DFIR Triage: 'Does this account exist, where did it originate, and what can it access?'
Concept
Section titled โConceptโWhen an EDR or SIEM detection flags suspicious activity attributed to a security principal (e.g., CORP\svc_deploy, DESKTOP-89A\admin, or S-1-5-21-98765-1105), the DFIR investigator must systematically resolve three forensic dimensions:
- Existence and Architecture: Is the principal a human user, machine account (
$), managed service account (gMSA), local SAM account, or a synthetic ghost identity generated via ticket forgery? - Authority and Authentication Path: Was identity proof validated by the local SAM, the local domain KDC, a remote forest authority across a trust, or was it never validated by a central authority at all (Silver Ticket)?
- Effective Access Scope: Do the actions taken correspond to legitimate group permissions, or do they indicate privilege escalation and unauthorized token manipulation?
Why It Matters in DFIR
Section titled โWhy It Matters in DFIRโThis triage discipline prevents critical diagnostic errors under incident pressure:
- Differentiating Local vs Domain Accounts: Resetting or disabling a domain account named
Administratordoes nothing to halt an adversary moving laterally using the local.\Administratorcredential across member servers. - Uncovering Ghost Principals: If an account name appears in Event ID 4624 but cannot be resolved in Active Directory (
Get-ADUserthrows non-existent object errors), the investigator is facing a forged Golden Ticket or an unsynchronized machine. - Containing Multi-Domain Intrusions: If the account originates from an external subsidiary domain across a trust, isolating the account in the local domain is insufficient; the trust perimeter must be evaluated.
How It Works
Section titled โHow It WorksโForensic Identity Qualification Matrix
Section titled โForensic Identity Qualification MatrixโAccount String from Logs: "TargetDomainName\TargetUserName" โ โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโดโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ โผ โผTargetDomainName == ComputerName TargetDomainName == AD Domain โ โ โผ โผ[ LOCAL SAM ACCOUNT ] [ DOMAIN ACCOUNT ]- Database: Local SAM (%SystemRoot%\System32\config) - Database: ntds.dit on DCs- SID: Machine Prefix (S-1-5-21-M-RID) - SID: Domain Prefix (S-1-5-21-D-RID)- DC Logs: ZERO telemetry on DCs - DC Logs: Events 4768 / 4769 / 4776- Lateral Spread: Local Pass-the-Hash - Lateral Spread: Kerberos / NTLMThe 3-Step Qualification Workflow
Section titled โThe 3-Step Qualification Workflowโ- Existence Verification:
- Query the local domain controller:
Get-ADUser -Identity <TargetUserName>. - If not found: query the Global Catalog (
-Server <GC>:3268) to verify if the principal belongs to another domain within the forest. - If still not found: query the local SAM on the endpoint (
Get-LocalUser). - If not found in any database: suspect a Golden Ticket forged with a synthetic username.
- Query the local domain controller:
- Origin Identification:
- Review Event 4624 on the target host: inspect
LogonProcessName(KerberosvsNtLmSsp). - If Kerberos: verify which DC recorded Event 4768 (TGT) and Event 4769 (TGS).
- If NTLM: check DC Event 4776 and Event 8004 to identify which DC processed the Netlogon validation.
- Review Event 4624 on the target host: inspect
- Effective Rights Mapping:
- Enumerate actual AD group memberships:
Get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership <Account>. - Compare with group SIDs inside the userโs Access Token (Event ID 4627 - Group Membership Information).
- Any SID in the token absent from Active Directory reveals token injection (
sIDHistoryor PAC forgery).
- Enumerate actual AD group memberships:
What Is Possible
Section titled โWhat Is Possibleโ- Instantly Confirming Account Database Origin: By matching the principalโs SID prefix against the local host machine SID versus domain SID.
- Unmasking Golden Tickets at Triage: Detecting Kerberos network logons lacking matching Event 4768/4769 KDC records, or accounts that do not exist in LDAP.
- Pinpointing Client Source IP and Hostname: Extracted reliably from
IpAddressandWorkstationNamein Event 4624.
What Is Not Possible
Section titled โWhat Is Not Possibleโ- Validating NTLM User Intent Without SMB Signing: In relay attacks, the authenticated identity was coerced or relayed without the genuine userโs knowledge.
- Reviewing Local SAM Activity on Domain Controllers: Local authentications remain entirely confined to endpoint security logs.
- Determining NTFS File Permissions from the DC: Active Directory domain controllers hold identity and group definitions; NTFS permissions are evaluated locally on resource servers.
Common DFIR Confusions
Section titled โCommon DFIR Confusionsโ| Frequent Confusion | Verifiable Forensic Reality |
|---|---|
| โThe account shows DOMAIN\Admin, so it is a domain administrator.โ | Inspect TargetDomainName and TargetUserSid. If the domain name matches the machine hostname, it is a local account. |
| โBecause the account exists in AD, the genuine employee initiated the session.โ | Successful authentication merely proves credentials (password, hash, ticket) were presented. |
| โThe account has zero domain rights, so it poses no operational risk.โ | A standard domain user can be nested into the local Administrators group of specific servers without having any rights in Active Directory. |
Concrete Forensic Example
Section titled โConcrete Forensic ExampleโSOC Alert: An account named sql_admin executed vssadmin delete shadows on database host DB01.
The responder executes the 3-question triage:
- Does it exist?
Get-ADUser sql_admin$\rightarrow$ Error:Cannot find an object with identity: 'sql_admin'.- On
DB01:Get-LocalUser sql_admin$\rightarrow$ Present, provisioned 3 years ago by a contractor. - SID:
S-1-5-21-44332211-1004(MatchesDB01machine SID prefix).
- Where did it originate?
- Event 4624 on
DB01:LogonType: 3,LogonProcessName: NtLmSsp,Workstation Name: LAPTOP-DEV,IpAddress: 192.168.20.45. - Finding: Local SAM authentication over SMB from a developer laptop.
- Event 4624 on
- Where can it go?
sql_adminis an administrator onDB01. It possesses zero permissions across domain controllers or other member servers.
- Immediate Containment: Isolate
192.168.20.45and disable the local account onDB01. Active Directorykrbtgtkeys remain entirely unaffected.
Key Forensic Artefacts
Section titled โKey Forensic Artefactsโ- Target Workload Event Logs:
- Event ID 4624:
TargetDomainName,TargetUserName,TargetUserSid,LogonProcessName,IpAddress. - Event ID 4627: Complete group SIDs embedded in the token during logon.
- Event ID 4672: Privileges granted to the session.
- Event ID 4624:
- Domain Controller Event Logs:
- Event ID 4768: TGT request (confirms domain account Kerberos authentication).
- Event ID 4776: NTLM credential validation.
Investigation Methods
Section titled โInvestigation Methodsโ- Compare TargetDomainName Against Local ComputerName: Determine immediately whether the transaction was local (SAM) or enterprise (Domain).
- Match SID Sub-Authority Prefixes:
Compare the SID against
(Get-ADDomain).DomainSIDto distinguish domain from local principals. - Correlate Workload Event 4624 with KDC Event Logs: Confirm whether the DC issued tickets for that specific session or if the session is orphaned.
Investigative Tooling
Section titled โInvestigative Toolingโ- PowerShell AD Module:
Terminal window # Compare Domain SID with principal SID$DomainSID = (Get-ADDomain).DomainSID.Value$SuspectSID = "S-1-5-21-987654321-1001"if ($SuspectSID -like "$DomainSID*") { "Domain Principal" } else { "Local or Foreign Principal" } - PsGetsid:
Terminal window psgetsid TARGET-HOST
Key Takeaways
Section titled โKey Takeawaysโ- Never rely exclusively on usernames: only SIDs provide unambiguous authority verification.
- If
TargetDomainName == ComputerName, the session is local and the DC is completely uninvolved. - A Kerberos logon lacking matching Event 4768 KDC records indicates a forged ticket (Golden/Silver Ticket).
- Effective rights are governed by target object DACLs and the groups encapsulated in the Access Token (Event 4627).
References & Further Reading
Section titled โReferences & Further Readingโ- Microsoft Learn: Active Directory Security Groups and SIDs
- Card 01 โ Windows Identities: Local Accounts vs Domain Accounts
- Card 02 โ SID, RID and Windows Identity
- Card 05 โ Authentication vs Authorization: The Decisive Boundary in DFIR
- Card 21 โ NTLM vs Kerberos: Fundamental Differences in DFIR Investigations