getDraftText()reads cached draft files (.draft) and passes their contents directly to PHPโs nativeunserialize()without restrictingallowed_classes. By exploiting a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition during concurrentdraft_saveAJAX writes (lib/exe/ajax.php), an attacker with page-editing rights can corrupt the serialized array structure and splice an arbitrary serialized PHP object (O:...) into the draft file, triggering Property-Oriented Programming (POP) gadget chains for arbitrary file write/delete and Remote Code Execution (RCE). - CVE-2026-113354 (
CWE-863/CWE-22, Finsys Dockhand< 1.0.46Arbitrary File Read via/api/system/files/content): In the Dockhand container and Compose stack management platform (< 1.0.46), the/api/system/files/contentendpoint allows non-admin users holdingstacks:editpermission to pass an arbitrary absolute filesystem path in thepathquery parameter (?path=/etc/shadowor?path=/root/.ssh/id_rsa) without scoping file reads to the designated Compose stack directory. - CVE-2026-113358 (
CWE-306, LavaLite CMS<= 10.1.2Missing Authentication via Filer Download Routes): In LavaLite CMS (<= 10.1.2), the Filer moduleโsFileControllerexposes/filer/downloadand/filer/displaywithout authentication middleware, enabling unauthenticated attackers to specify arbitrary storage disk names (local,s3) and file paths to exfiltrate private application files and cloud bucket objects. - CVE-2026-113353 (
CWE-862/CWE-639, WordPress LearnPress< 4.4.10Legacy Editor AJAX Authorization Bypass): Complements our recent analysis of CVE-2026-104736 (LearnPress Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection). In LearnPress versions prior to4.4.10, the legacy editor AJAX handlers (admin_course_editor,admin_quiz_editor, andadmin_question_editor) verify a generic session nonce but fail to verify object ownership on the targetidparameter, allowing low-privilege instructors to modify, overwrite, or delete courses, quizzes, and questions belonging to other users.
Technical Root Cause Analysis & Code Dissection
Section titled โTechnical Root Cause Analysis & Code Dissectionโ1. CVE-2026-113356: Concurrent draft_save Truncation Race to unserialize() POP Execution in DokuWiki
Section titled โ1. CVE-2026-113356: Concurrent draft_save Truncation Race to unserialize() POP Execution in DokuWikiโBecause DokuWiki is a flat-file PHP wiki that stores all pages, metadata, and working drafts on disk without a relational database, its draft subsystem (dokuwiki\Draft in inc/Draft.php) persists in-progress editor state inside data/cache/<hash>.draft.
When a user edits a page, the browser periodically sends background POST /lib/exe/ajax.php requests with call=draft_save, invoking Draft::saveDraft():
// VULNERABLE PATTERN: inc/Draft.php in DokuWiki (< 2026-07-14c)namespace dokuwiki;
class Draft { protected $cname; // Cache file path: data/cache/<md5(id + client)>.draft
public function saveDraft() { global $INPUT; $draft = [ 'id' => $this->id, 'prefix' => cleanText($INPUT->post->str('prefix')), 'text' => cleanText($INPUT->post->str('wikitext')), 'suffix' => cleanText($INPUT->post->str('suffix')), 'date' => time(), 'client' => $this->client, ]; // FLAW 1 (CWE-362): Non-atomic concurrent file writes via io_saveFile()! // Under high-concurrency overlapping AJAX draft_save requests of varying lengths, // interleaved writes or partial truncation corrupts string length specifiers (s:N:"...") // inside the serialized file on disk. return io_saveFile($this->cname, serialize($draft)); }
public function getDraftText() { if (!file_exists($this->cname)) return ''; // FLAW 2 (CWE-502): Unconditional PHP unserialize() without ['allowed_classes' => false]! // When the race condition shifts the serialized parser offset into attacker-controlled // 'text' / 'suffix' bytes, unserialize() instantiates arbitrary PHP gadget objects! $draft = unserialize(io_readFile($this->cname, false)); return $draft['prefix'] . $draft['text'] . $draft['suffix']; }}How the Concurrent Write Race Corrupts serialize() Framing
Section titled โHow the Concurrent Write Race Corrupts serialize() FramingโNormally, serialize($draft) encodes the user-supplied wikitext string safely as s:<byte_length>:"<wikitext>";. Even if <wikitext> contains ";O:21:"dokuwiki\...", PHPโs unserialize() strictly counts <byte_length> bytes and treats the embedded payload as inert string characters.
However, io_saveFile() in DokuWiki opens the target .draft file with fopen($file, 'wb') and writes the buffer without acquiring an exclusive advisory lock (LOCK_EX) across the open-truncate-write sequence:
- Thread A sends a
draft_saverequest with a longprefix/wikitextpayload, truncating the file and beginning its write stream. - Thread B concurrently sends a
draft_saverequest with a shortprefixand a craftedwikitextcontaining a serialized PHP gadget chain (";i:0;O:...). - When the OS kernel interleaves or partially overwrites the two concurrent
fwrite()streams on the shared.draftinode, the header written by one thread (s:120:"...) is paired with the body bytes of the other thread, causing a serialized string-length mismatch / parser desynchronization. - When
Draft::getDraftText()callsunserialize(io_readFile($this->cname, false)), the parser exits theprefixstring boundary prematurely and interprets the attackerโs injectedO:<len>:"<ClassName>":...bytes insidewikitextas a live top-level PHP objectโtriggering__wakeup()/__destruct()POP gadgets in DokuWiki core or bundled vendor libraries.
2. CVE-2026-113354: Finsys Dockhand < 1.0.46 Arbitrary File Read via /api/system/files/content
Section titled โ2. CVE-2026-113354: Finsys Dockhand < 1.0.46 Arbitrary File Read via /api/system/files/contentโIn Finsys Dockhand (< 1.0.46), non-administrative operators granted the stacks:edit role can edit Docker Compose files via the web UI. The backend exposes GET /api/system/files/content?path=<filepath> to load stack configuration files into the browser editor:
// VULNERABLE PATTERN: Dockhand File Content Handler (< 1.0.46)// Route: GET /api/system/files/content?path=/etc/shadowapp.get('/api/system/files/content', requirePermission('stacks:edit'), async (req, res) => { const filePath = String(req.query.path || ''); // FLAW (CWE-863 / CWE-22): No canonical path containment check verifying that // filePath resides inside the authorized /data/stacks/<stack_name> directory! const content = await fs.promises.readFile(filePath, 'utf8'); return res.json({ path: filePath, content });});Because the handler checks only stacks:edit and reads req.query.path directly from the container/host filesystem without enforcing path.resolve() containment inside the stacks directory, a low-privilege operator can read /etc/shadow, /root/.ssh/id_rsa, .git-credentials, or environment files containing cloud API keys and admin session secrets.
3. CVE-2026-113358 & CVE-2026-113353: LavaLite CMS /filer/download Unauthenticated File Exposure & LearnPress Legacy AJAX Bypass
Section titled โ3. CVE-2026-113358 & CVE-2026-113353: LavaLite CMS /filer/download Unauthenticated File Exposure & LearnPress Legacy AJAX Bypassโ- CVE-2026-113358 (
LavaLite CMS <= 10.1.2): TheFileControllerroutes/filer/download/{disk}/{path}and/filer/display/{disk}/{path}omit authentication middleware and allow callers to specify any configured Laravel Flysystem disk (local,public,s3) and file path, exposing confidential attachments and S3 bucket objects to unauthenticated requests. - CVE-2026-113353 (
WordPress LearnPress < 4.4.10): Ininc/admin/sub-menus/and legacy Vue/AJAX editor endpoints (lp-ajax=admin_course_editor,admin_quiz_editor,admin_question_editor), the backend verifieswp_verify_nonce()against a shared editor nonce available to anylp_teacher(Instructor) account, but omitscurrent_user_can('edit_post', $object_id)before executingduplicate_course,remove_item, or quiz answer mutations on arbitrary course/quiz IDs.
flowchart TD subgraph DokuWiki["CVE-2026-113356: DokuWiki (< 2026-07-14c)"] DW1["Contributor / Registered User<br/>Concurrent POST /lib/exe/ajax.php?call=draft_save"] DW2["CWE-362: Unlocked Concurrent io_saveFile()<br/>String-Length Desynchronization in .draft File"] DW3["CWE-502: Draft::getDraftText()<br/>unserialize() Without allowed_classes => false"] DW4["PHP POP Gadget Instantiation & RCE<br/>+ Enterprise Wiki / RAG Corpus Poisoning"] DW1 --> DW2 --> DW3 --> DW4 end
subgraph Companion["Companion 2026-10-21 Web CMS & Container Advisories"] DH["CVE-2026-113354: Finsys Dockhand (< 1.0.46)<br/>GET /api/system/files/content?path=/etc/shadow<br/>stacks:edit Arbitrary File Read"] LL["CVE-2026-113358: LavaLite CMS (<= 10.1.2)<br/>GET /filer/download & /filer/display<br/>Unauthenticated Local & S3 Bucket File Exfiltration"] LP["CVE-2026-113353: LearnPress (< 4.4.10)<br/>lp-ajax=admin_course_editor / admin_quiz_editor<br/>Cross-Instructor IDOR & Course Tampering"] end
style DW2 fill:#ff6600,stroke:#993300,color:#ffffff style DW3 fill:#ff1a1a,stroke:#800000,color:#ffffff style DW4 fill:#ff4d4d,stroke:#990000,color:#ffffff style DH fill:#ff4d4d,stroke:#990000,color:#ffffff style LL fill:#ff6600,stroke:#993300,color:#ffffff style LP fill:#ff6600,stroke:#993300,color:#ffffffProof-of-Concept & Detection Verification
Section titled โProof-of-Concept & Detection VerificationโThe following script demonstrates the request patterns for CVE-2026-113356 (concurrent draft_save race flooding followed by draft_get / page edit preview) and CVE-2026-113354 (Dockhand /api/system/files/content arbitrary file read) for defensive SIEM validation:
#!/usr/bin/env python3"""Defensive Verification Script:1. CVE-2026-113356 โ DokuWiki (< 2026-07-14c) Draft Race Condition & unserialize() Probe2. CVE-2026-113354 โ Finsys Dockhand (< 1.0.46) /api/system/files/content Path Traversal Probe"""from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutorimport requests
DOKUWIKI_URL = "http://dokuwiki.internal"DOCKHAND_URL = "http://dockhand.internal:3000"
def race_draft_save(session: requests.Session, variant: int): # Concurrent AJAX draft_save calls of differing prefix/wikitext lengths payload = { "call": "draft_save", "id": "playground:sandbox", "prefix": "A" * (4096 if variant % 2 == 0 else 16), "wikitext": '";s:6:"suffix";O:8:"stdClass":0:{}}', "suffix": "B" * 64, } return session.post(f"{DOKUWIKI_URL}/lib/exe/ajax.php", data=payload, timeout=3)
# 1. Simulate high-rate concurrent draft_save burst (CVE-2026-113356)with requests.Session() as s: with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=8) as pool: futures = [pool.submit(race_draft_save, s, i) for i in range(16)] for f in futures: try: f.result() except Exception: pass
# 2. Verify Dockhand /api/system/files/content containment (CVE-2026-113354)dh_resp = requests.get( f"{DOCKHAND_URL}/api/system/files/content", params={"path": "/etc/passwd"}, headers={"Authorization": "Bearer <STACKS_EDIT_USER_JWT>"}, timeout=5,)print("[*] Dockhand CVE-2026-113354 /api/system/files/content status:", dh_resp.status_code)Forensic Analysis & Detection Engineering
Section titled โForensic Analysis & Detection Engineeringโtitle: DokuWiki Draft Race Deserialization, Dockhand Arbitrary File Read & LavaLite/LearnPress Exploitation (CVE-2026-113356 / CVE-2026-113354 / CVE-2026-113358 / CVE-2026-113353)id: 113356d0-2026-4b52-8e11-cmscluster21status: experimentaldescription: Detects exploitation attempts against DokuWiki lib/exe/ajax.php draft_save with serialized PHP object markers (CVE-2026-113356), Finsys Dockhand /api/system/files/content sensitive file reads (CVE-2026-113354), LavaLite CMS /filer/download traversal (CVE-2026-113358), and LearnPress legacy editor AJAX calls (CVE-2026-113353).references: - https://vulncheck.com/advisories/dokuwiki-before-2026-07-14c-php-object-injection-via-draft-race-condition - https://vulncheck.com/advisories/dockhand-before-1.0.46-arbitrary-file-read-via-api-system-files-content - https://vulncheck.com/advisories/lavalite-cms-through-10.1.2-missing-authentication-via-filer-download-routes - https://vulncheck.com/advisories/learnpress-before-4.4.10-missing-authorization-via-legacy-editor-ajax-handlersauthor: Hermes Threat Intelligencedate: 2026/10/21logsource: category: webserverdetection: selection_dokuwiki_draft_poi: cs-method: 'POST' cs-uri-stem|contains: '/lib/exe/ajax.php' request_body|contains: 'draft_save' request_body|re: '(O:\+?[0-9]+:"|C:\+?[0-9]+:")' selection_dockhand_fileread: cs-method: 'GET' cs-uri-stem|contains: '/api/system/files/content' cs-uri-query|contains: - '/etc/passwd' - '/etc/shadow' - '.ssh/' - '.git-credentials' - '.env' - '..' selection_lavalite_filer: cs-uri-stem|contains: - '/filer/download' - '/filer/display' selection_learnpress_legacy_ajax: cs-uri-query|contains: - 'lp-ajax=admin_course_editor' - 'lp-ajax=admin_quiz_editor' - 'lp-ajax=admin_question_editor' condition: selection_dokuwiki_draft_poi or selection_dockhand_fileread or selection_lavalite_filer or selection_learnpress_legacy_ajaxfalsepositives: - Legitimate administrator or instructor edits in LearnPress or authenticated LavaLite downloadslevel: hightags: - attack.initial_access - attack.execution - attack.credential_access - attack.t1190 - attack.t1005 - cve.2026-113356 - cve.2026-113354 - cve.2026-113358 - cve.2026-113353index=web (uri_path="*/lib/exe/ajax.php*" OR uri_path="*/api/system/files/content*" OR uri_path="*/filer/download*" OR uri_query="*lp-ajax=admin_*_editor*")| bucket _time span=10s| stats count as req_count, values(uri_query) as queries, values(status) as http_statuses by _time, src_ip, dest_host, uri_path| eval threat_signal=case( match(uri_path, "lib/exe/ajax\.php") AND req_count >= 10, "CVE-2026-113356_DokuWiki_Concurrent_Draft_Race_Flood", match(uri_path, "/api/system/files/content") AND match(mvjoin(queries, " "), "(?i)(/etc/|/root/|\.ssh|\.env|\.git)"), "CVE-2026-113354_Dockhand_Arbitrary_File_Read", match(uri_path, "/filer/(download|display)"), "CVE-2026-113358_LavaLite_Unauth_Filer_Download", match(mvjoin(queries, " "), "lp-ajax=admin_(course|quiz|question)_editor"), "CVE-2026-113353_LearnPress_Legacy_Editor_AJAX", 1==1, "Benign")| where threat_signal != "Benign"| table _time, threat_signal, src_ip, dest_host, uri_path, req_count, queries#!/usr/bin/env bash# Hermes Forensic Audit for DokuWiki (CVE-2026-113356) & Dockhand (CVE-2026-113354)set -euo pipefail
DOKU_ROOT="${1:-/var/www/html/dokuwiki}"if [ -d "${DOKU_ROOT}" ]; then echo "[*] 1. Checking DokuWiki version and 'usedraft' configuration in ${DOKU_ROOT}..." cat "${DOKU_ROOT}/VERSION" 2>/dev/null || true grep -E "usedraft" "${DOKU_ROOT}/conf/"*.php 2>/dev/null || echo " [!] usedraft not explicitly disabled (enabled by default)."
echo "[*] 2. Scanning DokuWiki data/cache/*.draft files for injected PHP Object markers (O: / C:)..." find "${DOKU_ROOT}/data/cache" -name "*.draft" -type f -exec grep -E -H 'O:[0-9]+:"|C:[0-9]+:"' {} + 2>/dev/null || echo " [OK] No serialized object payloads found in active .draft files."fiRemediation & Hardening Directives
Section titled โRemediation & Hardening Directivesโ- Upgrade DokuWiki to
>= 2026-07-14cor Disableusedraft(CVE-2026-113356):- Immediately update all DokuWiki installations to release
2026-07-14cor later, which hardens draft deserialization (['allowed_classes' => false]/ safe draft parsing) and prevents race-induced object instantiation inDraft::getDraftText(). - Immediate Configuration Workaround: If you cannot upgrade immediately, disable draft saving in
conf/local.phpby adding$conf['usedraft'] = 0;and purge existing cached draft files viafind data/cache/ -name "*.draft" -delete.
- Immediately update all DokuWiki installations to release
- Upgrade Finsys Dockhand to
>= 1.0.46(CVE-2026-113354): Update Dockhand to version1.0.46or later so that/api/system/files/contentstrictly canonicalizes and confines requested file paths to the authorized Compose stack directory. Rotate any SSH keys,.git-credentials, or environment secrets present inside the Dockhand container if non-adminstacks:editaccounts existed prior to patching. - Update WordPress LearnPress to
>= 4.4.10(CVE-2026-113353) and Harden LavaLite CMS/filer/*Routes (CVE-2026-113358): Upgrade the LearnPress WordPress plugin to4.4.10or higher (remediating bothCVE-2026-113353andCVE-2026-104736), and attach strictauthmiddleware plus storage-disk allowlisting to/filer/downloadand/filer/displayin LavaLite CMS (<= 10.1.2).