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Multi-Domain, Trees, and Forests in Active Directory

Density:

In enterprise Active Directory environments, identities and securable assets are organized across three hierarchical levels:

  1. Domain: The basic administrative unit containing its own directory partition (ntds.dit), default domain policies, security principals, and Domain Controllers (DCs).
  2. Domain Tree: A contiguous DNS namespace hierarchy of domains (e.g., corp.ad.sec and emea.corp.ad.sec) automatically linked by two-way transitive parent-child trust relationships.
  3. Forest: The top-level administrative and security container. It encompasses one or more domain trees. All domains within a forest share a single Schema partition, a single Configuration partition, and a common Global Catalog (GC).

When responding to an intrusion inside a child or regional subsidiary domain:

  • The Illusion of Boundary Isolation: System and network administrators frequently assume that compromising subsidiary.corp.local does not threaten root corp.local. In reality, a compromised child Domain Admin can abuse inter-domain trusts (sIDHistory, inter-realm Golden Tickets) to compromise the root forest.
  • Directory Partitioning and Log Dispersal: Domain naming contexts are not replicated across DCs of other domains. If an attacker creates or leverages a user account in Domain A, corresponding logon and object modification events appear exclusively on Domain Aโ€™s DCs. Conversely, the Global Catalog (GC, port 3268/3269) replicates a read-only Partial Attribute Set (PAS) enterprise-wide.
  • Blast Radius Determination: The moment an adversary obtains Domain Admins rights within any child domain of a forest, forensic investigators must treat the entire forest as compromised.

Each DCโ€™s ntds.dit database is partitioned into distinct naming contexts:

โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ ACTIVE DIRECTORY FOREST โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ค
โ”‚ 1. Schema NC (Replicated across ALL forest) โ”‚
โ”‚ 2. Configuration NC (Replicated ALL forest) โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ฌโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
โ”‚
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ดโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ–ผ โ–ผ
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ” โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
โ”‚ Root Domain: corp.local โ”‚ โ”‚ Child Domain: emea.corp โ”‚
โ”œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ค โ”œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ค
โ”‚ 3. Domain NC (corp.local) โ”‚โ—„โ”€โ”€Parent-Childโ–บโ”‚ 3. Domain NC (emea.corp) โ”‚
โ”‚ (Replicated ONLY within โ”‚ Trust โ”‚ (Replicated ONLY within โ”‚
โ”‚ corp.local DCs) โ”‚ โ”‚ emea.corp DCs) โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜ โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
  1. Schema Partition: Defines all object classes and attributes. Identical across all DCs in the forest. Controlled by the Schema Master FSMO role.
  2. Configuration Partition: Stores physical AD topology (sites, subnets, trusts, replication links). Identical across all DCs in the forest.
  3. Domain Partition: Stores all objects specific to that domain. Each domain has its own independent domain partition.
  4. Global Catalog (GC): Hosted on designated DCs, storing a full replica of its host domain partition plus a partial, read-only copy of essential attributes (PAS) from all other domains in the forest.

  • Full Forest Reconnaissance by Any Standard User: Any domain user can query LDAP or DNS across the Configuration partition to map out every domain, trust relationship, and DC in the entire forest.
  • Cross-Domain Resource Access: Authenticated users can access authorized resources in peer domains through automated Kerberos referrals.
  • Horizontal-to-Vertical Forest Escalation: A child domain attacker who extracts the child domain krbtgt key can forge inter-realm tickets containing Enterprise Admins (RID 519) in sIDHistory unless inter-forest SID filtering is specifically enforced (which is disabled by default within an intra-forest trust).

  • Enforcing Impenetrable Security Isolation Between Domains in the Same Forest: Architecture-level isolation is technically impossible between domains of the same forest.
  • Reviewing Domain B Events on Domain A Controllers: Security event logs (such as Event 4625 for password spraying against Domain B users) will not be forwarded or visible on Domain A DCs.
  • Replicating Password Hashes Outside Their Own Domain: Domain partitions containing NTLM hashes and Kerberos keys are never replicated outside their domain. The Global Catalog does not replicate sensitive credential attributes like unicodePwd.

Frequent ConfusionVerifiable Forensic Reality
โ€We have two separate domains in the same forest, so subsidiary compromise does not threaten headquarters.โ€False. The forest is the sole security boundary. Tier 0 compromise of any domain allows takeover of the forest root.
โ€I inspected the root DC event logs and found no evidence of suspicious accounts.โ€Account creation in child domains is only logged in that child domainโ€™s DC logs.
โ€The Global Catalog stores all attributes for all enterprise objects.โ€The GC only stores the Partial Attribute Set (PAS). Password hashes and Kerberos keys are strictly excluded.

During a ransomware incident, an attacker gains initial access to a workstation in a branch office domain (ch.megacorp.local) and extracts local Domain Admin credentials:

  1. On the branch DC, the attacker performs DCSync and extracts the krbtgt NTLM hash of ch.megacorp.local.
  2. The attacker crafts an inter-realm TGT with sIDHistory set to S-1-5-21-ROOT-519 (Enterprise Admins of megacorp.local).
  3. When requesting a TGS against root services, the root KDC processes the ticket without stripping the SID because intra-forest trusts do not filter forest-internal SIDs by default. The attacker gains immediate root domain dominance.

  1. Active Directory Configuration Naming Context:
    • CN=Partitions,CN=Configuration,DC=root,DC=local: contains crossRef objects for all authorized domains in the forest.
  2. Child Domain DC Events:
    • Event ID 4662: Directory Service replication rights abuse (DCSync).
    • Event ID 4720: Suspicious local account creation in the branch domain.
  3. Root Domain DC Events:
    • Event ID 4769: Inter-realm TGS requests for krbtgt/root.local.
    • Event ID 4624 (Logon Type 3): Administrative network logons from child domain principals into root Tier 0 systems.

  1. Enumerate the Entire Forest Topology: Query [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Forest]::GetCurrentForest() to identify all domains, trees, and Global Catalogs.
  2. Catalog Domain Controllers per Domain: Map out DC endpoints across all domains to ensure targeted log collection of Events 4624, 4625, 4672, and 4769.
  3. Verify Intra-Forest Trust Filtering: Check whether SID Filtering or quarantine flags were configured on intra-forest trusts (netdom trust <Domain> /filterSIDs:Yes).

  • PowerShell Active Directory Module:
    Terminal window
    Get-ADForest | Select-Object Name, RootDomain, Domains, GlobalCatalogs
    Get-ADDomain -Identity "emea.corp.local" | Select-Object NetBIOSName, DomainSID, ReadOnlyReplicaDirectoryServers
  • SharpHound / BloodHound: Collect multi-domain topologies (--collectionmethods All,Trusts) to expose escalation pathways from child domains to Enterprise Admins.

  • Domains are administrative boundaries; the forest is the sole security boundary.
  • Compromising any domain in a forest grants an adversary mathematical pathways to compromise the entire forest.
  • DC security event logs are not cross-replicated across domains; DFIR analysis requires log collection from every affected domain.