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Trust Direction and Transitivity: Traps and Realities

Density:

Two foundational properties dictate the operational scope of an Active Directory trust relationship:

  1. Trust Direction:
    • One-way Inbound: The local domain trusts the remote domain. Users in the remote domain can authenticate to resources in the local domain.
    • One-way Outbound: The remote domain trusts the local domain. Users in the local domain can authenticate to resources in the remote domain.
    • Two-way (Bidirectional): Both domains mutually trust each other. Authentication is enabled in both directions.
  2. Transitivity:
    • Transitive: If A trusts B and B trusts C, A implicitly trusts C. Authentication can traverse multiple domain hops.
    • Non-transitive: Authentication is strictly restricted to the two directly connected domains. No intermediate hopping is permitted.

Multi-domain incident response frequently suffers from direction and transitivity misinterpretations:

  • Inverting the Attack Flow: Defenders often firewall the wrong traffic direction or falsely assume a domain is immune because it was โ€œonlyโ€ the trusting domain.
  • Unanticipated Multi-Hop Attack Paths: Threat actors in a partner forest can hop through transitive forest trusts to hit sensitive internal systems that engineers believed were isolated.
  • Memory Credential Pivoting Against the Trust Flow: If a machine in Domain A is accessed by a Domain B user across a one-way inbound trust, that Domain B userโ€™s NTLM hash or Kerberos ticket is stored in LSASS memory on Domain A. An attacker on Domain A can harvest those credentials to pivot back into Domain B against the trust direction!

ONE-WAY TRUST RELATIONSHIP:
Resource Domain (CORP) โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€ Trusts โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ–บ Account Domain (PARTNER)
โ–ฒ โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€ Authentication / Attack Flow โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
TRANSITIVE TRUST (Multi-Hop):
Domain A โ—„โ”€โ”€Trustโ”€โ”€โ–บ Domain B โ—„โ”€โ”€Trustโ”€โ”€โ–บ Domain C
โ–ฒ โ”‚
โ”‚ โ”‚
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€ Transitive Kerberos Access โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
  • 1: Inbound โ€” Local domain trusts remote domain. Foreign accounts access local resources.
  • 2: Outbound โ€” Remote domain trusts local domain. Local accounts access foreign resources.
  • 3: Bidirectional โ€” Mutual trust in both directions.

  • Accessing Resources in Any Trusting Domain: A principal in a trusted domain can present cryptographic proof to access SMB shares, SQL databases, and web applications in the trusting domain.
  • Executing Multi-Hop Referral Requests: An attacker can hop across child domains via the forest root without direct point-to-point trusts.
  • Reversing Access via Credential Harvesting: Stealing credentials of users who authenticated across a one-way trust allows an adversary to pivot in reverse.

  • Accessing Trusted Domain Resources Across a One-Way Inbound Trust: If Domain A trusts Domain B, users in Domain A cannot authenticate against Domain B resources.
  • Transversing Non-Transitive External Trusts: An external trust between Domain A and Domain B never grants access to Domain C (parent of B).
  • Remotely Administering Remote Directory Objects: Trust relationships do not grant cross-domain user password reset capabilities without explicit LDAP delegation.

Frequent ConfusionVerifiable Forensic Reality
โ€The trust is Outbound from our domain, so external threats cannot enter.โ€Outbound trust means the external domain trusts your accounts. But if your accounts are compromised, they traverse outward. Inbound trust means external accounts authenticate inside!
โ€Non-transitive trusts prevent all lateral movement.โ€They block automatic Kerberos referrals to third domains, but do not prevent harvesting credentials from memory to pivot manually.
โ€Forest trusts are non-transitive across child domains.โ€Forest trusts are fully transitive: every domain in Forest A trusts every domain in Forest B.

An engineering firm (engineering.corp) establishes a one-way trust with an external accounting consultancy (audit-firm.com):

  • Intended business goal: allow auditors to access a financial records portal in engineering.corp.
  • The TDO on engineering.corp is created with trustDirection: 1 (Inbound).
  • Incident: An auditorโ€™s workstation is compromised via malware. The attacker leverages the consultantโ€™s domain account to connect via SMB to an internal engineering file server where audit-firm.com\Domain Users was assigned write permissions.
  • The DFIR investigator verifies the inbound trust permitted direct ingress into corporate assets without triggering perimeter alarms.

  1. LDAP Attributes on trustedDomain Objects:
    • trustDirection: 0x1 (Inbound), 0x2 (Outbound), 0x3 (Bidirectional).
    • trustAttributes: bit 0x1 (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE) denoting disabled transitivity.
  2. Security Event Logs:
    • Event ID 4624 (Target Server): Logon Type: 3, Authentication Package: Kerberos, TargetDomainName: TRUSTED_DOMAIN_NAME.
    • Event ID 4769 (DC): Referral TGS requests for krbtgt/TARGET_DOMAIN_NAME.

  1. Catalog Exact Directionality for Every Trust: Run nltest /domain_trusts /v and document [INBOUND], [OUTBOUND], or [BOTH] flags.
  2. Audit Permissions Assigned to Foreign Security Principals: Inspect local Domain Local groups for foreign SIDs originating from trusted domains.
  3. Analyze Cached Logon Credentials on Target Hosts: Inspect LSASS memory on servers accessed via cross-domain logons to detect foreign credentials susceptible to theft.

  • Nltest:
    Terminal window
    nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts /v
  • PowerView:
    Terminal window
    Get-DomainTrust | Select-Object TargetName, TrustDirection, TrustType, TrustAttributes
  • BloodHound: Graph view of TrustedBy edges: BloodHound aligns arrows with attacker lateral movement trajectories.

  • Trust direction is the reverse of access direction: Resource domain $ ightarrow$ trusts $ ightarrow$ Account domain.
  • Forest and intra-forest trusts are transitive.
  • External trusts are non-transitive.
  • One-way trusts can be traversed in reverse if credentials of incoming users are dumped from memory.