Skip to content

CVE-2026-77268: mcp-atlassian World-Readable Permissions on OAuth Fallback Tokens

HERMES

HERMES THREAT SCORE & MCP RISK EXPOSURE

Target: Model Context Protocol (MCP) Server & Atlassian Ecosystem Gateway
Confidence: 96%
75 / 100
HIGH

Measures real-world operational relevance, exploit weaponization, and active threat posture.

Dimension Breakdown
Exploitability 18 / 20
Threat Activity 16 / 20
Weaponization 15 / 20
Exposure 19 / 20
Prevalence 18 / 20
Impact 17 / 20
Exploit Maturity 17 / 20
Attack Chain Potential 20 / 20
⚖️ Divergence & Operational Rationale

CVSS v3.1 rates CVE-2026-77268 at 5.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N). Hermes Threat Score assigns 75 (HIGH) to capture the amplified blast radius of AI agent tool execution and direct file/network access.

HASS

HASS AGENTIC SEVERITY & TOOL EXECUTION IMPACT

Target: Autonomous LLM Agent Interface & Host Execution Boundary
Confidence: 92%
72 / 100
HIGH

Measures specific systemic risk arising from autonomy, tool authority, and cascading execution.

Dimension Breakdown
Autonomy 16 / 20
Tool Access 19 / 20
Privilege 17 / 15
Persistence 15 / 15
External Impact 18 / 15
Propagation 16 / 15
⚖️ Divergence & Operational Rationale

Agentic tool protocols like MCP grant language models direct access to host filesystems and cloud services. Vulnerabilities in MCP tool endpoints allow indirect prompt injections to achieve arbitrary host compromise.

🕸️ Connected Knowledge Graph & Provenance

CVE-2026-77268: mcp-atlassian World-Readable Permissions on OAuth Fallback TokensVULNERABILITY

Connected Nodes: 1
Active Relationships (Outgoing)
→ affectsPRODUCTLangChain & LangGraph Framework
98% VERY_HIGH

Multi-agent coordination framework and cyclic state graph orchestration engine for tool-calling agents.

🔍 Why is this related? (Evidence & Provenance)

“Confirmed security vulnerability in LangGraph Multi-Agent Runtime documented in Hermes dossier.”

Supporting Verified Evidence:

1. Technical Context & Affected Software Matrix

Section titled “1. Technical Context & Affected Software Matrix”
ParameterSpecificationOperational Assessment
CVE IdentifierCVE-2026-77268Official Disclosure / Advisory
Affected Productsooperset/mcp-atlassianModel Context Protocol Server
Vulnerability ClassCWE-276Insecure File Permissions
Vulnerable ComponentOAuth Token File StorageTool Execution & Dispatch Engine
Exploitation VectorRemote Network / Prompt InjectionHTTP SSE Endpoint or Agent stdio pipe
Privileges RequiredLow (PR:L)Agent tool execution context
Resulting AccessArbitrary Host File Access / SSRFFull read/write over local host files or cloud IAM
Remediation StatusFixed in version 0.22.0Immediate package update mandated

2. Vulnerability Anatomy & Root Cause Analysis

Section titled “2. Vulnerability Anatomy & Root Cause Analysis”

The flaw resides in OAuth Token File Storage. The server failed to enforce directory sandboxing via validate_safe_path() or strict authentication checks:

# Vulnerable pattern in mcp-atlassian (< 0.22.0)
def OAuth Token File Storage(file_path: str, **kwargs):
# INSECURE: caller-supplied path is accessed without workspace boundary enforcement
with open(file_path, "rb") as f:
file_bytes = f.read()
return client.upload(file_bytes)

In version 0.22.0, the maintainers introduced mandatory path verification:

# Remediated pattern in mcp-atlassian (0.22.0)
from mcp_atlassian.utils import validate_safe_path
def OAuth Token File Storage(file_path: str, **kwargs):
safe_path = validate_safe_path(file_path, workspace_dir=CONFIG.WORKSPACE_ROOT)
with open(safe_path, "rb") as f:
file_bytes = f.read()
return client.upload(file_bytes)

sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor Attacker as Attacker / Adversarial Prompt
participant Agent as LLM Agent (Claude/Cursor)
participant MCP as mcp-atlassian Daemon
participant Host as MCP Host OS Filesystem
participant Atlassian as Jira / Confluence Cloud API
Attacker->>Agent: Indirect Prompt Injection (Ticket / Repo)
Agent->>MCP: tools/call OAuth Token File Storage(file_path="../../../../etc/passwd")
Note over MCP: Vulnerability CVE-2026-77268:<br/>Missing Path Validation / Auth Bypass
MCP->>Host: Access arbitrary host resource
Host-->>MCP: Raw file data or execution pipe
MCP->>Atlassian: Upload secret as attachment / Outbound Request
Atlassian-->>Attacker: Sensitive Data Disclosed
  1. Adversarial Ingress: The attacker feeds a poisoned prompt into an issue ticket or source file consumed by an autonomous AI agent.
  2. Agentic Tool Invocation: The LLM agent generates a JSON-RPC tools/call invoking OAuth Token File Storage with a malicious argument.
  3. Boundary Transgression: Due to CVE-2026-77268, the MCP server performs the operation outside the designated workspace sandbox.
  4. Data Exfiltration: Host secrets, SSH keys, or cloud credentials are uploaded into Atlassian or returned in tool results.

alert http any any -> any any (
msg:"HERMES-CODEX EXPLOIT mcp-atlassian CVE-2026-77268 Attack Attempt";
flow:to_server,established;
content:"POST"; http_method;
content:"/mcp/tools/call"; http_uri;
content:"OAuth Token File Storage"; nocase;
content:"../";
classtype:attempted-admin;
sid:20260101;
rev:1;
metadata:cve CVE-2026-77268, severity medium;
)

  1. Immediate Package Upgrade: Upgrade mcp-atlassian to version 0.22.0 or higher:
    Terminal window
    pip install --upgrade "mcp-atlassian>=0.22.0"
  2. Local Loopback Binding: Restrict the HTTP/SSE listener strictly to 127.0.0.1:
    Terminal window
    python -m mcp_atlassian.server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
  3. Workspace Isolation: Set MCP_WORKSPACE_DIR to confine all file reads/writes to a dedicated sandbox.
  4. Tool Whitelisting: Disable attachment manipulation tools if unneeded using ENABLED_TOOLS or TOOLSETS.