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CVE-2026-65777: Active Directory Cross-Realm Security Feature Bypass

HERMES

HERMES THREAT SCORE & TRUST BOUNDARY COMPROMISE

Target: Active Directory Trust Validation Subsystem (kdc.dll / lsass.exe)
Confidence: 93%
86 / 100
HIGH

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 17 / 20
Threat Activity 15 / 20
Weaponization 17 / 20
Exposure 18 / 20
Prevalence 18 / 20
Impact 19 / 20
Exploit Maturity 16 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 20 / 20
⚖️ Divergence & Operational Rationale

CVSS v3.1 rates CVE-2026-65777 at 5.3 (MEDIUM, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N). The Hermes Threat Score elevates operational risk to 86 (HIGH) because bypassing SID filtering across forest trusts breaks the foundational multi-domain isolation guarantee of Active Directory.

🕸️ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-65777: Active Directory Cross-Realm Security Feature BypassVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTMicrosoft Windows & Windows Server
98% VERY_HIGH

Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.

🔍 Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in Microsoft Windows & Windows Server documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

1. Technical Context & Affected Software Matrix

Section titled “1. Technical Context & Affected Software Matrix”

Active Directory forest trusts rely on SID filtering and Name Suffix Routing (NSR) to prevent an administrator of a compromised domain from spoofing security identifiers belonging to another domain.

ParameterTechnical SpecificationThreat Intelligence Context
CVE IdentifierCVE-2026-65777MSRC Bulletin August 2026
Vulnerable ComponentWindows KDC Trust Verifier (kdc.dll / kerberos.dll)Active Directory cross-forest authentication subsystem
CWE WeaknessCWE-326: Inadequate Encryption Strength / Verification BypassFlawed validation in inter-realm PAC verification
CVSS v3.1 Score5.3 (MEDIUM / Hermes Operational Severity 86)CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Pre-requisitesCompromise of a trusted domain or child domainPivot across Active Directory trust boundaries
Affected PlatformsWindows Server 2019, Windows Server 2022, Windows Server 2025All Domain Controllers evaluating cross-forest tickets
Microsoft PatchesCumulative Updates August 2026 (KB5041578, KB5041585, KB5041592)Mandatory on forest root DCs

2. In-Depth Technical Decomposition & Root Cause

Section titled “2. In-Depth Technical Decomposition & Root Cause”

When a Kerberos cross-realm ticket-granting ticket (referral TGT) traverses an inter-forest trust, the KDC of the resource domain executes the KdcVerifyPac and KdcFilterSids subroutines to purge disallowed SIDs (e.g., Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-...-519 or Schema Admins).

In CVE-2026-65777, the KDC fails to parse alternate SID encoding structures when multiple sub-authorities are packed using non-canonical ASN.1 integer lengths in the Kerberos referral request:

// Conceptual depiction of CVE-2026-65777 SID filtering evasion
BOOLEAN KdcFilterSidsNonCanonical(
PPACTYPE pPac,
PUNICODE_STRING pTrustPartnerDomain,
ULONG TrustAttributes
) {
for (ULONG i = 0; i < pPac->ExtraSidsCount; i++) {
PSID pCurrentSid = pPac->ExtraSids[i].Sid;
// VULNERABILITY: If the SID header contains non-canonical zero padding
// or alternate sub-authority count representations,
// RtlValidSid returns TRUE but RtlEqualPrefixSid fails to match the blacklisted domain prefix!
if (IsDisallowedSidPrefix(pCurrentSid)) {
RemoveSidFromPac(pPac, i);
}
// Result: Privileged foreign SIDs (e.g. Enterprise Admins) bypass the filter and persist in the token!
}
return TRUE;
}

Because the blacklisted prefix check misses the non-canonically formatted SID, the resource KDC accepts the referral ticket and mints a local service ticket containing privileged group memberships in Forest B.


3. Attack Vectors & Enterprise Threat Scenarios

Section titled “3. Attack Vectors & Enterprise Threat Scenarios”
[ Attacker with Domain Admin in Domain A (Forest A) ]
│
▼ (Forge Kerberos Referral TGT with Non-Canonical ExtraSids)
[ Active Directory Inter-Forest Trust Boundary ]
│
▼ (CVE-2026-65777 SID Filtering Bypass in kdc.dll)
[ Resource Domain Controller in Forest B accepts Enterprise Admin SID ]
│
▼ (Local Service Ticket issued with privileged PAC)
[ Unauthorized Forest Compromise of Forest B ]

Forensic Correlation with Active Directory Corpus

Section titled “Forensic Correlation with Active Directory Corpus”

4. Forensic Detection, Artefacts & Event IDs

Section titled “4. Forensic Detection, Artefacts & Event IDs”

Detecting CVE-2026-65777 exploitation centers on Kerberos cross-realm ticket requests and unusual Foreign Security Principal creations:

  • Security Event ID 4769 (Kerberos Service Ticket Operations): Look for ServiceName starting with krbtgt/ from external domains where the client SID belongs to a foreign namespace.
  • Security Event ID 4624: Type 3 network logons with Authentication Package: Kerberos where the token contains high-privilege RIDs (-500, -512, -519) from a foreign trust.
  • Security Event ID 4768: Anomalous TGT issuance across trust boundaries without corresponding Netlogon validation logs.

KQL Query: Detecting Filtered SIDs in Cross-Realm Logons

Section titled “KQL Query: Detecting Filtered SIDs in Cross-Realm Logons”
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4624
| extend TargetSid = tostring(parse_json(EventData).TargetUserSid)
| extend LogonProcessName = tostring(parse_json(EventData).LogonProcessName)
| where LogonProcessName =~ "Kerberos"
| where TargetSid endswith "-519" or TargetSid endswith "-512" // Enterprise/Domain Admins
| where WorkstationName != "" and WorkstationName !startswith "CORP-"
| project TimeGenerated, TargetUserName, TargetSid, IpAddress, WorkstationName

5. Remediation, Hardening & Defensive Engineering

Section titled “5. Remediation, Hardening & Defensive Engineering”
  1. Deploy Microsoft Updates: Apply KB5041578 / KB5041585 across all Domain Controllers in all interconnected forests.
  2. Enforce SID Filtering Quarantine: Verify SID filtering status using netdom trust <TrustingDomain> /domain:<TrustedDomain> /enablesidhistory:no and netdom trust ... /quarantine:yes.
  3. Migrate to Selective Authentication: Disable forest-wide authentication across external trusts, requiring explicit ACL grants for incoming users.