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CVE-2026-113356: DokuWiki PHP Object Injection via Draft::getDraftText() TOCTOU Race Condition & Companion Web CMS / Container File-Access Flaws (CVE-2026-113354, CVE-2026-113358, CVE-2026-113353)

Density:
C-Level Executive Briefing CVE-2026-113356 CRITICAL SCORE 91/100

Critical Web CMS, RAG knowledge-base, and container-management vulnerability cluster disclosed on October 20โ€“21, 2026. Under CVE-2026-113356 (CWE-502 / CWE-362), DokuWiki versions prior to 2026-07-14c pass serialized draft files (.draft) directly to PHP's unserialize() inside Draft::getDraftText() (inc/Draft.php) without ['allowed_classes' => false]. By exploiting a concurrent AJAX draft_save race condition, users with page-editing permissions splice crafted serialized PHP object payloads into the draft file to trigger Property-Oriented Programming (POP) gadget chains and Remote Code Execution (RCE). Dissected alongside Finsys Dockhand < 1.0.46 arbitrary file read via /api/system/files/content (CVE-2026-113354), LavaLite CMS <= 10.1.2 unauthenticated file download via /filer/download (CVE-2026-113358), and WordPress LearnPress < 4.4.10 legacy editor AJAX authorization bypass (CVE-2026-113353).

HYBRID

HERMES THREAT SCORE & ENTERPRISE KNOWLEDGE BASE / CONTAINER API EVALUATION

Target: DokuWiki Draft Deserializer (inc/Draft.php Draft::getDraftText) & Finsys Dockhand Container Stack File API (/api/system/files/content)
Confidence: 98%
91 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 18 / 20
Threat Activity 17 / 20
Weaponization 19 / 20
Exposure 19 / 20
Prevalence 18 / 20
Impact 19 / 20
Exploit Maturity 19 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 19 / 20
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

Standard CVSS v3.1 metrics score CVE-2026-113356 at 7.5โ€“8.1 (HIGH) because winning a concurrent file-write race condition is modeled as High Attack Complexity (AC:H) and editing a draft requires contributor permissions (PR:L). However, the Hermes Threat Score elevates this cluster to 91 (CRITICAL) with a Hermes Agentic Security Score (HASS) of 87 (CRITICAL). In practice, asynchronous HTTP/2 multiplexing against lib/exe/ajax.php?call=draft_save reliably hits the unlocked file-truncation/write window in seconds, turning any open-registration or contributor wiki account into full PHP unserialize() RCE. Furthermore, DokuWiki serves as a primary internal documentation and RAG ingestion source for enterprise LLM agents, while companion flaw CVE-2026-113354 in Finsys Dockhand (< 1.0.46) allows any user with 'stacks:edit' permissions to read arbitrary host/container files (/etc/shadow, SSH private keys, .git-credentials) via GET /api/system/files/content?path=.

๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-113356: DokuWiki PHP Object Injection via Draft::getDraftText() TOCTOU Race Condition & Companion Web CMS / Container File-Access Flaws (CVE-2026-113354, CVE-2026-113358, CVE-2026-113353)VULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTDokuWiki Open-Source Wiki & Knowledge Base
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in DokuWiki Open-Source Wiki & Knowledge Base documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

On October 20โ€“21, 2026, VulnCheck Initial Access Intelligence published weaponization advisories for four high-impact vulnerabilities targeting enterprise knowledge bases (DokuWiki), Docker stack management planes (Finsys Dockhand), and web Content/Learning Management Systems (LavaLite CMS & WordPress LearnPress):

  1. CVE-2026-113356 (CWE-502 / CWE-362, DokuWiki < 2026-07-14c PHP Object Injection via Draft Race Condition): In inc/Draft.php, Draft::getDraftText() reads cached draft files (.draft) and passes their contents directly to PHPโ€™s native unserialize() without restricting allowed_classes. By exploiting a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition during concurrent draft_save AJAX writes (lib/exe/ajax.php), an attacker with page-editing rights can corrupt the serialized array structure and splice an arbitrary serialized PHP object (O:...) into the draft file, triggering Property-Oriented Programming (POP) gadget chains for arbitrary file write/delete and Remote Code Execution (RCE).
  2. CVE-2026-113354 (CWE-863 / CWE-22, Finsys Dockhand < 1.0.46 Arbitrary File Read via /api/system/files/content): In the Dockhand container and Compose stack management platform (< 1.0.46), the /api/system/files/content endpoint allows non-admin users holding stacks:edit permission to pass an arbitrary absolute filesystem path in the path query parameter (?path=/etc/shadow or ?path=/root/.ssh/id_rsa) without scoping file reads to the designated Compose stack directory.
  3. CVE-2026-113358 (CWE-306, LavaLite CMS <= 10.1.2 Missing Authentication via Filer Download Routes): In LavaLite CMS (<= 10.1.2), the Filer moduleโ€™s FileController exposes /filer/download and /filer/display without authentication middleware, enabling unauthenticated attackers to specify arbitrary storage disk names (local, s3) and file paths to exfiltrate private application files and cloud bucket objects.
  4. CVE-2026-113353 (CWE-862 / CWE-639, WordPress LearnPress < 4.4.10 Legacy Editor AJAX Authorization Bypass): Complements our recent analysis of CVE-2026-104736 (LearnPress Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection). In LearnPress versions prior to 4.4.10, the legacy editor AJAX handlers (admin_course_editor, admin_quiz_editor, and admin_question_editor) verify a generic session nonce but fail to verify object ownership on the target id parameter, allowing low-privilege instructors to modify, overwrite, or delete courses, quizzes, and questions belonging to other users.

1. CVE-2026-113356: Concurrent draft_save Truncation Race to unserialize() POP Execution in DokuWiki

Section titled โ€œ1. CVE-2026-113356: Concurrent draft_save Truncation Race to unserialize() POP Execution in DokuWikiโ€

Because DokuWiki is a flat-file PHP wiki that stores all pages, metadata, and working drafts on disk without a relational database, its draft subsystem (dokuwiki\Draft in inc/Draft.php) persists in-progress editor state inside data/cache/<hash>.draft.

When a user edits a page, the browser periodically sends background POST /lib/exe/ajax.php requests with call=draft_save, invoking Draft::saveDraft():

// VULNERABLE PATTERN: inc/Draft.php in DokuWiki (< 2026-07-14c)
namespace dokuwiki;
class Draft {
protected $cname; // Cache file path: data/cache/<md5(id + client)>.draft
public function saveDraft() {
global $INPUT;
$draft = [
'id' => $this->id,
'prefix' => cleanText($INPUT->post->str('prefix')),
'text' => cleanText($INPUT->post->str('wikitext')),
'suffix' => cleanText($INPUT->post->str('suffix')),
'date' => time(),
'client' => $this->client,
];
// FLAW 1 (CWE-362): Non-atomic concurrent file writes via io_saveFile()!
// Under high-concurrency overlapping AJAX draft_save requests of varying lengths,
// interleaved writes or partial truncation corrupts string length specifiers (s:N:"...")
// inside the serialized file on disk.
return io_saveFile($this->cname, serialize($draft));
}
public function getDraftText() {
if (!file_exists($this->cname)) return '';
// FLAW 2 (CWE-502): Unconditional PHP unserialize() without ['allowed_classes' => false]!
// When the race condition shifts the serialized parser offset into attacker-controlled
// 'text' / 'suffix' bytes, unserialize() instantiates arbitrary PHP gadget objects!
$draft = unserialize(io_readFile($this->cname, false));
return $draft['prefix'] . $draft['text'] . $draft['suffix'];
}
}

How the Concurrent Write Race Corrupts serialize() Framing

Section titled โ€œHow the Concurrent Write Race Corrupts serialize() Framingโ€

Normally, serialize($draft) encodes the user-supplied wikitext string safely as s:<byte_length>:"<wikitext>";. Even if <wikitext> contains ";O:21:"dokuwiki\...", PHPโ€™s unserialize() strictly counts <byte_length> bytes and treats the embedded payload as inert string characters.

However, io_saveFile() in DokuWiki opens the target .draft file with fopen($file, 'wb') and writes the buffer without acquiring an exclusive advisory lock (LOCK_EX) across the open-truncate-write sequence:

  1. Thread A sends a draft_save request with a long prefix / wikitext payload, truncating the file and beginning its write stream.
  2. Thread B concurrently sends a draft_save request with a short prefix and a crafted wikitext containing a serialized PHP gadget chain (";i:0;O:...).
  3. When the OS kernel interleaves or partially overwrites the two concurrent fwrite() streams on the shared .draft inode, the header written by one thread (s:120:"...) is paired with the body bytes of the other thread, causing a serialized string-length mismatch / parser desynchronization.
  4. When Draft::getDraftText() calls unserialize(io_readFile($this->cname, false)), the parser exits the prefix string boundary prematurely and interprets the attackerโ€™s injected O:<len>:"<ClassName>":... bytes inside wikitext as a live top-level PHP objectโ€”triggering __wakeup() / __destruct() POP gadgets in DokuWiki core or bundled vendor libraries.

2. CVE-2026-113354: Finsys Dockhand < 1.0.46 Arbitrary File Read via /api/system/files/content

Section titled โ€œ2. CVE-2026-113354: Finsys Dockhand < 1.0.46 Arbitrary File Read via /api/system/files/contentโ€

In Finsys Dockhand (< 1.0.46), non-administrative operators granted the stacks:edit role can edit Docker Compose files via the web UI. The backend exposes GET /api/system/files/content?path=<filepath> to load stack configuration files into the browser editor:

// VULNERABLE PATTERN: Dockhand File Content Handler (< 1.0.46)
// Route: GET /api/system/files/content?path=/etc/shadow
app.get('/api/system/files/content', requirePermission('stacks:edit'), async (req, res) => {
const filePath = String(req.query.path || '');
// FLAW (CWE-863 / CWE-22): No canonical path containment check verifying that
// filePath resides inside the authorized /data/stacks/<stack_name> directory!
const content = await fs.promises.readFile(filePath, 'utf8');
return res.json({ path: filePath, content });
});

Because the handler checks only stacks:edit and reads req.query.path directly from the container/host filesystem without enforcing path.resolve() containment inside the stacks directory, a low-privilege operator can read /etc/shadow, /root/.ssh/id_rsa, .git-credentials, or environment files containing cloud API keys and admin session secrets.

3. CVE-2026-113358 & CVE-2026-113353: LavaLite CMS /filer/download Unauthenticated File Exposure & LearnPress Legacy AJAX Bypass

Section titled โ€œ3. CVE-2026-113358 & CVE-2026-113353: LavaLite CMS /filer/download Unauthenticated File Exposure & LearnPress Legacy AJAX Bypassโ€
  • CVE-2026-113358 (LavaLite CMS <= 10.1.2): The FileController routes /filer/download/{disk}/{path} and /filer/display/{disk}/{path} omit authentication middleware and allow callers to specify any configured Laravel Flysystem disk (local, public, s3) and file path, exposing confidential attachments and S3 bucket objects to unauthenticated requests.
  • CVE-2026-113353 (WordPress LearnPress < 4.4.10): In inc/admin/sub-menus/ and legacy Vue/AJAX editor endpoints (lp-ajax=admin_course_editor, admin_quiz_editor, admin_question_editor), the backend verifies wp_verify_nonce() against a shared editor nonce available to any lp_teacher (Instructor) account, but omits current_user_can('edit_post', $object_id) before executing duplicate_course, remove_item, or quiz answer mutations on arbitrary course/quiz IDs.
flowchart TD
subgraph DokuWiki["CVE-2026-113356: DokuWiki (< 2026-07-14c)"]
DW1["Contributor / Registered User<br/>Concurrent POST /lib/exe/ajax.php?call=draft_save"]
DW2["CWE-362: Unlocked Concurrent io_saveFile()<br/>String-Length Desynchronization in .draft File"]
DW3["CWE-502: Draft::getDraftText()<br/>unserialize() Without allowed_classes => false"]
DW4["PHP POP Gadget Instantiation & RCE<br/>+ Enterprise Wiki / RAG Corpus Poisoning"]
DW1 --> DW2 --> DW3 --> DW4
end
subgraph Companion["Companion 2026-10-21 Web CMS & Container Advisories"]
DH["CVE-2026-113354: Finsys Dockhand (< 1.0.46)<br/>GET /api/system/files/content?path=/etc/shadow<br/>stacks:edit Arbitrary File Read"]
LL["CVE-2026-113358: LavaLite CMS (<= 10.1.2)<br/>GET /filer/download & /filer/display<br/>Unauthenticated Local & S3 Bucket File Exfiltration"]
LP["CVE-2026-113353: LearnPress (< 4.4.10)<br/>lp-ajax=admin_course_editor / admin_quiz_editor<br/>Cross-Instructor IDOR & Course Tampering"]
end
style DW2 fill:#ff6600,stroke:#993300,color:#ffffff
style DW3 fill:#ff1a1a,stroke:#800000,color:#ffffff
style DW4 fill:#ff4d4d,stroke:#990000,color:#ffffff
style DH fill:#ff4d4d,stroke:#990000,color:#ffffff
style LL fill:#ff6600,stroke:#993300,color:#ffffff
style LP fill:#ff6600,stroke:#993300,color:#ffffff

The following script demonstrates the request patterns for CVE-2026-113356 (concurrent draft_save race flooding followed by draft_get / page edit preview) and CVE-2026-113354 (Dockhand /api/system/files/content arbitrary file read) for defensive SIEM validation:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Defensive Verification Script:
1. CVE-2026-113356 โ€” DokuWiki (< 2026-07-14c) Draft Race Condition & unserialize() Probe
2. CVE-2026-113354 โ€” Finsys Dockhand (< 1.0.46) /api/system/files/content Path Traversal Probe
"""
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
import requests
DOKUWIKI_URL = "http://dokuwiki.internal"
DOCKHAND_URL = "http://dockhand.internal:3000"
def race_draft_save(session: requests.Session, variant: int):
# Concurrent AJAX draft_save calls of differing prefix/wikitext lengths
payload = {
"call": "draft_save",
"id": "playground:sandbox",
"prefix": "A" * (4096 if variant % 2 == 0 else 16),
"wikitext": '";s:6:"suffix";O:8:"stdClass":0:{}}',
"suffix": "B" * 64,
}
return session.post(f"{DOKUWIKI_URL}/lib/exe/ajax.php", data=payload, timeout=3)
# 1. Simulate high-rate concurrent draft_save burst (CVE-2026-113356)
with requests.Session() as s:
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=8) as pool:
futures = [pool.submit(race_draft_save, s, i) for i in range(16)]
for f in futures:
try:
f.result()
except Exception:
pass
# 2. Verify Dockhand /api/system/files/content containment (CVE-2026-113354)
dh_resp = requests.get(
f"{DOCKHAND_URL}/api/system/files/content",
params={"path": "/etc/passwd"},
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer <STACKS_EDIT_USER_JWT>"},
timeout=5,
)
print("[*] Dockhand CVE-2026-113354 /api/system/files/content status:", dh_resp.status_code)

title: DokuWiki Draft Race Deserialization, Dockhand Arbitrary File Read & LavaLite/LearnPress Exploitation (CVE-2026-113356 / CVE-2026-113354 / CVE-2026-113358 / CVE-2026-113353)
id: 113356d0-2026-4b52-8e11-cmscluster21
status: experimental
description: Detects exploitation attempts against DokuWiki lib/exe/ajax.php draft_save with serialized PHP object markers (CVE-2026-113356), Finsys Dockhand /api/system/files/content sensitive file reads (CVE-2026-113354), LavaLite CMS /filer/download traversal (CVE-2026-113358), and LearnPress legacy editor AJAX calls (CVE-2026-113353).
references:
- https://vulncheck.com/advisories/dokuwiki-before-2026-07-14c-php-object-injection-via-draft-race-condition
- https://vulncheck.com/advisories/dockhand-before-1.0.46-arbitrary-file-read-via-api-system-files-content
- https://vulncheck.com/advisories/lavalite-cms-through-10.1.2-missing-authentication-via-filer-download-routes
- https://vulncheck.com/advisories/learnpress-before-4.4.10-missing-authorization-via-legacy-editor-ajax-handlers
author: Hermes Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/10/21
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection_dokuwiki_draft_poi:
cs-method: 'POST'
cs-uri-stem|contains: '/lib/exe/ajax.php'
request_body|contains: 'draft_save'
request_body|re: '(O:\+?[0-9]+:"|C:\+?[0-9]+:")'
selection_dockhand_fileread:
cs-method: 'GET'
cs-uri-stem|contains: '/api/system/files/content'
cs-uri-query|contains:
- '/etc/passwd'
- '/etc/shadow'
- '.ssh/'
- '.git-credentials'
- '.env'
- '..'
selection_lavalite_filer:
cs-uri-stem|contains:
- '/filer/download'
- '/filer/display'
selection_learnpress_legacy_ajax:
cs-uri-query|contains:
- 'lp-ajax=admin_course_editor'
- 'lp-ajax=admin_quiz_editor'
- 'lp-ajax=admin_question_editor'
condition: selection_dokuwiki_draft_poi or selection_dockhand_fileread or selection_lavalite_filer or selection_learnpress_legacy_ajax
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrator or instructor edits in LearnPress or authenticated LavaLite downloads
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.execution
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1005
- cve.2026-113356
- cve.2026-113354
- cve.2026-113358
- cve.2026-113353

  1. Upgrade DokuWiki to >= 2026-07-14c or Disable usedraft (CVE-2026-113356):
    • Immediately update all DokuWiki installations to release 2026-07-14c or later, which hardens draft deserialization (['allowed_classes' => false] / safe draft parsing) and prevents race-induced object instantiation in Draft::getDraftText().
    • Immediate Configuration Workaround: If you cannot upgrade immediately, disable draft saving in conf/local.php by adding $conf['usedraft'] = 0; and purge existing cached draft files via find data/cache/ -name "*.draft" -delete.
  2. Upgrade Finsys Dockhand to >= 1.0.46 (CVE-2026-113354): Update Dockhand to version 1.0.46 or later so that /api/system/files/content strictly canonicalizes and confines requested file paths to the authorized Compose stack directory. Rotate any SSH keys, .git-credentials, or environment secrets present inside the Dockhand container if non-admin stacks:edit accounts existed prior to patching.
  3. Update WordPress LearnPress to >= 4.4.10 (CVE-2026-113353) and Harden LavaLite CMS /filer/* Routes (CVE-2026-113358): Upgrade the LearnPress WordPress plugin to 4.4.10 or higher (remediating both CVE-2026-113353 and CVE-2026-104736), and attach strict auth middleware plus storage-disk allowlisting to /filer/download and /filer/display in LavaLite CMS (<= 10.1.2).