CVE-2026-65777: Active Directory Cross-Realm Security Feature Bypass
HERMES THREAT SCORE & TRUST BOUNDARY COMPROMISE
Target:Active Directory Trust Validation Subsystem (kdc.dll / lsass.exe) CVSS v3.1 rates CVE-2026-65777 at 5.3 (MEDIUM, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N). The Hermes Threat Score elevates operational risk to 86 (HIGH) because bypassing SID filtering across forest trusts breaks the foundational multi-domain isolation guarantee of Active Directory.
CVE-2026-65777: Active Directory Cross-Realm Security Feature BypassVULNERABILITY
Software platform affected by security vulnerabilities and agentic attack patterns.
🔍 Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)
“Confirmed security vulnerability in Microsoft Windows & Windows Server documented in Hermes dossier.”
- [vulnerability_report]
- [government_confirmation]CISA verified active exploitation in the wild and mandated federal remediation deadline in KEV entry. — Source: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA Adds CVE-2026-59822 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Reliability: VERY_HIGH)
1. Technical Context & Affected Software Matrix
Section titled “1. Technical Context & Affected Software Matrix”Active Directory forest trusts rely on SID filtering and Name Suffix Routing (NSR) to prevent an administrator of a compromised domain from spoofing security identifiers belonging to another domain.
| Parameter | Technical Specification | Threat Intelligence Context |
|---|---|---|
| CVE Identifier | CVE-2026-65777 | MSRC Bulletin August 2026 |
| Vulnerable Component | Windows KDC Trust Verifier (kdc.dll / kerberos.dll) | Active Directory cross-forest authentication subsystem |
| CWE Weakness | CWE-326: Inadequate Encryption Strength / Verification Bypass | Flawed validation in inter-realm PAC verification |
| CVSS v3.1 Score | 5.3 (MEDIUM / Hermes Operational Severity 86) | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N |
| Pre-requisites | Compromise of a trusted domain or child domain | Pivot across Active Directory trust boundaries |
| Affected Platforms | Windows Server 2019, Windows Server 2022, Windows Server 2025 | All Domain Controllers evaluating cross-forest tickets |
| Microsoft Patches | Cumulative Updates August 2026 (KB5041578, KB5041585, KB5041592) | Mandatory on forest root DCs |
2. In-Depth Technical Decomposition & Root Cause
Section titled “2. In-Depth Technical Decomposition & Root Cause”When a Kerberos cross-realm ticket-granting ticket (referral TGT) traverses an inter-forest trust, the KDC of the resource domain executes the KdcVerifyPac and KdcFilterSids subroutines to purge disallowed SIDs (e.g., Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-...-519 or Schema Admins).
In CVE-2026-65777, the KDC fails to parse alternate SID encoding structures when multiple sub-authorities are packed using non-canonical ASN.1 integer lengths in the Kerberos referral request:
// Conceptual depiction of CVE-2026-65777 SID filtering evasionBOOLEAN KdcFilterSidsNonCanonical( PPACTYPE pPac, PUNICODE_STRING pTrustPartnerDomain, ULONG TrustAttributes) { for (ULONG i = 0; i < pPac->ExtraSidsCount; i++) { PSID pCurrentSid = pPac->ExtraSids[i].Sid;
// VULNERABILITY: If the SID header contains non-canonical zero padding // or alternate sub-authority count representations, // RtlValidSid returns TRUE but RtlEqualPrefixSid fails to match the blacklisted domain prefix! if (IsDisallowedSidPrefix(pCurrentSid)) { RemoveSidFromPac(pPac, i); } // Result: Privileged foreign SIDs (e.g. Enterprise Admins) bypass the filter and persist in the token! } return TRUE;}Because the blacklisted prefix check misses the non-canonically formatted SID, the resource KDC accepts the referral ticket and mints a local service ticket containing privileged group memberships in Forest B.
3. Attack Vectors & Enterprise Threat Scenarios
Section titled “3. Attack Vectors & Enterprise Threat Scenarios”[ Attacker with Domain Admin in Domain A (Forest A) ] │ ▼ (Forge Kerberos Referral TGT with Non-Canonical ExtraSids)[ Active Directory Inter-Forest Trust Boundary ] │ ▼ (CVE-2026-65777 SID Filtering Bypass in kdc.dll)[ Resource Domain Controller in Forest B accepts Enterprise Admin SID ] │ ▼ (Local Service Ticket issued with privileged PAC)[ Unauthorized Forest Compromise of Forest B ]Forensic Correlation with Active Directory Corpus
Section titled “Forensic Correlation with Active Directory Corpus”- SID Filtering and Name Suffix Routing: The exact mechanics of SID quarantine and how inter-forest trusts defend against SID injection. See AD-17: SID filtering and Name Suffix Routing.
- Active Directory Trust Fundamentals: Understanding one-way, two-way, and transitivity in trust relationships. See AD-13: Active Directory trust fundamentals.
- What an Attacker Controlling Domain A Can Do to Domain B: The operational implications of trust compromise. See AD-19: What an attacker controlling Domain A can do to Domain B.
4. Forensic Detection, Artefacts & Event IDs
Section titled “4. Forensic Detection, Artefacts & Event IDs”Detecting CVE-2026-65777 exploitation centers on Kerberos cross-realm ticket requests and unusual Foreign Security Principal creations:
Essential Artefacts & Event IDs
Section titled “Essential Artefacts & Event IDs”- Security Event ID 4769 (Kerberos Service Ticket Operations): Look for
ServiceNamestarting withkrbtgt/from external domains where the client SID belongs to a foreign namespace. - Security Event ID 4624: Type 3 network logons with
Authentication Package: Kerberoswhere the token contains high-privilege RIDs (-500,-512,-519) from a foreign trust. - Security Event ID 4768: Anomalous TGT issuance across trust boundaries without corresponding Netlogon validation logs.
KQL Query: Detecting Filtered SIDs in Cross-Realm Logons
Section titled “KQL Query: Detecting Filtered SIDs in Cross-Realm Logons”SecurityEvent| where EventID == 4624| extend TargetSid = tostring(parse_json(EventData).TargetUserSid)| extend LogonProcessName = tostring(parse_json(EventData).LogonProcessName)| where LogonProcessName =~ "Kerberos"| where TargetSid endswith "-519" or TargetSid endswith "-512" // Enterprise/Domain Admins| where WorkstationName != "" and WorkstationName !startswith "CORP-"| project TimeGenerated, TargetUserName, TargetSid, IpAddress, WorkstationName5. Remediation, Hardening & Defensive Engineering
Section titled “5. Remediation, Hardening & Defensive Engineering”- Deploy Microsoft Updates: Apply KB5041578 / KB5041585 across all Domain Controllers in all interconnected forests.
- Enforce SID Filtering Quarantine: Verify SID filtering status using
netdom trust <TrustingDomain> /domain:<TrustedDomain> /enablesidhistory:noandnetdom trust ... /quarantine:yes. - Migrate to Selective Authentication: Disable forest-wide authentication across external trusts, requiring explicit ACL grants for incoming users.