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Read-Only Domain Controllers (RODC): Promises, Limits, and Forensic Reality

Density:

Introduced in Windows Server 2008, the Read-Only Domain Controller (RODC) hosts read-only replicas of Active Directory directory partitions:

  1. Read-Only NTDS Database: Applications and administrators cannot commit directory modifications on the RODC; write operations are forwarded via LDAP referrals to a standard Writable Domain Controller (RWDC).
  2. Isolated KDC and Dedicated krbtgt Account: Each RODC possesses a distinct, dedicated krbtgt account (named krbtgt_XXXXX), ensuring that compromise of an RODC does not permit forging Golden Tickets across the rest of the enterprise.
  3. Password Replication Policy (PRP): A strict access control list defining which accounts are permitted to have their credential hashes cached on the local RODC (Allowed List vs Denied List).

When responding to an incident at a branch office hosting an RODC:

  • Blast Radius Containment: If an adversary physically steals the RODC server or dumps its ntds.dit file, they acquire only the credential hashes of locally cached accounts. High-privilege administrative groups (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins) reside in the default Denied List and are never cached on an RODC.
  • Surgical Credential Remediation: The RWDC maintains an authoritative record of every identity whose secret was replicated to that RODC (via the msDS-RevealedUsers attribute). Incident responders know exactly which accounts must be rotated without forcing an enterprise-wide password reset.
  • Targeted krbtgt_XXXXX Revocation: Rotating the domainโ€™s primary krbtgt account is completely unnecessary during an isolated RODC breach: only the specific krbtgt_XXXXX account tied to that RODC must be rotated or deleted.

The Password Replication Policy (PRP) and Authentication Workflow

Section titled โ€œThe Password Replication Policy (PRP) and Authentication Workflowโ€
Branch Client Workstation RODC Hub RWDC
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ 1. TGT-REQ โ”‚ โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ–บโ”‚ โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ 2. Is hash cached locally? โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ -> NO โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ 3. Forward request โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ–บโ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚ 4. Validate credentials
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚ Evaluate PRP
โ”‚ โ”‚ 5. Return TGT + Hash (if allowed)โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚โ—„โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ค
โ”‚ โ”‚ 6. Cache hash (PRP Allowed) โ”‚
โ”‚โ—„โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ค โ”‚
โ”‚ 7. Return TGT signed by krbtgt_XXXXX โ”‚ โ”‚
  1. Default Denied List Blocks All Privileged Principals:
    • Enterprise Admins, Domain Admins, Administrators, Backup Operators, Account Operators, Server Operators.
    • All domain controller computer accounts (Domain Controllers).
  2. Allowed List Encompasses Local Branch Personas:
    • Typically a designated group such as Branch-Office-Users representing physical staff on site.

  • Extracting the Exact Inventory of Exposed Credentials: Inspecting msDS-RevealedUsers on the RWDC returns all accounts whose credentials were cached on the compromised RODC.
  • Issuing Locally Authoritative TGTs: The RODC KDC encrypts TGTs using its own krbtgt_XXXXX key, accepted across the forest because the key is mirrored on RWDCs.
  • Delegating Local RODC Administration: A branch technician can be granted local administrator rights over the RODC OS without possessing any rights over the Active Directory directory.

  • Forging Domain-Wide Golden Tickets from an RODC: The krbtgt_XXXXX key is only accepted for accounts permitted by the PRP. A ticket forged for Domain Admins using this key is rejected by writable DCs.
  • Direct Directory Writes on the RODC: LDAP write attempts return LDAP_REFERRAL directing the client to an RWDC.
  • Caching Domain Admins Credentials Under Default Policies: Even if an administrator attempts to add an admin into the Allowed List, the Denied List takes precedence during PRP evaluation.

Frequent ConfusionVerifiable Forensic Reality
โ€The adversary extracted ntds.dit from the RODC, therefore the entire enterprise domain is compromised.โ€False. An RODC ntds.dit contains only credential hashes permitted by the PRP and actively cached.
โ€We must reset the primary domain krbtgt account after an RODC theft.โ€Unnecessary. Only the specific krbtgt_XXXXX account belonging to the stolen RODC must be revoked.
โ€An attacker can invoke DCSync against an RODC.โ€An RODC does not possess replication secrets for arbitrary principals and cannot fulfill DCSync requests.

A physical burglary occurs at a regional branch in Lyon. The physical server hosting RODC-LYON is stolen:

  1. The DFIR team connects to the headquarters RWDC.
  2. Executing PowerShell: Get-ADDomainControllerPasswordReplicationPolicyUsage -Identity "RODC-LYON" -Revealed
  3. Output lists 42 local employee accounts and 2 local print service accounts.
  4. Zero Tier 0 or enterprise administrative accounts appear in the list.
  5. Remediation Executed:
    • Immediate password rotation for the 44 revealed identities.
    • Deletion of the RODC-LYON computer object (automatically purging krbtgt_12894).
    • Headquarters domain remains entirely secure with zero operational disruption.

  1. Active Directory Attributes (on RWDC):
    • msDS-RevealedUsers: SIDs of identities cached on the RODC.
    • msDS-KrbTgtLinkBl: Pointer to the associated krbtgt_XXXXX account.
  2. RWDC Security Event Logs:
    • Event ID 4929: RODC password replication policy change.
    • Event ID 4930: Secret replicated to an RODC.
  3. RODC Security Event Logs:
    • Event ID 4768: Local TGT issued by krbtgt_XXXXX.

  1. Extract Revealed Users from Central RWDC: Run Get-ADDomainControllerPasswordReplicationPolicyUsage -Revealed targeting an RWDC.
  2. Audit PRP Configuration Integrity: Verify that administrative groups remain firmly enclosed in the PRP Denied List.
  3. Revoke the Dedicated RODC KDC Secret: Delete the orphaned RODC computer account to invalidate its associated krbtgt_XXXXX principal.

  • PowerShell AD Module:
    Terminal window
    # List accounts cached on the RODC
    Get-ADDomainControllerPasswordReplicationPolicyUsage -Identity "RODC01" -Revealed |
    Select-Object SamAccountName, DistinguishedName
    # Audit PRP configuration
    Get-ADDomainControllerPasswordReplicationPolicy -Identity "RODC01"
  • Repadmin:
    Terminal window
    repadmin /prp view RODC01
    repadmin /prp query RODC01 revealed

  • RODCs isolate branch locations by limiting the credential footprint on disk and in memory.
  • Administrative groups are strictly excluded from replication by default.
  • Each RODC operates with a dedicated krbtgt_XXXXX key, preventing global Golden Ticket forgery.
  • The msDS-RevealedUsers attribute provides a verifiable forensic boundary in the event of hardware theft.