Authentication vs Authorization: The Decisive Boundary in DFIR
Concept
Section titled โConceptโIn the Windows NT and Active Directory security architecture, two sequential and strictly distinct mechanisms operate:
- Authentication (AuthN) โ โWho are you?โ: The process by which a security principal proves its identity to an authority (local SAM or Kerberos KDC) via a shared secret (password), cryptographic key, or certificate. Success results in a Logon Session and the issuance of an Access Token.
- Authorization (AuthZ) โ โWhat are you allowed to do?โ: The process by which the operating systemโs Security Reference Monitor (SRM) compares the SIDs and privileges inside the callerโs Access Token against the Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) of the target object (file, registry key, service, network share).
Why This Matters in DFIR
Section titled โWhy This Matters in DFIRโConflating authentication and authorization generates severe false positives and flawed incident scopes:
- The Illusion of Host Compromise: Observing an Event ID 4624 (Logon Type 3 - Network) on a financial database server proves the adversary authenticated to the network stack. It does not prove database compromise. If the folder DACL denies the account, all file access requests terminate in
STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED. - Misinterpreting NetExec Results: As detailed in Doc 23: NetExec: What Do the Results Actually Prove?, a green
[+]indicates successful authentication, whereas thePwn3d!badge denotes administrative authorization on administrative shares (ADMIN$,C$). - Active Directory Trusts: Establishing a trust enables cross-domain authentication, but grants zero default resource permissions on trusting domain hosts (see Doc 13: Active Directory Trust Fundamentals).
How It Works
Section titled โHow It Worksโ[User / Client] โ โ 1. Submits Credentials (Kerberos AS-REQ or NTLM Negotiate) โผ[Security Authority (DC / SAM)] โโโโโโโโบ Authentication (AuthN) โ Issues: Logon Session + Access Token โ 2. Resource Access Request (\\FS01\Finances) โผ[Security Reference Monitor (SRM)] โโโบ Authorization (AuthZ) โ Compares: Token (SIDs + Privs) vs DACL โโโบ Access Granted (STATUS_SUCCESS) โโโโโบ Events 4624 + 5140/5145 โโโบ Access Denied (STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED) โโบ Events 4624 + 5145 (Failure)- Identification: The client presents principal identity
CORP\alice. - Authentication: The KDC validates cryptographic proof and inserts group SIDs into the PAC.
- Token Creation: The target server transforms the PAC into a local kernel Access Token.
- Authorization: The SRM checks the token SIDs against the resourceโs DACL.
What Is Possible
Section titled โWhat Is Possibleโ- Being Authenticated with Zero Access Rights: A guest or standard user from a trusted foreign domain can authenticate (Event 4624) without permissions to list shares or read files.
- Being Authorized Without Administrator Rights: An account can have Full Control on a specific database folder without belonging to local administrative groups.
- Failing Authorization Continuously within an Active Session: Network sessions remain open while dozens of unauthorized file read requests generate access denied errors.
What Is Not Possible
Section titled โWhat Is Not Possibleโ- Authorization Without Prior Authentication: The Windows SRM rejects unauthenticated callers seeking access to securable objects (outside null sessions).
- Modifying ACLs Without Ownership or
WRITE_DAC: Altering permissions requires either object ownership (Owner) or explicitWRITE_DACrights.
Forensic Artifacts
Section titled โForensic Artifactsโ| Stage | Security.evtx Event ID | Meaning & Telemetry Value |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication Success | Event ID 4624 | Session creation (LogonType, TargetUserName, TargetLogonId). |
| Authentication Failure | Event ID 4625 | Invalid password, locked or disabled account (Status / SubStatus). |
| Share Authorization Attempt | Event ID 5140 | Network share accessed (ShareName). |
| Detailed Object Authorization | Event ID 5145 | Granular check (AccessMask, RelativeTargetName). Indicates Access Granted or Access Denied. |
Key Takeaways
Section titled โKey Takeawaysโ- Authentication validates identity proof; authorization validates operational rights.
- Event ID 4624 records network or interactive logon, NOT file tampering or theft.
- Authorization evaluation occurs locally on the target host via the Security Reference Monitor.
- NetExec
[+]denotes authentication;Pwn3d!denotes administrative authorization.