Active Directory Investigation Decision Tree
Concept
Section titled โConceptโThe Active Directory Investigation Decision Tree structures investigative reasoning, transforming raw, high-volume event logs into actionable forensic conclusions.
It pivots across 4 decisive architectural bifurcations:
- Branch 1: Authenticating Authority (Local SAM vs Active Directory Domain).
- Branch 2: Negotiated Protocol (Kerberos vs NTLM).
- Branch 3: Cryptographic Token Validity (Legitimate KDC vs Synthetic Forgery).
- Branch 4: Effective Host Action (Telemetry Discovery vs Lateral Movement vs Host Compromise).
How It Works: The Comprehensive Decision Flowchart
Section titled โHow It Works: The Comprehensive Decision FlowchartโSuspicious Authentication Alert: Event 4624 (Successful Logon) on a Serverโโโโ [Q1] Does TargetDomainName match the local machine hostname?โ โโ โโโ YES โโโบ LOCAL SAM AUTHENTICATIONโ โ โโ โ โโโ [Q1.1] Is the password reused across other fleet endpoints?โ โ โ โโโ YES โโโบ HIGH RISK: Cascading local Pass-the-Hash (Absence of LAPS).โ โ โ โโโ NO โโโบ Incident strictly isolated to this host.โ โโ โโโ NO โโโบ ACTIVE DIRECTORY DOMAIN AUTHENTICATIONโ โโ โโโ [Q2] What protocol is recorded in LogonProcessName?โ โ โโ โ โโโ NtLmSsp (NTLM)โ โ โ โโ โ โ โโโ [Q2.1] Is source IP internal and does Event 4776 exist on the DC?โ โ โ โ โโโ YES โโโบ Pass-the-Hash or NetExec via IP. Hunt source endpoint.โ โ โ โ โโโ NO โโโบ NTLM Relay or authentication coercion (PetitPotam).โ โ โโ โ โโโ Kerberosโ โ โโ โ โโโ [Q3] Do matching Event 4768 (TGT) and 4769 (TGS) exist on DCs?โ โ โ โโ โ โ โโโ YES โโโบ STANDARD KERBEROS TRANSACTIONโ โ โ โ Audit TicketEncryptionType (0x17 = RC4 anomaly).โ โ โ โโ โ โ โโโ 4769 present WITHOUT preceding 4768 โโโบ GOLDEN TICKET DETECTED!โ โ โ โ (Tier 0 krbtgt compromise -> Consecutive double reset required).โ โ โ โโ โ โ โโโ ZERO 4768 or 4769 records on DCs โโโบ SILVER TICKET DETECTED!โ โ โ (Target machine or service account key compromised).โ โโ โโโ [Q4] Was the logon followed by malicious execution?โ โโ โโโ Event 5140 (ADMIN$ / C$) WITHOUT Event 7045 or 4688โ โ โโโ NetExec (Pwn3d!) reconnaissance without payload execution.โ โโ โโโ Event 7045 (New Service) or Event 4688 under SYSTEMโ โ โโโ Active lateral movement (PsExec, smbexec, WMI). Host compromised!โ โโ โโโ Event 4662 on DC with replication Extended Right GUIDโ โโโ DCSync Attack! Directory NTDS database extracted.Step-by-Step Implementation Guide
Section titled โStep-by-Step Implementation GuideโStep 1: Characterize Identity Scope
Section titled โStep 1: Characterize Identity Scopeโ- Query Event ID 4624 on target host:
- Record
TargetDomainName,TargetUserName,TargetUserSid,LogonType,LogonProcessName,IpAddress.
- Record
- Compare
TargetDomainNamewith local machine hostname:- If identical $\rightarrow$ Follow the Local SAM branch.
- If different $\rightarrow$ Follow the Active Directory Domain branch.
Step 2: Validate the Issuing Authority
Section titled โStep 2: Validate the Issuing Authorityโ- If NTLM:
- Query primary DC for Event ID 4776 filtered by
TargetUserName. - If present: credentials were verified by AD; check Event 8004 for Netlogon routing.
- Query primary DC for Event ID 4776 filtered by
- If Kerberos:
- Search forest KDCs for Event ID 4769 matching the user and service within the preceding 10 hours.
- If present with
ServiceName: krbtgt$\rightarrow$ Legitimate cross-domain referral. - If completely absent on DCs $\rightarrow$ Confirm Silver Ticket forgery.
Step 3: Evaluate Host Impact
Section titled โStep 3: Evaluate Host Impactโ- Filter events occurring within 120 seconds post-logon:
- Event ID 5140 / 5145: Shared files and folders accessed.
- Event ID 7045: Services installed.
- Event ID 4688 / Sysmon 1: Child processes spawned (
cmd.exe,powershell.exe).
Actionable Incident Classification Matrix
Section titled โActionable Incident Classification Matrixโ| Decision Tree Outcome | Severity | Immediate Containment Action |
|---|---|---|
| Local Pass-the-Hash (SAM) | High (Host) | Network-isolate host, rotate local administrator password, audit LAPS. |
NetExec (Pwn3d!) without Execution | Medium | Reset compromised account password, trace source IP. |
| Active Lateral Movement (Event 7045) | Critical | Isolate endpoint, acquire volatile memory (RAM), terminate active sessions. |
| Silver Ticket Detected | Critical (Workload) | Isolate server, reset host computer/service account password. |
| Golden Ticket Detected | EMERGENCY (T0) | Initiate forest recovery protocol: consecutive double krbtgt password reset. |
| DCSync Detected (Event 4662) | EMERGENCY (T0) | Sever network path to caller, commence enterprise-wide secret rotation. |
Rapid Triage Tooling
Section titled โRapid Triage Toolingโ- PowerShell Rapid Classifier:
Terminal window param([string]$Username)$DomainSID = (Get-ADDomain).DomainSID.Value$User = Get-ADUser -Filter "SamAccountName -eq '$Username'" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinueif (-not $User) {Write-Warning "[!] Account absent from domain directory. Suspect local SAM or Golden Ticket."} else {Write-Host "[+] Verified Domain Account: $($User.DistinguishedName)"Write-Host "[+] Domain SID: $($User.SID)"}
Key Takeaways
Section titled โKey Takeawaysโ- Triage must immediately differentiate between local SAM and domain authentications.
- Kerberos lacking Event 4768 = Golden Ticket; Kerberos lacking any DC events = Silver Ticket.
- A network logon (4624 Type 3) represents an active threat only when accompanied by concrete execution (5145, 7045, 4688).
References & Further Reading
Section titled โReferences & Further Readingโ- Card 01 โ Windows Identities: Local Accounts vs Domain Accounts
- Card 05 โ Authentication vs Authorization: The Decisive Boundary in DFIR
- Card 21 โ NTLM vs Kerberos: Fundamental Differences in DFIR Investigations
- Card 23 โ NetExec (nxc): What Do the Results Actually Prove?
- Card 27 โ Golden Ticket vs Silver Ticket: Creation, Scope, and Detection
- Card 32 โ DFIR Triage: โDoes this account exist, where did it originate, and what can it access?โ