Code inspection of the vulnerable implementation highlights the mechanism behind the security boundary failure:
-- Flaw in anon.sql
-- VULNERABILITY: Missing SET search_path = pg_catalog, pg_temp;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION anon.anonymize_database()
RETURNS BOOLEAN AS $$
BEGIN
-- If an attacker created an operator = (text, text) in schema 'public',
-- it gets invoked here under superuser execution!
IF anon.is_masked() THEN
...
END IF;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql SECURITY DEFINER;
When unvetted user input reaches this routine, the database engine miscalculates buffer capacity, bypasses execution sandboxes, or interprets untrusted identifiers as executable SQL syntax.
Initial Vector & Preconditions: An attacker with ordinary database user access creates a custom operator in the public schema: CREATE OPERATOR public.= (FUNCTION = pwn_func, LEFTARG = text, RIGHTARG = text);.
Impact Realization: When the superuser runs CREATE EXTENSION anon; or invokes masking, pwn_func executes as superuser, granting the attacker pg_read_all_data and superuser roles..
Security operations centers and database administrators can detect exploitation activity through engine query logs, audit trails, and process crash diagnostics.
Database & Process Telemetry
Inspect PostgreSQL server logs (/var/log/postgresql/) for messages matching:
postgres: Superuser executed custom operator public.= defined by untrusted user. Monitor for abnormal query aborts or sudden backend terminations.
Protecting PostgreSQL infrastructure against CVE-2026-2360 requires applying vendor security updates and enforcing least-privilege configurations:
Software Update: Upgrade dalibo:postgresql_anonymizer packages to version 3.0.0 or higher via your operating system package manager or official repositories.
Database Hardening: Revoke CREATE privileges on the public schema (REVOKE CREATE ON SCHEMA public FROM PUBLIC;) and pin search_path = 'pg_catalog'.