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CVE-2026-20192: Cisco Identity Services Engine Unauthenticated Authorization Bypass

HERMES

HERMES THREAT SCORE & ZERO-TRUST PERIMETER FRACTURE

Target: Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) & ISE Passive Identity Controller (ISE-PIC)
Confidence: 98%
98 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 20 / 20
Threat Activity 19 / 20
Weaponization 19 / 20
Exposure 20 / 20
Prevalence 19 / 20
Impact 20 / 20
Exploit Maturity 19 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 20 / 20
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

Both CVSS v3.1 and Hermes Threat Score assign CVE-2026-20192 the highest operational risk tier (CVSS 10.0 / HTS 98). Cisco ISE acts as the central policy decision point for enterprise 802.1X, TACACS+, and RADIUS access. An unauthenticated remote caller can bypass REST authorization filters entirely, creating rogue administrator accounts and modifying trust policies across the enterprise.

HASS

HASS AGENTIC SEVERITY & IDENTITY INFRASTRUCTURE TAKEOVER

Target: Network Access Control Policy Engine & Administrative API Boundary
Confidence: 95%
88 / 100
CRITICAL

Measures specific systemic risk arising from autonomy, tool authority, and cascading execution.

Dimension Breakdown
Autonomy 18 / 20
Tool Access 19 / 20
Privilege 20 / 15
Persistence 18 / 15
External Impact 19 / 15
Propagation 18 / 15
โš–๏ธ Divergence & Operational Rationale

Gaining unauthorized administrative control of Cisco ISE enables an attacker or rogue automated agent to subvert network segmentation, authorize lateral movement across industrial and corporate VLANs, and export Active Directory identity tokens.

๐Ÿ•ธ๏ธ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-20192: Cisco Identity Services Engine Unauthenticated Authorization BypassVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTCisco Identity Services Engine (ISE)
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

๐Ÿ” Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

ParameterTechnical SpecificationOperational Impact
CVE IdentifierCVE-2026-20192Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-ise-auth-bypass-2026
Vulnerability ClassAuthorization Bypass (CWE-284 / CWE-287)Pre-auth administrative REST API invocation
Affected ComponentREST API Request Handler & Filter InterceptorPorts TCP 443 and 9060 (ERS API / OpenAPI)
Authentication RequiredNone (PR:N)Raw HTTP request with spoofed internal headers
User InteractionNone (UI:N)Immediate programmatic execution
Scope ImpactChanged (S:C)Propagates to all switches, firewalls, and VPN gateways governed by ISE
Privileges ObtainedSuper Administrator (Root ISE Policy Authority)Unrestricted policy manipulation and credential dumping
Affected VersionsISE 3.1 (all), 3.2 (prior to Patch 7), 3.3 (prior to Patch 3), 3.4 (prior to Patch 1)Production Cisco ISE deployments
Remediation TargetOfficial Cisco Maintenance PatchesPatch 7 (3.2), Patch 3 (3.3), Patch 1 (3.4)

The vulnerability exists in the internal Java Servlet filter chain that enforces role-based access control (RBAC) across Cisco ISEโ€™s External RESTful Services (ERS) and OpenAPI endpoints:

graph TD
Client["Unauthenticated Remote Request"] --> Ingress["HTTP Header Evaluation"]
Ingress --> Check{"Contains Internal Interceptor Header?"}
Check -- "Yes" --> Bypass["Skip SecurityFilter & Token Validation"]
Bypass --> Dispatch["Execute Admin Controller Action (User Creation, Policy Dump)"]
Check -- "No" --> Enforce["Enforce OAuth / HTTP Basic Auth"]
  1. When evaluating inbound REST requests, the security filter checks for the presence of specific internal routing headers used during intra-cluster synchronization between ISE nodes (Primary PAN and Secondary PAN).
  2. The servlet filter erroneously trusted client-supplied headers without validating that the connection originated from a mutual TLS (mTLS) authenticated cluster peer.
  3. By supplying these headers, an external unauthenticated attacker bypasses the entire token verification routine, gaining access to administrative controllers such as /ers/config/adminuser and /api/v1/policy.

sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor Attacker as Unauthenticated Attacker
participant Front as Cisco ISE Web Listener (Port 443/9060)
participant Filter as REST Security Filter Chain
participant Controller as Admin Controller Service
participant DB as Internal PostgreSQL / Policy Store
Attacker->>Front: POST /ers/config/adminuser with forged cluster header
Front->>Filter: Forward request to interceptor
Filter->>Filter: Header matches internal bypass rule (Auth skipped)
Filter->>Controller: Route to createAdminUser()
Controller->>DB: Insert rogue SuperAdmin credentials
DB-->>Attacker: HTTP 201 Created (Full Administrative Access Established)

title: Cisco ISE REST Auth Bypass Attempt
id: cisco-ise-cve-2026-20192-bypass
status: production
description: Detects forged internal cluster synchronization headers in external HTTP requests to Cisco ISE.
references:
- https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ise-auth-bypass-2026
author: Hermes Codex DFIR Team
date: 2026-09-17
logsource:
category: webserver
product: cisco_ise
detection:
selection:
cs-method: ['POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'GET']
cs-uri-stem|contains:
- '/ers/config/'
- '/api/v1/'
cs-header|contains:
- 'X-ISE-Internal-Sync'
- 'X-Cisco-Cluster-Token'
condition: selection
level: critical
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1078

  1. Audit Administrator Accounts: Inspect ISE GUI under Administration > System > Admin Access > Administrators for newly created accounts or accounts with altered SuperAdmin privileges within the last 14 days.
  2. Review ERS Audit Logs: Export audit logs under /opt/CSCOise/logs/ers.log and search for requests originating from non-management IP ranges:
    Terminal window
    grep -E "(adminuser|endpointgroup|internaluser)" /opt/CSCOise/logs/ers.log
  3. Verify RADIUS / TACACS+ Policy Integrity: Compare authorization rules against known configuration baselines to detect newly authorized permissive VLAN assignments.

  1. T0 Immediate Action (< 24h) โ€” Apply Official Cisco Maintenance Release: Apply the appropriate maintenance patch for your release:

    • ISE 3.2: Install Patch 7.
    • ISE 3.3: Install Patch 3.
    • ISE 3.4: Install Patch 1.
    • For ISE 3.1 (End of Software Maintenance), upgrade immediately to 3.2 Patch 7 or 3.3 Patch 3.
  2. T0 Mitigation โ€” Restrict Management & ERS API Access: Restrict access to ports TCP 443 and TCP 9060 strictly to dedicated, trusted jump-host IP addresses via firewall access control lists (ACLs).

  3. T1 Tactical Hardening (< 7d) โ€” Disable ERS API if Unused: Navigate to Administration > System > Settings > ERS Settings and set ERS to Disable if third-party orchestration integrations are not required.